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Genealogies of Risk: Searching for
Safety, 1930s-1970s
William Boyd*

Health, safety, and environmental regulation in the United States are
saturated with risk thinking. It was not always so, and it may not be so in the
future. But today, the formal, quantitative approach to risk provides much of
the basis for regulation in these fields, a development that seems quite natural,
even necessary. This particular approach, while it drew on conceptual and
technical developments that had been underway for decades, achieved
prominence during a relatively short timeframe; roughly, between the mid1970s and the early 1980s—a time of hard looks and regulatory reform. Prior
to this time, formal conceptions of risk were rarely invoked in the effort to
regulate the increasingly complex set of hazards associated with industrial
society and quantitative risk assessment was considered too uncertain to serve
as a basis for regulatory decision making. With few exceptions, safety, hazard,
and endangerment provided the dominant framings, drawing on different
conceptual and normative tendencies and leading to different regulatory
outcomes. This Article investigates the emergence and development of formal
approaches to risk in health, safety, and environmental law during the
twentieth century. It focuses specifically on the concepts, tools, and practices
that have underwritten risk thinking in these fields, developing a perspective on
health, safety, and environmental regulation that seeks to historicize risk and
situate the contemporary debate regarding the merits of risk versus precaution
in its proper historical context. In doing so, the Article demonstrates how both
approaches struggled to address the much more vast and complicated world of
potential environmental harm brought into view as a result of substantial
advances in analytical techniques during the 1960s and early 1970s, thereby
revealing the contours of a more fundamental clash over environmental law’s
distinctive problem of knowledge. The Article covers the formative period from
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the New Deal through the 1970s, showing how efforts to operationalize safety
in the middle decades of the twentieth century led to many of the foundational
concepts and techniques that would structure risk thinking in subsequent
decades, highlighting the critical role of analytical advances in pushing toward
a redefinition of safety as acceptable risk and a corresponding move toward
quantitative risk assessment, and revealing how earlier precautionary impulses
were ultimately subsumed under an emerging administrative law of risk.
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INTRODUCTION
Let us first clarify what this intellectualist rationalization, created by
science and scientifically oriented technology, means practically. . . . [I]t
means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that
come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by
calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer
have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits,
as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical
means and calculation perform the service.

—Max Weber, Science as a Vocation1
Risk thinking is everywhere. Health and environmental threats, social
deviance and criminality, financial crises, terrorism, emerging diseases, the fate
of the planet: all of these (and many more) are now to a very considerable
degree conceived, assessed, and managed as risk—a concept that emerged in
the early modern period, but one that has taken on its contemporary,
increasingly formal usage only in the last century. To say that we live in a risk
society is cliché. To ask why we have come to view misfortune through the
lens of risk seems almost out of place. How did this happen? What does the
story of risk thinking say about the ways in which certain abstractions have
come to dominate modern forms of social life—forms of life that we have
naturalized to the point that even asking the question seems strange? How, in
particular, has the concept of risk come to structure so much of environmental
decision making and what are the implications for our ongoing efforts to
organize and manage responses to an increasingly complex set of
environmental challenges?
This Article seeks to answer the last of these questions through an
investigation of the emergence and development of risk thinking in health,
safety, and environmental law in the United States during the crucial period
from the New Deal through the 1970s. As understood here, risk thinking is
intended as shorthand for the various concepts, tools, and practices that
underwrite the formal understanding and assessment of risk.2 The Article is

1. MAX WEBER, Science as a Vocation (1919), in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY
139 (Hans H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., trans., 1946).
2. In a formal sense, risk has come to be defined as the product of probability and consequence
(the expected value of an undesirable outcome). The key element of formal risk thinking is calculability.
See, e.g., Mark J. Machina, Decision-Making in the Presence of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 537 (1987)
(discussing formal treatment of risk in context of expected utility theory). But the calculation of specific
risks, or risk assessment, varies considerably across subject matters, from relatively simple actuarial
calculations to elaborate, multi-step processes that depend on a range of extrapolative techniques. In the
fields of health, safety, and environmental regulation, the general approach to risk assessment was
formalized in the early 1980s into a four-step process involving (1) hazard identification; (2) doseresponse assessment; (3) exposure assessment; and (4) risk characterization. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983)
[hereinafter NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT]. A key objective of this Article and the larger project of which it
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part of a larger, ongoing project on risk and the problem of knowledge in
environmental law.
The concept of risk has become so pervasive in contemporary life that any
effort to historicize it runs up hard against a deeply embedded naturalism.
Obviously, human beings have always confronted dangers, hazards, the
prospect of misfortune (one searches in vain for a neutral vocabulary), but it is
a fallacy to view risk in transhistorical terms. Like all concepts, risk has a
distinctive genealogy, a past, a public life. And that past matters as we seek to
understand how this particular concept and the related practices of risk
assessment have come to exercise such tremendous influence over the
institutions and activities directed at protecting public health and the
environment over the last century.
Such a perspective is contrary to much of the conventional thinking about
risk in environmental law. Leading legal scholars, prominent jurists, and much
of the scientific and policy establishment tend to view the concept of risk in
neutral, ahistorical terms, implicitly assuming that the contemporary practice of
risk assessment represents a natural and obvious extension of rational,
technocratic decision making.3 To be sure, there is no shortage of criticism,
official and otherwise, of prevailing practices of risk assessment.4 And there is
a vocal minority—including a number of environmental law scholars—who
have leveled substantial normative critiques at risk assessment and related tools
such as cost-benefit analysis while mounting a strong defense of alternative
approaches founded on the precautionary principle.5 But that critique is also,

is part is to understand how this particular approach to risk assessment emerged and took hold when it
did.
3. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE & DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT
26–36 (2009) [hereinafter NRC, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS] (discussing evolution of risk assessment at
EPA as a natural process emerging out of interactions between statutory mandates, agency precedent,
and input from expert advisory bodies); NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 151 (advocating for a
“clear conceptual distinction” between the largely scientific and technical practice of risk assessment
and the more policy-based exercise of risk management); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 9–10 (1992) (discussing risk assessment as a technical
exercise separate and distinct from risk management and advocating for a centralized risk authority in
the executive branch); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
294 (2002) (defending “a highly technocratic approach to risk regulation”).
4. See, e.g., NRC, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 3–4 (noting that the risk assessment
process is “bogged down” and discussing significant challenges facing contemporary practice of risk
assessment); CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE
LAW (1993) (discussing technical and normative problems facing risk assessment); John S. Applegate,
The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1991) (discussing problems associated with quantitative risk assessment in toxics
regulation).
5. See, e.g., Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from its Critics, 2011
U. ILL. L. REV. 1285 (2011) (criticizing current practice of risk-based toxics regulation and advocating
use of precautionary principle); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 9–14 (2010) (criticizing the prevailing “risk-assessment-costbenefit analysis paradigm” in environmental law and advocating a return to an earlier approach based on
precaution); David A. Dana, The Contextual Rationality of the Precautionary Principle, 35 QUEEN’S
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with few exceptions, carried out with little attention to the history of how these
different approaches to environmental hazards emerged.6 Indeed, one
sometimes gets the sense that the vitally important debate between risk and
precaution can be reduced to a contest between rival theories, ideas, and
principles.7 But such a framing, which has done so much to shape our views of
the normative terrain of contemporary environmental law, obscures some of the
more subterranean aspects of how these different kinds of thinking became
possible in the first place and why particular approaches gained traction when
they did.
L.J. 67, 68–70 (2009) (defending a contextual approach to the precautionary principle and its
appropriateness as a policy tool in the face of particular kinds of problems); Donald T. Hornstein,
Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Assessment, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 562 (1992) (criticizing normative foundations of comparative risk assessment). There are multiple
versions of the precautionary principle in use in domestic and international legal contexts throughout the
world. One widely referenced definition is Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development: “In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious of irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” See United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 13–14, 1992, The Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (June 13, 1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992). This relatively “weak” version of the precautionary principle can
be contrasted with “strong” versions embracing a presumption in favor of regulation in the face of
serious threats marked by significant scientific uncertainty and imposing the burden of overcoming such
a presumption on those responsible for the activities that generate the potential threats. See Sachs, supra
at 1295–99 (discussing the “strong” version of the precautionary principle); see also DAVID VOGEL, THE
POLITICS OF PRECAUTION: REGULATING HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS IN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES 252–78 (2012) (discussing precautionary principle in U.S. and EU law);
JONATHAN B. WIENER, The Rhetoric of Precaution, in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 9–12 (Wiener et al. eds., 2011) (discussing
development of the precautionary principle in U.S. and EU legal contexts).
6. In his recent book, Douglas Kysar makes the important point that the rise of formal
approaches to environmental decision making displaced an earlier approach based on precaution that
was “messy, pluralistic and pragmatic,” but nonetheless a source of important but forgotten “wisdoms”
regarding the practice of environmental law and policy. See KYSAR, supra note 5, at 2–3. One of the
goals of this Article is to investigate how this earlier precautionary approach to environmental law
emerged in particular contexts and how it was displaced by formal quantitative approaches to risk
starting in the mid-1970s. See also John S. Applegate, The Precautionary Preference: An American
Perspective on the Precautionary Principle, 6 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 413, 420–29
(2000) (discussing historical examples of precaution in various aspects of American environmental law);
Shelia Jasanoff, A Living Legacy: the Precautionary Ideal in American Law, in PRECAUTION, ENVTL.
SCI., & PREVENTIVE PUB. POLICY 230, 230–33 (Joel A. Tickner ed., 2003) (discussing historical
examples of precaution in American environmental law); Shelia Jasanoff, The Songlines of Risk, 8
ENVT’L VALUES 135, 141-45 (1999) [hereinafter Jasanoff, Songlines of Risk] (discussing historical
context of formal risk assessment and the ways in which it shapes understandings of environmental
harms).
7. See, e.g., Gail Charnley & Donald E. Elliott, Risk Versus Precaution: Environmental Law and
Public Health Protection, 32 ENVTL L. REP. 10,363 (2002) (characterizing the debate between risk and
precaution in U.S. environmental law as a debate between normative principles); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 14–15 (2005) (criticizing the precautionary
principle as “incoherent,” “paralyzing,” and “self-blinding”); Sachs, supra note 5, at 1288 (defending
the “strong precautionary principle” against the predominant approach of “unreasonable risk” in U.S.
chemicals regulation).

900

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 39:895

This Article focuses on those more subterranean developments. It
contends that we cannot properly gauge what is at stake in the debate between
risk and precaution without looking carefully at how the concept of risk and the
related practices of risk assessment emerged and took shape in particular
contexts. It recognizes that ideas and theories matter a great deal—that this is
not simply a story about politics and material interests—but it starts from the
premise that we cannot really appreciate how they matter and how they gain
force without looking at how specific constellations of concepts, tools, and
practices come together in an effort to solve particular problems, thereby
opening up new opportunities for the expansion and elaboration of certain ways
of thinking.
In investigating this deeper history, the Article sheds new light on how
this remarkably powerful way of looking at the world came to dominate health,
safety, and environmental law in the United States and the implications of this
mode of thinking going forward. It shows that the conventional view of risk in
these fields is both descriptively and normatively incomplete; that the rise of
quantitative risk assessment was much messier and more contingent than
previously recognized; and that the ongoing debate between risk and precaution
cannot be viewed simply as a battle between ideas or theories but instead must
be situated in a broader, more complex (and more social) terrain of knowledge
practices. This is important not merely as an intellectual exercise aimed at a
more complete understanding, but also for normative reasons, as various
constituencies seek to engage more directly the challenges and the
opportunities facing efforts to revitalize health, safety, and environmental
decision making in the face of a host of new problems. The Article also speaks
to larger debates (positive and normative) regarding risk regulation and its
relationship to more general tendencies toward calculation and control in the
post-World War II United States.8

8. Quantitative risk assessment can be viewed as an element of the more general embrace during
the post-World War II period of formal analytic techniques directed at the study and solution of complex
problems. Systems analysis, operations research, and decision theory emerged during the postwar
decades in response to a perceived need for more systematic and quantitative approaches to decisionmaking. As risk assessment became an increasingly professional discipline during the late 1970s and
early 1980s, it borrowed heavily from these broader developments. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Policy
Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 66 (1972) (discussing the growing prominence
of fields such as policy science, cost-benefit analysis, operations research, systems analysis, and
decision theory in the post-World War II period and their implications for law); M. Fortun & S.S.
Schweber, Scientists and the Legacy of World War II: The Case of Operations Research, 23 SOC. STUD.
SCI. 595, 698 (1993) (noting that World War II “initiated a revolution in management science, risk
assessment, and military planning” through the development and consolidation of operations research
and systems analysis); David R. Jardini, Out of the Blue Yonder: The Transfer of Systems Thinking from
the Pentagon to the Great Society, 1961–1965, in SYSTEMS, EXPERTS, AND COMPUTERS: THE SYSTEMS
APPROACH IN MANAGEMENT AND ENGINEERING, WORLD WAR II AND AFTER 311 (Hughes & Hughes
eds., 2000) (discussing diffusion of systems analysis and program budgeting from the Defense
Department to federal civilian departments during the 1960s); IDA R. HOOS, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IN
PUBLIC POLICY: A CRITIQUE 42–85, 271–80 (rev. ed. 1983) (discussing historical development of

2012]

GENEALOGIES OF RISK

901

Part I of the Article briefly situates the overall approach within the context
of previous scholarship on risk and elaborates on some of the key conceptual
and regulatory developments prior to the 1930s that underwrote later
applications of risk thinking in health, safety, and environmental law. It traces
the emergence of particular concepts and techniques of aggregation that were
instrumental in elaborating a more formal definition of risk and distinguishing
it from uncertainty; describes the increase in government attention during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to problems of public health,
industrial disease, and food safety; and discusses the implications of new ways
of thinking about populations and environmental hazards for the future
development of risk regulation.
Part II assesses efforts to operationalize the concept of safety between the
1930s and the 1960s, with particular attention to radiation, industrial exposures,
food safety, and the special problem of carcinogens. It shows how key elements
of risk thinking started to take shape in the context of specific problems:
attention began to shift from individuals to populations and averages,
regulatory tasks were increasingly defined as the setting of tolerances and
thresholds, dose-response models were formalized and used to define the
boundary between harm and no harm, and safety came to be seen as an
increasingly relative term. But it also highlights the continued reluctance to
embrace formal notions of risk as a basis for regulation in the face of a growing
appreciation for the significant uncertainty, even ignorance, that confronted
efforts to regulate an increasingly complex set of hazards. This Part then
reveals how tendencies that had been underway in a variety of areas coalesced
at the end of this period in a strong precautionary posture, manifest most
prominently in the famous Delaney “anti-cancer” clause that was added to the
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act in 1958, establishing a “zero tolerance”
for chemicals added to the food supply in any quantity if there was evidence
that such chemicals induced cancer in animals or humans.9 Contrary to
conventional accounts of the Delaney Clause, moreover, this Part demonstrates
that it was not a naïve, overly rigid effort by Congress to respond to public
hysteria about cancer but was instead explicitly grounded upon widely accepted
views in the scientific community regarding the challenges of understanding
and regulating carcinogens.10
systems approach in military and civilian contexts and elaboration as risk analysis in health, safety, and
environmental regulation).
9. The so-called Delaney Clause, named for its sponsor, Representative James J. Delaney (DNY), was enacted as an amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act in 1958. In its
original form, the Delaney Clause prohibited the use of food additives that had been shown to induce
cancer in humans or animals. See Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat.
1784, 1785 (1958); see also discussion infra Part II.A.3.
10. Cf. Wendy Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181,
219–20 (1999) (recounting views of Delaney Clause as “rigid” and “unwise”); BREYER, supra note 3, at
41 (describing Delaney Clause as “unreasonably and pointlessly strict”); Charles H. Blank, The Delaney
Clause: Technical Naïveté and Scientific Advocacy in the Formulation of Public Health Policies, 62
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Part III, which covers the 1960s through the 1970s, shows how significant
advances in environmental monitoring, detection capabilities, and analytical
techniques during this period facilitated a dramatic transformation in the ability
to see environmental problems—from chemicals in the food supply to air and
water pollution to persistent organic compounds in the global environment.11
This Part argues that the new world that was brought into focus by these new
ways of seeing represented an important rupture in the development of health,
safety, and environmental law—opening up a moment of possibility when
competing views regarding the distinctive problem of knowledge confronting
these fields crystallized, leading to very different regulatory commitments and
approaches. Specifically, this Part shows how early decisions by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the courts to ban DDT and other
pesticides, strong precautionary directives in the Clean Air and Clean Water
Acts, and efforts by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) to establish a generic cancer policy reflected a deep and longstanding
concern with uncertainty and the challenge of securing environmental
knowledge that drew directly upon hard thinking about hard problems in
industrial hygiene, food safety, and environmental cancer that had been
underway since at least mid-century.12 It was during this moment (and it really
was little more than a moment) when the emerging field of environmental law
took seriously the daunting task of regulating “on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge,”13 posing important questions about the feasibility of quantitative
risk assessment, and recognizing, at least partially, that such an approach
carried with it important epistemic decisions about what counted as uncertainty
and what sorts of knowledge claims could be made on the basis of the
techniques and evidence available.
And yet, as Part III shows, this was also the moment when formal,
quantitative approaches to risk in health, safety, and environmental law began
to emerge, stemming in large part from a perceived crisis and need for triage as
it became apparent that the world of possible harms was much more vast and
complicated than previously recognized.14 Drawing on previous conceptual and
technical developments, regulators and other professionals explicitly redefined

CALIF. L. REV. 1084 (1974) (criticizing the Delaney Clause as scientifically and technically naïve). But
see Richard A. Merrill, Food Safety Regulation: Reforming the Delaney Clause, 18 ANN. REV. PUB.
HEALTH 313, 322 (1997) (discussing prevailing view in 1958 that Delaney Clause would not have broad
application because only a “handful of chemicals” had been shown to induce cancer in animals); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 496–97 (1989) (noting
the significant differences in “[t]he factual background against which the Delaney Clause was written”
compared to “present circumstances” and the increasing “obsolescence” of the Clause in the context of
new facts and understandings). See also discussion infra Part III.B.1.
11. See discussion infra Part III.A.
12. See discussion infra Part III.B.
13. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 71–72 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
14. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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safety as “acceptable risk” and began to explore the possibility of formal,
quantitative approaches to risk as a way forward.15 Contrary to the
conventional account, this Part demonstrates that quantitative risk assessment
did not emerge as some sort of natural progression in the ongoing effort to
understand and regulate environmental harms. Nor did it arise as a result of the
push for regulatory reform or as a reaction to the hard look doctrine in
administrative law. While those developments surely helped to consolidate the
role of quantitative risk assessment, they do not explain how it first arose and
took shape within governmental practices.
Part IV offers a brief look at developments in the late 1970s and early
1980s and distills some of the lessons and insights from the Article. It shows
how the Supreme Court’s famous 1980 Benzene decision consolidated an
ongoing but fragile embrace of quantitative risk assessment by repudiating
OSHA’s efforts to develop a generic cancer policy, thereby marking a de facto
end to the Delaney era and opening up a more systematic approach to risk that
was eventually embraced across multiple regulatory domains.16 More
abstractly, Part IV demonstrates how the redefinition of safety as “acceptable
risk” and the move to quantitative risk assessment effectively reformatted what
were previously viewed as discrete problems of food safety, environmental
pollution, or the possibility of accidents at nuclear power plants (to name a few)
in a manner that made them amenable to a common evaluative framework. It
also explains how the shift from earlier conceptions of hazard or danger to risk
worked to bring the future into the present and make it calculable, reframing
what were previously viewed as external threats to be avoided as possible
future losses or consequences stemming from decisions that had to be made.17
Part IV concludes by showing how the consolidation of formal approaches to
risk in the early 1980s worked to marginalize uncertainty and cabin the
precautionary impulse of earlier years, raising important normative questions
regarding the continued but troubled role of risk assessment in contemporary
health, safety, and environmental regulation.
As for the broader lessons from the study, there are several. First, it is
clear that true moments of possibility in law—that is, moments when the
development of a field such as environmental law could have gone in one of

15. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND THE
DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 8 (1976) (“[A] thing is safe if its attendant risks are judged to be
acceptable”); see also discussion infra Part III.C.
16. Indus. Union Dep’t. v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980); see also infra
Part III.C.
17. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 101–02 (Rhodes Barrett trans.,
1993) (“The concept of risk is, however, clearly distinguished from the concept of danger, this to say,
from the case where future losses are seen not at all as the consequences of a decision that has been
made, but are attributed to an external factor.”); LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A
SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 142–47 (1986) (discussing significant
intellectual and practical differences entailed in the move from hazard/danger/threat to risk).
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several different directions—are few and far between.18 Much more common
are the deep, settled grooves of path dependency in which styles of thinking
and their affinities with particular modes of governance take hold and develop a
stubborn recalcitrance to change.19 Historicizing how particular ways of
thinking emerge and take hold, therefore, does not suddenly open up the
possibility of revision or reform, but it is an important step towards recognizing
the contingency and the limits of such ways of thinking, forcing us to confront
the fact that things could have been (and still could be) otherwise.
Second, it would be a mistake to interpret the giving way or the settling in
as a wholesale displacement or victory of one paradigm over another. In health,
safety, and environmental law, as in so many other fields, the reality is more
complex, reflecting a (re)combination of different forms and practices of
making knowledge; a mash-up of different ways of viewing and governing the
world that mixes the old with the new. Thus, the precautionary impulse that
motivated early efforts to grapple with the challenges of health, safety, and
environmental law lives on in various guises, albeit as a pale shadow of its
earlier manifestation. Put another way, precaution and endangerment persist as
important but recessive strains in contemporary health, safety, and
environmental law, subordinated to the dominant logic of risk assessment and
cost-benefit analysis. We cannot, in this view, simply recover the wisdoms of
an earlier time and deploy them in the face of problems that seem to outstrip
our current ways of thinking and governing. For although these recessive
strains can and do provide resources with which to grapple with new and
different problems, their capacity to serve as such is limited by the broader
material and institutional substrates in which they are now embedded and, as
always, by the different and changing politics of the day.
Third, understanding these moments of possibility and their giving way
requires that we get beneath the surface conflicts between ideas and principles
to explain how specific knowledge practices shape and constrain these more
general ways of looking at the world. It is on this more social terrain of
knowledge practices, in other words, that important normative debates such as
that between risk and precaution need to be engaged. Specific concepts,
particular techniques, working instruments, actual practices—these together are
the stuff that make knowledge, render particular problems visible, valorize
certain positions and perspectives, and get mobilized in ongoing political
struggles to determine which environmental harms will be imposed on whom.

18. Christopher Tomlins provides an important discussion of this point in his recent article on
critical legal history. See Christopher L. Tomlins, After Critical Legal History: Scope, Scale, Structure,
8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 31, 36 (2012) (“Moments of uncertainty and opportunity, in other words,
are not constant but fleeting—fragile, fragmentary, and easily overborn. Moments when history breaks
free of repetitions and regularities are rare. They demand a means of recognition than that can explain
their rarity rather than one that treats them as immanent.”).
19. Id.
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Finally, from a more self-consciously normative perspective, it is hard not
to follow Max Weber and embrace a deep ambivalence about these
developments. In the seemingly relentless march of disenchantment, in the
never-ending quest for calculability, it is clear that something important was
lost as the strong precautionary impulse of earlier years was subsumed by more
formal approaches to risk and embedded within increasingly elaborate
bureaucratic routines and expert systems. And while we should not deceive
ourselves about the difficulties of holding onto such an approach in the context
of the far more complicated and increasingly politicized world of
environmental harms that came into view during the 1970s, and while we
cannot ignore the remarkable advances that have been made in understanding
and managing the risks of industrial society, neither should we dismiss these
earlier approaches to environmental harms as hopelessly antiquated and out of
reach as we continue to grapple with environmental problems—old and new—
and strive to make sense of our place in the world.
I.

RISK AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN HEALTH, SAFETY,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

There is no shortage of commentary on risk and its place in health, safety,
and environmental regulation. The extensive legal literature goes back several
decades.20 Leading scholars have identified risk management as a key
problematic for contemporary governance, the “market state,” and the legal
system.21 Social theorists have integrated risk into theories of modernity and
modern forms of government.22 Behavioralists of various persuasions have

20. See, e.g., James P. Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental
Carcinogens, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 86 (1980); Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk
Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1983); SHELIA JASANOFF, RISK MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL
CULTURE (1986); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495 (1986);
Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027 (1990);
Applegate, supra note 4; Hornstein, supra note 5; BREYER, supra note 3; John D. Graham & Jonathan
Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 33 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995); Wendy E. Wagner,
The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995); Lisa Heinzerling,
Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025 (1999); SUNSTEIN, supra note 3; SIDNEY
A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH (2003); ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
(2007); KYSAR, supra note 5.
21. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at viii (noting that “risk reduction has become a principal goal of
modern governments”); PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR & CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2008) (discussing the critical role of the “market state” in managing various types of risks);
George Priest, The New Legal Structure of Risk Control, in RISK 209 (Edwin J. Burger ed., 1993) (“The
predominant function of modern law is to allocate risk.”).
22. See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK & CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE
SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982); ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY:
TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter trans., 1992); LUHMANN, supra note 17; Anthony Giddens,
Risk & Responsibility, 62 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1999); Jasanoff, Songlines of Risk, supra note 6; PAT
O’MALLEY, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND GOVERNMENT (2004).
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created a cottage industry of analyzing risk perception by “ordinary people”
(their label) and the effects of heuristics and biases on judgment and decision
making about risk.23 Popular writers have traced its history and offered
countless tales of the many specific risks confronting people in their everyday
lives.24 And, of course, there is a massive and growing technical literature on
risk spanning a huge range of disciplines and subject matters, not to mention a
vast library of government reports on the practice of risk assessment itself that
stretches back several decades.25 This Part briefly situates the approach
developed in this Article in the context of existing perspectives and elaborates
on some of the early conceptual and regulatory foundations of risk thinking in
U.S. health, safety, and environmental law.
A. Risk and the Public Life of Concepts
Much of the extensive environmental law literature on risk regulation is
normative in orientation, often framed in the context of larger debates about the
proper role of agency expertise and judgment,26 the need for objective
measures to allocate scarce regulatory resources among competing priorities,27
and the merits of precautionary stances toward particular types of hazards.28
Many valuable insights have come out of these debates, and it would be wrong
to suggest that one can escape the normative implications of risk and the related
practices of risk assessment. Risk thinking has a deep affinity with
consequentialist thinking, giving it a distinctive normative valence that belies
its seeming neutrality.29 It is, as George Priest says, “relentlessly utilitarian.”30
Rather than arguing for or against a particular position in the risk debates,
however, this Article focuses on the technical and normative structuring of risk
thinking as it has emerged and developed in U.S. health, safety, and
environmental law and the implications of this way of thinking in the face of an

23. See, e.g., BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK (1981); GERD GIGERENZER,
RECKONING WITH RISK: LEARNING TO LIVE WITH UNCERTAINTY (2002); THE PERCEPTION OF RISK
(Paul Slovic ed., 2001).
24. See, e.g., PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK
(1986).
25. NRC, SCIENCE & DECISIONS, supra note 3; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, RISK AND REGULATORY POLICY: IMPROVING THE GOVERNANCE OF RISK (2010).
26. Compare Richard Stewart, The Role of Courts in Risk Management, 15 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,208, 10,209 (1986) (concluding that “primary responsibility for managing risk must be given to
administrative agencies”), and Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 333 (1985) (concluding that in the area of public
risk management, courts “should defer to the experts”), with Gillette & Krier, supra note 20, at 1031
(concluding that “ambitious proposals to increase the scope of agency authority at the expense of
judicial scrutiny are remarkably premature” and questioning “the wisdom of wholesale abdication to
technocratic rule”).
27. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 3; SUNSTEIN, supra note 3; Graham & Wiener, supra note 20.
28. See e.g., KYSAR, supra note 5; Hornstein, supra note 5; Sachs, supra note 5.
29. See Hornstein, supra note 5.
30. Priest, supra note 21, at 215.
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increasingly complex set of environmental challenges. In doing so, it draws on
a broader legal and social science literature on risk that touches on several
different fields but has not been widely engaged by environmental law
scholars.31 By emphasizing the historical development and cultural contexts of
risk thinking in various domains, these perspectives provide an important point
of departure for investigating how risk and its associated knowledge practices
have become embedded in the contemporary practice of health, safety, and
environmental regulation. To that end, this Article can be viewed as an inquiry
into the “public life of concepts,” focusing specifically on the conditions of
possibility for the emergence and organization of concepts such as risk, their
translation into specific governmental practices, and the ways in which they
gain authority as they mutate and migrate across different domains.32 The
influence of politics and special interests, the structural constraints of material
conditions, the role of institutions, the values and experiences of everyday
life—all of these are given less attention than they surely deserve. But they are
necessarily pushed to the background in order to maintain the focus on how
techniques and ways of thinking shape what comes to count as official
knowledge and how this in turn gets translated into official practice. One of the
goals of such an inquiry is to reveal a deeper political economy, shedding some
light on how specific practices tend to naturalize, and thereby privilege, certain
ways of looking at the world vis-à-vis others.33
31. Examples of key works from the multiple literatures on risk that have informed this project
include LUHMANN, supra note 17, at viii (“The question is rather what we can learn about normal
processes in our society from the fact that it seeks to comprehend misfortune in the form of risk.”);
François Ewald, Risk in Contemporary Society, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 365, 366 (2000) (“Risk has become
ubiquitous and a kind of conceptual umbrella used to cover all sorts of events, be they individual or
collective, minor or catastrophic. Risk presents itself as the modern approach to an event and the way in
which, in our societies, we reflect upon issues that concern us.”); JASANOFF, supra note 20 (analyzing
approaches to risk assessment and risk management in comparative context and highlighting the
importance of national political cultures and styles of regulation in understanding different approaches
to risk); David Garland, The Rise of Risk, in RISK AND MORALITY (Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle
eds., 2003) (discussing various social, cultural and political studies of risk and its place in modern
society); Mariana Valverde et al., Legal Knowledges of Risk, in LAW AND RISK 86–87 (Law
Commission of Canada ed., 2005) (discussing how participants in “particular legal networks” shape and
deploy different “risk knowledge practices”); Jonathan Simon, Risk and Reflexivity: What Socio-Legal
Studies Add to the Study of Risk and the Law, 57 ALA. L. REV. 119, 123 (2005) (advocating a socio-legal
analysis of risk that is pluralistic, historical and reflexive); Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of
Actuarial Practices, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771 (1988) (discussing impacts of actuarial practices on
conception of individuals and the concept of the individual and the relationship between individuals and
the state); IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE (1990) (investigating the rise of probability and
related practices of statistical reasoning and their profound impacts on assessment and management of
risk in modern society); and François Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES
IN GOVERNMENTALITY 201–05, 209 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) (discussing risk and insurance
as schemas of rationality and management central to the operation of modern society).
32. See HACKING, supra note 31, at 7 (“I am concerned with the public life of concepts and the
ways in which they gain authority. My data are published sentences.”).
33. Cf. PIERRE BORDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 164 (Richard Nice trans., 1977)
(“Every established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and with very different means) the
naturalization of its own arbitrariness.”).
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Such an approach has particular relevance for environmental law, a field
that has never been particularly reflective about its distinctive ways of
knowing, but one in which the problem of knowledge has long been front and
center. To be sure, the general critique of technocratic forms of decision
making has been a recurring, if recessive, theme in environmental law
scholarship for more than thirty years and draws upon older philosophical and
sociological critiques of instrumental reason.34 Moreover, various scholars
inside and outside of law continue to investigate how specific ideas, tools, and
ways of thinking structure the field.35 But for the most part, environmental law,
along with the related fields of health and safety law, is still waiting for a
detailed intellectual history.36
Risk provides an important, albeit daunting, way into such an effort.
Indeed, much of the history of modern health, safety, and environmental law
can be told as the story of efforts to define, assess, and manage various types of
risk, and many aspects of this story are quite technical, spanning multiple
disciplines.37 It should be made clear at the outset, therefore, that this project
does not pretend to offer a comprehensive history of risk and its place in health,
safety, and environmental law. The notion of “genealogies” in the title is

34. See, e.g., MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 9
(John Cumming trans., 1991) (1944) (“Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation from that
over which they exercise their power. Enlightenment behaves toward things as a dictator toward men.
He knows them in so far as he can manipulate them.”); Laurence Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or
Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 76 (1972) (showing how seemingly technical exercises in policy
science entail substantive conclusions and outcomes); Laurence Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic
Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1331–32 (1974) (showing how
emerging welfarist approaches to environmental law and policy could only be understood and engaged if
situated within the larger framework of instrumental reason and an overarching value system of liberal
individualism); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
(1974) (demonstrating the limits of “technocratic intelligence” in environmental law).
35. See William Boyd, Douglas A. Kysar & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Law, Environment, and the
‘Non-Dismal’ Social Sciences, 8 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 183, 192-98 (2012) (reviewing various
literatures).
36. There are several excellent general histories of U.S. environmental law and policy that touch
upon a number of the developments discussed in this article and provide important context for the more
specific focus on the rise of formal, quantitative approaches to risk. See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE
MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004); RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT,
MANAGING OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1999). Of course, there
are also many detailed histories of specific events or issues that are relevant to this project, some of
which are discussed in the pages that follow. Finally, more than twenty years ago, Professor Robert
Blomquist offered a brief prospectus on what an intellectual history of American environmental law
might look like. See Robert F. Blomquist, “Clean New World”: Toward an Intellectual History of
American Environmental Law, 1961-1990, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1990).
37. The more technical literature on the history of risk analysis has also been important for this
project. See e.g., Terje Aven, The Risk Concept—Historical and Recent Development Trends, 99
RELIABILITY ENG’G & SYS. SAFETY 33 (2012); John D. Graham, Historical Perspective on Risk
Assessment in the Federal Government, 102 TOXICOLOGY 29 (1995); Vincent T. Covello & Jeryl
Mumpower, Risk Analysis and Risk Management: An Historical Perspective, 5 RISK ANALYSIS 103
(1985).
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intended as recognition that there is no one right way to do that history.38 It is
also intended to signal a different way into these fields—one that takes the
concepts, tools, techniques, and ways of thinking that structure and animate
particular approaches to particular problems as objects of inquiry in their own
right.39 Viewed from this perspective, the “making of environmental law”40
becomes more than a story about efforts to manage spillovers, externalities,
commons problems of various kinds, or particular types of ecological and
human harm; more than a story about the political and institutional dynamics of
38. Several broader contextual developments are worth identifying here, if only for the purpose of
bracketing them and putting them to the side. Specifically, the move to particular forms of social
insurance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the rise of the welfare state are deeply
implicated with risk thinking. See, e.g., FRANÇOIS EWALD, L’ETAT PROVIDENCE (1986) (discussing the
central role of risk thinking and the rise of the welfare state in France); PIERRE ROSANVALLON, THE
NEW SOCIAL QUESTION: RETHINKING THE WELFARE STATE 16–19 (Barbara Harshav trans., 2000)
(describing key role of risk and the “insurance paradigm” in underwriting the welfare state). Likewise,
risk thinking has been intimately connected to the development of tort law, and there surely are
important and interesting connections to be developed between risk/benefit balancing in tort and
environmental law. See, e.g., Henry Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915) (proposing a “risk
theory” of negligence); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Finally, risk
has obviously played a fundamental role in economics and modern finance, a vast territory that has been
well canvassed by specialists in those fields, but one that is also beyond the scope of this project except
with respect to the influence of expected utility and decision theory on formal approaches to risk in
environmental law. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 24 (providing a popular historical account of risk
in economics and finance).
39. This is not the place for an extended discussion of the rich set of methodological debates on
genealogy and its relationship to historical research, and this Article does not use the term genealogy out
of fidelity to any particular thinker or approach. As employed here, genealogy denotes an effort to trace
the historical formation and migration of concepts, knowledge practices, and styles of thinking across
various domains with particular attention to how they get refashioned and gain authority in specific
contexts. See, e.g., IAN HACKING, HISTORICAL ONTOLOGY 198 (2002) (characterizing his mode of
inquiry as “a study of the ways in which the styles of reasoning provide stable knowledge and become
not uncoverers of objective truth but rather standards of objectivity”). The approach taken here embraces
the nominalism of both Max Weber and Michel Foucault, attending in detail to the circumstances and
conditions of possibility for the emergence of specific concepts and knowledge practices. In that sense,
it may be closer in some respects to Foucault’s earlier archaeological approach to knowledge than to his
later genealogical inquiries. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 4 (A.M.
Sheridan Smith trans., 1972) (“[T]he history of a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its
progressive refinement, its continuously increasing rationality, its abstraction gradient, but that of its
various fields of constitution and validity, that of its successive rules of use, that of the many theoretical
contexts in which it developed and matured.”); Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social
Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 72 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch trans.
eds., 1949) (“The social science that we wish to pursue is an empirical science of concrete reality. Our
aim is an understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move. We wish to
understand on the one hand the relationships and the cultural significance of individual events in their
contemporary manifestations and on the other the causes of their being historically so and not
otherwise.”). For discussions of some of the similarities between Weber and Foucault, including their
mutual embrace of nominalism and their shared concern with a historical treatment of “rationalization,”
see PAUL VEYNE, FOUCAULT: HIS THOUGHT, HIS CHARACTER 34–35, 54 (Janet Lloyd trans., 2010). See
also HERBERT L. DREYFUS AND PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND
HERMENEUTICS 133 (2d ed., 1983) (describing Foucault’s efforts to “isolate[] and identif[y] the
mechanisms of the power of rationalization with a finer grained analysis than Weber . . . as an advance,
not a refutation of the Weberian project”).
40. See LAZARUS, supra note 36.
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particular legislative efforts, judicial review, agency practice, or the search for
optimal policy design. It becomes a story also about how certain ways of
understanding environmental problems have become possible, about how
distinctive knowledge practices have conditioned the possibilities for response,
and about what is gained and what is lost as these practices become routine
features of the administrative state.
B. Early Conceptual Developments
Although the word is much older,41 modern understandings of “risk”
appear to have come into common use in Europe during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, with the word coming to mean “a chance of peril or
loss.”42 Niklas Luhmann argues that embedded within this new conception was
an understanding of risk that tied outcomes to the consequences of human
decisions and actions, thereby taking on for the first time an explicit
understanding of time and rationality and an explicit orientation toward the
future.43 Because the existing languages in use at the time already had words
for danger, venture, chance, luck, courage, fear, and adventure, we may
assume, Luhmann argues, that the new term “risk” came into use to indicate a
problem situation that could not be expressed precisely enough with the
vocabulary at hand.44 In his view, these early instances of risk thinking
stemmed from the realization that certain advantages are to be gained only if
something is at stake; nothing ventured, nothing gained.45 This volitional
conception of risk, where possible future loss is perceived as a consequence of
a decision to be made, signals an important departure from previous views of
hazard or danger as external threats to be avoided.46
It is, of course, difficult to evaluate the merits of these claims regarding
the manner in which certain practical and intellectual problems motivated early
use of the term risk. What is clear, though, is that writing about risk took off
during the late eighteenth century with the significant expansion of commercial
activity and various forms of insurance (marine, property, life) reflecting in part
the adoption and refinement of actuarial techniques to assess risk and price

41. The etymology of the word risk is subject to debate. Some claim Arabic origins, while others
point to Greek and Latin roots. See PIET STRYDOM, RISK, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIETY 75 (2002)
(noting that the origin of the word is unknown and much debated); LUHMANN, supra note 17, at 9
(“There are no comprehensive studies on the etymology and conceptual history of the term”); Catherine
E. Althaus, A Disciplinary Perspective on the Epistemological Status of Risk, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 567,
570 (2005) (discussing disputed origins of the term).
42. STRYDOM, supra note 41, at 75; Althaus, supra note 41, at 570.
43. See LUHMANN, supra note 17, at 10–11.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 101–02. Luhmann discusses how “distinct forms of social solidarity develop differently
depending on whether the future is seen from the angle of risk or from the angle of danger.” Id. at 102.
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insurance contracts.47 These developments depended upon a host of important
conceptual and administrative advances that had been underway since the
seventeenth century: collection of vital statistics and other information on
populations,48 the development of probability,49 the advent of statistical

47. See, e.g., Lorraine J. Daston, The Domestication of Risk: Mathematical Probability and
Insurance, 1650–1830, in THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION (Lorenz Kruger et al. eds., 1987) (noting
that mathematical probability was not widely used in insurance until the end of the eighteenth century);
GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., THE EMPIRE OF CHANCE: HOW PROBABILITY CHANGED SCIENCE AND
EVERYDAY LIFE 23–26 (1989) (discussing adoption of mathematical probability in insurance in late
eighteenth century); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860
226–37 (1977) (discussing development of actuarial conceptions of risk in American insurance law
during the nineteenth century). The Google n-gram explorer provides one method for tracking use of the
word “risk” over time. For general information on the n-gram application, see
http://books.google.com/ngrams. Searching for the word “risk” between 1700 and 2000 generates the
following graph:

48. Systematic thinking about populations did not begin until the late seventeenth century with
the methodical collection of vital statistics on births, deaths, marriage, illness, and the like. This new
information provided the basis for the construction of the first mortality tables and, more generally,
facilitated the charting of trends and patterns across populations. See ANDREA A. RUSNOCK, VITAL
ACCOUNTS: QUANTIFYING HEALTH AND POPULATION IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND AND
FRANCE 4 (2002) (“The modern concept of population and its measurement were mutually
constitutive.”); HACKING, supra note 31, at 6–7 (“But even the very idea of an exact population is one
which has little sense until there are institutions for establishing and defining what ‘population’
means.”).
49. See generally GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 47, at 23–26 (1989); IAN HACKING, THE
EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF EARLY IDEAS ABOUT PROBABILITY,
INDUCTION AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE (1975).
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techniques and concomitant attention to regularities as a way of understanding
the world.50
By stabilizing new objects of inquiry, these new ways of thinking made
possible a coherent approach to understanding regularities at the level of the
collective, underwriting the development of modern aggregative techniques
that would prove transformative across multiple domains.51 Mean values,
averages, the normal distribution—these new concepts promised to reveal a
deeper social reality beyond individual variation and seemingly random events,
opening up in the process new ways of being objective about human beings.52
As such, they provided the basis for the more formal conceptualizations of
risk that started to take shape in the early twentieth century.53 In viewing risk
as a distribution of possible outcomes (deaths, accidents, or other misfortune)
across a population or group of instances, what were previously seen as random
or uncertain events could now be aggregated and subjected to probability
estimates. Put another way, risk came to be understood as some future
consequence or outcome whose probability could be calculated. This basic
element of calculability provided the foundation for efforts to distinguish
situations of risk (understood as “measurable uncertainty”) from those of true
uncertainty, a distinction made famous during the 1920s by Frank Knight, John
Maynard Keynes, and others, and one that has been well rehearsed ever since.54
Yet, despite these important conceptual advances, it would take another half
century before this more formal, actuarial conception of risk would become
part of the standard vocabulary for understanding health, safety, and
environmental hazards.

50. See generally ALAIN DESROSIERES, THE POLITICS OF LARGE NUMBERS: A HISTORY OF
STATISTICAL THINKING (1998); THEODORE M. PORTER, THE RISE OF STATISTICAL THINKING, 1820–
1900 (1986).
51. See, e.g., Theodore M. Porter, Statistics and Statistical Methods, in 7 THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF SCIENCE 241 (Porter & Ross eds., 2003) (identifying as “the most fundamental principle of
statistical reasoning” the idea that “[i]t is possible to build a coherent science at the level of the
collective by attending only to frequencies or rates without seeking causes of individual behavior”).
52. See GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 47, at 41 (discussing implications of new statistical
aggregates on understanding of social reality); HACKING, supra note 31, at 160 (“The word [normal]
became indispensible because it created a way to be objective about human beings.”). Hacking describes
the “benign and sterile sounding word normal” as “one of the most powerful ideological tools of the
twentieth century.” Id. at 169.
53. See, e.g., ALLAN H. WILLETT, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF RISK AND INSURANCE (1901)
(offering one of the first systematic treatments of the nature of risk and its relationship to uncertainty).
54. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 19–20, 233 (1921) (distinguishing
between “measurable risk” and “unmeasurable uncertainty”); see also John M. Keynes, The General
Theory of Employment, 51 Q.J. ECON. 209, 214 (1937) (describing as uncertain matters for which “there
is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.”).
On this distinction and its relevance to environmental law, see RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE:
RISK AND RESPONSE 171–75 (2004); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 147, 162 (2007);
Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 903 (2011). But see LUHMANN, supra note 17, at 1
(noting that “Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty has . . . petrified into a sort of dogma—so
that conceptual innovation earns the reproach of not having applied the concept correctly”).

2012]

GENEALOGIES OF RISK

913

C. Regulatory Foundations
Notwithstanding the relatively slow uptake of the formal nomenclature of
risk, the new techniques of aggregation that emerged in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries provided an important basis for a deepening engagement
by governments during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the
overall health and well-being of their citizens, establishing a crucial part of the
foundation for future government involvement in risk regulation.55 Workers
compensation and other social insurance programs in Europe and the United
States constituted the most obvious government interventions in this respect,
building directly upon the application of actuarial thinking to accidents and
other potential harms.56 At the same time, governments in Europe and the
United States also began to regulate sanitation and public health, food safety,
and industrial hygiene. In each of these areas, important conceptual and
technical developments underwrote a more proactive role for government in
regulating the hazards of industrial society.
Thus, the late nineteenth century sanitation movement, and what came to
be known as “the new public health,”57 led directly to new laws and regulations
regarding sanitation and public hygiene and provided the general populationbased framing necessary for the subsequent application of risk thinking to all
manner of environmental hazards.58 Likewise, early twentieth century efforts to
55. See Alain Desrosieres, How to Make Things Which Hold Together: Social Science, Statistics,
and the State, in DISCOURSES ON SOCIETY 195, 197 (Peter Wagner ed., 1991) (noting “the extent to
which the setting up of systems of statistical recording goes hand in hand with the construction of the
State”); Karl H. Metz, Paupers and Numbers: The Statistical Argument for Social Reform in Britain
During the Period of Industrialization, in THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION, supra note 47, at 345
(“Statistics made the social state of the nation an affair that could be measured, and in this way it
contributed significantly to the bureaucratization of disease and poverty that was to pave the way for the
development of the welfare state.”).
56. This history has been well documented. See, e.g., JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL
REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW
(2004); Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, in
AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 279 (Freidman &
Scheiber eds., 1978) (“Workmen’s compensation was designed to replace a highly unsatisfactory system
with a rational, actuarial one.”).
57. See STEVEN JOHNSON, THE GHOST MAP: THE STORY OF LONDON’S MOST TERRIFYING
EPIDEMIC—AND HOW IT CHANGED SCIENCE, CITIES, AND THE MODERN WORLD 97 (2006) (discussing
the crucial breakthrough of population thinking as a basis for John Snow’s efforts to understand the
cholera epidemic in London in the 1850s and the foundation for epidemiology and the new public
health); JOHN DUFFY, THE SANITARIANS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH 205–18 (1992)
(discussing emergence during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of the “new public health”
founded upon revolutionary advances in bacteriology and epidemiology); GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY
OF PUBLIC HEALTH 295–319 (rev. ed. 1993) (1958) (discussing the growing sophistication of public
health in combating infectious disease during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
58. This new way of thinking about public health as a target of government regulation gained
considerable traction in the United States during the second half of the nineteenth century. In his history
of law and regulation in nineteenth century America, William Novak concludes that far from being a
narrow interest of certain professionals, “public health was at the center of a legal and political
revolution that culminated in the creation of modern constitutional law and a positive administrative
state.” WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
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protect the public from unsafe food, most notably through the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906,59 got the government into the business of establishing
tolerances for “poisonous” or “deleterious” substances and represented one of
the first efforts by the federal government to establish a science-based approach
to harmful substances.60 Finally, pioneering efforts in industrial hygiene during
the 1920s, marked most prominently by the work of professionals such as Alice
Hamilton, shifted attention from acute to chronic industrial poisonings
associated with ongoing low-level exposures to substances such as lead,
arsenic, mercury, and benzene in the workplace61 and ushered in the modern
idea of a stable relationship between dose and response—a conceptual
innovation that would prove central to the effort to understand and regulate the
health effects of various industrial chemicals and other hazardous substances in
the years ahead.62
These developments opened up new worlds of possibility: the health of the
general population became an explicit object of government regulation,
establishing tolerances and thresholds for exposures to harmful substances
came to be viewed as a key responsibility of government, and formal
understandings of the dose-response relationship emerged as an important tool
for assessing potential harms associated with exposure to hazardous agents
across large segments of the population. In the process, individuals, the human
body, and their relationship to the environment were reconceived in the context

AMERICA 194 (1996). Enactment of new state and local laws together with the creation of municipal
health departments, which Novak refers to as the “first real administrative agencies in the United
States,” and later state boards of health represented a substantial expansion of state police powers
directed at maintaining the health of the population. Id. at 202.
59. Federal Food & Drugs (Wiley) Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 STAT. 768 (1906) [hereinafter
Pure Food & Drugs Act] (repealed in 1938 by Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52
Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938))). As its name suggested, the main objective
of the new law was to secure the purity of food and drugs and to inform purchasers. See United States v.
Antikamnia Chem. Co., 231 U.S. 654, 665 (1913) (“The purpose of the act is to secure the purity of food
and drugs and to inform purchasers of what they are buying.”).
60. See Pure Food & Drugs Act, supra note 59, § 7 (providing that food containing “any added
poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient which may render such article injurious to health”
would be considered adulterated under the Act); see also United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator
Co., 232 U.S. 399, 410–11 (1913) (interpreting § 7 as requiring only that the Government show possible
rather actual harm before regulating).
61. See ALICE HAMILTON, INDUSTRIAL POISONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1925) (“Industrial
poisoning is typically chronic, the acute forms are relatively rare”). For historical overviews of industrial
hygiene and occupational health in the United States, see CHRISTOPHER C. SELLERS, HAZARDS OF THE
JOB: FROM INDUSTRIAL DISEASE TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SCIENCE (1997); JACQUELINE KARNELL
CORN, RESPONSE TO OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1992).
62. See ROBERT N. PROCTOR, CANCER WARS 154–55 (1995) (“[I]t is first with industrial diseases
that one gets the notion that the probability or severity of a disease can be understood as a well-behaved
function of the frequency, intensity, and duration of exposure.”). During this time, moreover, a number
of states began to broaden their workers compensation laws to cover certain occupational diseases. See
Christopher Sellers, Factory as Environment: Industrial Hygiene, Professional Collaboration and the
Modern Sciences of Pollution, 18 ENVTL. HIST. REV. 55, 63–64 (1994) (discussing broadening of
compensation laws to cover occupational disease starting in the 1920s).
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of a more abstract, aggregative logic. New forms of sociability came into
being.63 New relations were forged between citizen and government.64
II.

SEARCHING FOR SAFETY, 1930S-1960S

By the 1930s, as the challenges of understanding and regulating a
proliferating set of industrial hazards became more apparent, experts of various
persuasions struggled to operationalize safety. In the process, governmental
thinking about health and environmental harms developed along more formal
lines, taking its place in the emerging administrative state. This period (1930s1960s), particularly during the years following World War II, also witnessed
growing public anxiety about the hazards of industrial society, with
considerable attention to cancer.65 Deepening awareness of and concern for the
impacts of radiation, largely as a result of the radioactive fallout controversy of
the mid-1950s, combined with the proliferation of new, synthetic chemicals
that appeared to pose a range of ecological and health harms, demonstrated
most dramatically by the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962,
stoked public fears of a mounting, largely unchecked series of industrial
hazards that went well beyond the workplace to impinge upon daily life in
novel ways.66 Calls for more protective approaches led to significant reductions
in radiation limits, strong precautionary stances in the context of carcinogens
and food, including the 1958 Delaney Clause, and a first wave of federal
environmental laws that included explicit mandates to protect public health
with an adequate margin of safety.
With the partial exception of radiation, these efforts were almost always
framed in terms of safety, hazard, and danger. Despite widespread use in
insurance and other areas, formal conceptions of risk were rarely invoked as a
means of understanding and regulating the harms posed by radiation,
occupational exposures, chemicals in the food supply, and carcinogens. To be
63. Cf. CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 17–19, 64–67 (2004) (discussing new
forms of sociality—new social imaginaries—that made possible the rise of modern individualism);
LUHMAN, supra note 17, at 102 (discussing the “distinct forms of social solidarity” entailed by the
concept of risk).
64. See NOVAK, supra note 58, at 198, 191–233 (discussing rise of public health in the nineteenth
century as “an ongoing practice and technique of governance” central to the rise of the modern
administrative state).
65. See SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE EMPEROR OF ALL MALADIES: A BIOGRAPHY OF CANCER
(2010) (discussing increased public attention to cancer in post-World War II United States); DEVRA
DAVIS, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE WAR ON CANCER (2007) (same); JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE
DREAD DISEASE: CANCER AND MODERN AMERICAN CULTURE (1987) (same).
66. See CATHERINE CAUFIELD, MULTIPLE EXPOSURES: CHRONICLES OF THE RADIATION AGE
123–32 (1989) (discussing fallout controversy during the 1950s); BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING
CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN, AND TECHNOLOGY 51–56 (1972) (discussing fallout controversy and its crucial
role in raising awareness about the environment and human exposure to toxic agents); RACHEL CARSON,
SILENT SPRING 6 (1962) (identifying “universal contamination of the environment” by chemicals and
radioactive fallout); see also ANDREWS, supra note 36, at 213–18 (discussing radiation and pesticide
controversies during the 1950s and 1960s).
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sure, efforts to operationalize safety during this time were marked by an
ongoing effort to quantify potential harm and develop specific standards or
thresholds that would define safe levels, often with safety factors built in to
compensate for uncertainty. But, for the most part, the world of environmental
harms was viewed in terms of hazard and danger rather than risk and there was
a general view that the precise, quantitative assessment of potential harm was
beyond the reach of current capabilities.
And yet, as safety determinations came to depend increasingly on a set of
extrapolative techniques that went beyond experience, important elements of
risk thinking began to take hold: attention began to shift from individuals to
populations and averages, regulatory tasks were defined as setting quantitative
thresholds and tolerances, dose-response models were formalized, safety
factors and other tools were developed to manage uncertainty, and safety itself
came to be viewed as a fluid, relative concept. In all of this, however, experts
and regulatory officials showed a continuing reluctance to embrace formal risk
thinking as a basis for regulation, and there was a strong impulse in certain
areas, notably carcinogens, toward precaution. This Part discusses the difficult
search for ways to operationalize safety during the interwar and post-World
War II decades in the context of efforts to regulate the potential harms
associated with radiation, occupational hazards, chemicals in the food supply,
and carcinogens.
A. Tolerances and Thresholds
Government regulators and public health professionals charged with
ensuring safety during the middle decades of the twentieth century faced the
challenging task of understanding and defining levels of exposure to harmful
substances or activities that could be classified as “safe” and then embedding
these in specific standards. Tolerances, threshold limit values, and maximum
allowable concentrations all drew from the same general conviction that the
human body could tolerate a certain level of exposure without experiencing
harm—that there was a safe, threshold dose for harmful substances. This
relatively simple idea proved immensely important in the development of
environmental, health, and safety regulation and quite vexing to those charged
with putting it into practice.
This was made all the more challenging by ongoing improvements in
analytical capabilities that could detect responses at lower levels of exposure
and, more importantly, the recognition that certain types of harmful agents
might not have thresholds—a fact that was apparent early on in the case of
radiation and later with certain industrial chemicals, particularly carcinogens.67

67. Peter Hutt notes that detection capabilities for food chemicals in the 1950s were generally
sensitive in the range of twenty to fifty parts per million. By the end of the 1960s, detection capabilities
were sensitive in the very low parts per billion range. See Peter Hutt, Use of Quantitative Risk

2012]

GENEALOGIES OF RISK

917

Determining safety came to depend increasingly on the development and use of
new techniques that allowed scientists and others to move beyond direct
experience in their efforts to understand the world of environmental harms.
Starting in the 1940s, animal testing became an established part of regulatory
toxicology, providing a basis for efforts to operationalize safety in the face of
low-level chronic exposures—an exercise that brought with it a host of
uncertainties.68 Extrapolating from high-dose animal studies undertaken on
genetically identical populations in controlled conditions to the messy realities
of low-dose human exposures in the real world of significant individual
variability was no easy task. And it was one that would pose significant
challenges to efforts aimed at developing a precise, objective approach to safety
in the years to come.
1. Radiation and Permissible Dose
Low-level radiation and its implications for human health garnered
considerable attention from scientists, regulators, and the public during the
middle decades of the twentieth century.69 In important respects, radiation
provided the first opportunity to grapple with some of the fundamental aspects
of risk thinking in the context of a new wave of environmental harms
associated with exposure to toxic agents in minute quantities.70 As X-rays and
other forms of radiation became a more common part of daily life, experts and
medical professionals recognized that safeguards would be needed to protect
workers and the general public from the potentially harmful effects of low-level
exposures. During the 1930s, both the U.S. and international committees on
radiation protection proposed the first “tolerance doses” for exposure to
external radiation.71 These early standards were based on the presence of
erythema or visible burning of the skin, an approach that led to tolerance doses
that were several orders of magnitude more permissive than those adopted in
later years.72
As understanding of the potential genetic damage and somatic effects of
radiation improved, however, it became increasingly apparent that any

Assessment in Regulatory Decisionmaking under Federal Health and Safety Statutes, in RISK
QUANTITATION AND REGULATORY POLICY 20–21 (D.G. Hoel et al. eds., 1985).
68. FDA proposed its first rule on animal toxicity testing in 1948. See id. at 20 (“With the advent
of controlled animal experimentation, operational definitions of safety were for the first time feasible.”).
69. See, e.g., CAUFIELD, supra note 66 (providing a detailed history of ionizing radiation in the
twentieth century United States).
70. Id. at viii (“Ionizing radiation is the best-understood and most tightly controlled toxic
substances known to man.”).
71. See The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and its Effects on Man: Hearings before the Special
Subcomm. on Radiation, J. Comm. on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong. 828–29, 856 (1957) [hereinafter
Nature of Radioactive Fallout] (statement of Lauriston Taylor, discussing early efforts to establish
tolerance doses and standards for radiation exposure).
72. Id. at 828–29.
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exposure to radiation had an impact on the human body.73 By the late 1940s,
the U.S. National Committee on Radiation Protection (NCRP) had abandoned
the tolerance dose concept, adopting in its place the notion of “permissible
dose” in recognition of the widely accepted view that there was no threshold
level below which exposure to radiation was “safe.”74 Radiation, in other
words, could not be tolerated by the human body in any absolute sense; there
was always a potential for harm at even de minimis levels of exposure. For
external sources of radiation, permissible dose was defined as “the dose of
ionizing radiation that, in light of present knowledge, is not expected to cause
appreciable bodily injury to a person at any time during his lifetime.”75
Although the NCRP acknowledged the possibility of harm from radiation
exposures below the permissible level, it defended the concept on the grounds
that the chance of such injury occurring was so low that the risk would be
“readily acceptable to the average individual,”76 providing an early example of
the notion of acceptable risk as determined by reference to the “average
individual.”77
More importantly, the NCRP also recognized the fluid, relative nature of
“acceptable risk” as well as its relationship to advances in detection capabilities
and new understandings of the effects of radiation exposure. As one NCRP
member put it, “as the means of detection become more refined it will be
possible to determine changes of smaller and smaller magnitude. Also new
kinds of effect will be found. Therefore, at some point it will become necessary
to decide what degree of any particular change is to be considered injurious.”78
Despite the best efforts of the NCRP, the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC), and other experts to contextualize the hazards of radiation, the issue

73.
74.

Id.
See NAT’L COMM. ON RADIATION PROTECTION, PERMISSIBLE DOSE FROM EXTERNAL
SOURCES OF IONIZING RADIATION 26 (1954) (“The concept of a tolerance dose involves the assumption
that if the dose is lower than a certain value—the threshold value—no injury results. Since it seems well
established that there is no threshold dose for the production of gene mutations by radiation, it follows
that strictly speaking there is no such thing as a tolerance dose when all possible effects of radiation on
the individual and future generations are included. In connection with the protection problem the
expression has been used in a more liberal sense, namely, to represent a dose that may be expected to
produce only ‘tolerable’ deleterious effects, if any are produced at all. Since it is desirable to avoid this
ambiguity the expression ‘permissible dose’ is much to be preferred.”).
75. Id. at 27.
76. Id. at 21.
77. Id. (“Because there is at present no way of determining in advance who is most susceptible to
radiation, each person has, in effect, the same chance of escaping injury as anyone else. Under these
conditions and in this sense, then, the risk of radiation injury has essentially the same characteristics as
more common risks readily accepted by the average person in his ordinary pursuits.”); see also Nature
of Radioactive Fallout, supra note 71, at 856 (testimony of Lauriston Taylor) (“There is always some
risk involved in radiation exposure but also there is risk in virtually everything else that we do. With
radiation the challenge is to balance the risk by exposure against the tangible and intangible gains to be
gained by this exposure and against the risks that occur from a variety of other sources.”).
78. See NAT’L COMM. ON RADIATION PROTECTION, supra note 74, at 22.
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became a prominent source of public concern during the 1950s.79 The 1954
Lucky Dragon incident, in which Japanese fishermen suffered severe radiation
injuries and at least one death as a result of exposure to fallout from weapons
testing at Bikini Atoll,80 as well as weapons testing in the Nevada desert, raised
the prospect of “global” contamination of the environment and widespread
exposure among human populations. When strontium-90, a radioisotope that
moves through the environment in a manner similar to calcium, appeared in
milk, food, and human bone samples, it illustrated in dramatic and novel ways
how toxic agents could travel through the global environment, concentrate in
food chains, and pose new dangers for human health.81 All of these
developments put the issue of whether there could be a “safe” dose of radiation
exposure squarely on the public agenda.82 The general view was that radiation
acted as a mutagen and, thus, had the potential to cause harm at any level of
exposure.83 For its part, the AEC insisted that levels of radioactivity associated
with fallout from weapons testing were too low to pose any significant threat to
public health and that such tests were necessary in the face of the growing
Soviet menace.84 As an AEC report put the matter in February 1955: “The
degree of risk must be balanced against the great importance of the test
programs to the security of the nation.”85
But in a time of heightened fear about new, invisible hazards and
increased incidence of cancer, doubts about the AEC’s credibility persisted.86
79. See CAUFIELD, supra note 66, at 123–32 (discussing fallout controversy in the United States
during the second half of the 1950s).
80. In March 1954, Japanese fishermen aboard the Lucky Dragon, which was fishing in waters
some eighty to ninety miles from Bikini Atoll, suffered injuries and death from exposure to the fallout
from the U.S. atomic weapons test at Bikini. See J. SAMUEL WALKER, PERMISSIBLE DOSE: A HISTORY
OF RADIATION PROTECTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 19 (2000).
81. See, e.g., J.L. Kulp et al., Strontium-90 in Man, 125 SCIENCE 219, 219 (1957) (reviewing
previous studies, reporting results of world-wide investigation of strontium-90 contamination, and
concluding that the radioisotope could be “found in all human beings, regardless of age or geographic
location” as a result of radioactive fallout); see also COMMONER, supra note 66, at 51–57 (discussing
strontium-90 fallout contamination, implications for new understandings of the environment, and
relationship to human health).
82. See, e.g., E. Anderson et al., Radioactivity of People and Foods, 125 SCIENCE 1273 (1957)
(pointing to increased public concern regarding the “problems of widespread, low-level radioactive
contamination from nuclear weapons testing”). Much of the concern was directed at the movement of
strontium-90 through the biosphere and its residual deposition in the human body, leading scientists to
focus increasingly on an overall “body burden” for such substances. Id.
83. Id. Although there was some debate regarding the reparative abilities of cells and others
questioned whether there might be a “safe” threshold dose for somatic injury, the general view was that
radiation was a mutagen with no safe dose.
84. See WALKER, supra note 80, at 20.
85. Id. (quoted in WALKER, supra note 80, at 20).
86. Dr. Hermann J. Muller offered the following assessment to the National Academy of Sciences
in 1955:
So many of the public are already aware of the genetic damage produced by radiation that
their morale is weakened and their apprehensions are increased when they see that the
damage is denied by prominent sponsors of our national defense. Thus the door is opened for
their acceptance of the defeatist propaganda, which alleges that even the tests are seriously
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In an effort to resolve the controversy, the AEC and the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) launched a comprehensive study culminating in the 1956
Report, The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation, the first of a series of NAS
reports on the health effects of low-level radiation and one of the earliest efforts
to comprehensively assess a specific environmental hazard.87 The report did
not exactly provide the resolution the AEC sought but instead emphasized the
potential harm from low doses of radiation and urged that exposure to all
sources of radiation be kept as low as possible.88 Given the cumulative nature
of radiation exposure and the fact that people were already receiving a sizeable
dose from increasingly routine use of X-rays (not to mention background
radiation), the NAS report stressed the vital importance of focusing on the total
lifetime dose from all sources and keeping overall cumulative exposure to a
minimum.89 In response, the NCRP and its international counterpart both
reduced their permissible dose limits by one-third, and re-emphasized their
view that radiation exposures should be kept as low as practicable.90
The following year, Congress convened extensive hearings on “the nature
of radioactive fallout and its effects on man.”91 Much of the attention was
directed at efforts to get a handle on the nature and scope of the fallout problem
in the United States.92 Early fate and transport models were presented for the
purpose of mapping the distribution of radionuclides in the environment and
leading scientists gave extensive testimony on the potential harm posed to the

undermining the biological integrity of mankind. In this situation the only defensible or
effective course for our democratic society is to recognize the truth, to admit the damage, and
to base our case for continuance of tests on the weighing of the alternative consequences.
Nature of Radioactive Fallout, supra note 71, at 1057 (statement of Hermann J. Muller).
87. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION:
SUMMARY REPORTS FROM A STUDY BY THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (1956) [hereinafter
NRC, BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS].
88. Id. at 28 (noting the “basic fact that any additional radiation is undesirable . . . [and that]
society should hold additional radiation exposure as low as it possibly can”).
89. Id. at 30 (“We ought to keep all of our expenditures of radiation as low as possible. . . . From
the point of view of genetics, they are all bad.”).
90. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM. ON RADIATION PROT. & MGMT., MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE
RADIATION EXPOSURES TO MAN 1–2 (1958) (discussing downward revisions in maximum permissible
dose and noting that the NCRP “reemphasizes its long-standing philosophy that radiation exposures
from whatever sources should be as low as practical”); see also WALKER, supra note 80, at 22–23
(discussing reaction of NCRP and ICRP to 1956 NAS report); FED. RADIATION COUNCIL,
BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS, 23–25, 37
(1960) (discussing development of radiation protection standards and endorsing approach of maintaining
radiation doses as far below the recommended limits as practical).
91. See Nature of Radioactive Fallout, supra note 65.
92. Id. at 1 (statement of Representative Chet Hollifield, Chairman of the Special Subcommittee
on Radiation) (“It is the committee’s intention through the presentation of expert scientific testimony, to
trace the fallout cycle from the moment of the nuclear explosion, through the scattering of radioactive
debris in the atmosphere, its descent to the ground, and finally its effects on human beings, livestock,
and agriculture.”).
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general public and future generations.93 The question of safety came up most
directly in the context of establishing permissible dose levels. Lauriston Taylor,
head of the Atomic and Radiation Physics Division of the National Bureau of
Standards and a member of the NCRP, discussed the difficulties involved in
such an exercise:
In connection with the question of permissible dose standards, there are, as
I have indicated, a large number of variables, and a large number of
uncertainties. We do not now have, and probably will not have for a long
time, any quantitative evaluation of the risks involved. What somebody has
to do is to evaluate the risk due to radiation against the benefits from the
use of radiation, and the risk due to other things that affect our normal life.
In this connection I frequently feel compelled to say that this question of
radiation safety and permissible dosage standards is not a subject for which
there is a clean and simple answer. The whole question of setting radiation
exposure limits depends on physics and biology. It depends enormously on
ethics and morality, and on an enormous amount of good judgment and
good wisdom on the part of the people who are responsible for setting
them. It is by no means a clean-cut quantitative physical problem.94

Setting standards was hardly a simple technical exercise, nor would it ever be.
In radiation, well before it was the case for chemicals and other industrial
hazards, experts charged with assessing hazards and determining what was
“acceptable” recognized that they were aiming at a moving target. Safety, in
this view, could only be evaluated in the context of the hazards of everyday,
“normal life.” And there was certainly no reason to believe that expertise—
“good judgment and good wisdom” as Taylor put it—should not be at the
center of the exercise. Quantitative assessments, even where feasible, were
viewed as tools to guide the overall assessment rather than as ends in
themselves.
By the end of the 1950s, with the fallout controversy in full swing,
President Eisenhower appointed a new Federal Radiation Council (FRC) in an
effort to bring some coherence to the federal role in radiation safety.95 In 1960,
the FRC released its first set of radiation protection standards for workers and
the general population, recommending levels that were very similar to those of
the NCRP.96 In doing so, the FRC framed radiation protection as an exercise in
determining what level of health hazard would be acceptable in light of the

93. See, e.g, id. at 104–28, 130–34 (testimony and statement of Dr. W.W. Kellogg, Rand
Corporation) (reporting on efforts to model atmospheric transport and fallout of radioactive debris from
atomic explosions); id at 141–70 (testimony and statement of Dr. Lester Machta, U.S. Weather Bureau)
(discussing worldwide transport of radioactive debris from weapons testing).
94. Id. at 793 (statement of Lauriston Taylor).
95. See Executive Order 10,831 (1959); Pub. L. No. 86-373; 73 Stat. 688 (1959). The FRC was
abolished in 1970 and its responsibilities were transferred to the EPA.
96. See Fed. Radiation Council, Radiation Protection Guidance for Federal Agencies, 25 Fed.
Reg. 4402, 4402 (May 18, 1960).
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benefits of radiation.97 It noted, however, that there was “particular uncertainty
with the respect to the biological effects at very low doses and low-dose
rates.”98 In light of such uncertainty, the FRC concluded that it was “not
prudent . . . to assume that there is a safe level of radiation exposure below
which there is absolute certainty that no effect may occur.”99 Based on the
conservative assumption of a linear relationship between dose and biological
effect, the Council determined that radiation standards should thus be set at a
level that would build in as much safety as possible.100 In addition, “every
effort should be made to encourage the maintenance of radiation doses as far
below [the proposed radiation limits] as practicable.”101 This “as low as
practicable” standard, which would become a cornerstone of radiation
protection in the decades ahead, reflected a precautionary impulse in the face of
persistent uncertainty and the general inability to come up with precise risk
estimates.102 As such it comported with efforts underway in food safety and
other areas to develop a precautionary basis for protecting against a growing
number of environmental hazards.103
In a deeper sense, the mid-century controversy over low-level radiation
posed for the first time questions about widespread contamination of the global
environment as well as the long-term “biological integrity of mankind” in the
context of a vast new range of hazards.104 Even though the dangers associated
with fallout turned out to be relatively minor, the notion of cumulative body
burdens resulting from exposures to mutagenic agents that could travel very
long distances, persist in the environment for centuries, and cause harm to
future generations, seemed qualitatively different when compared to previous
hazards.105 The view that there was no absolutely “safe” level of exposure to
radiation, that biological effects were present at any dose, that some of these

97. Id. (“Fundamentally, setting radiation protection standards involves passing judgment on the
extent of the possible health hazard society is willing to accept in order to realize the known benefits of
radiation.”).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (noting that the uncertainty regarding low-level exposures combined with the “adoption of
the conservative hypothesis of a linear relation between biological effect and the amount of dose,
determines our basic approach to the formulation of radiation protection guides”).
101. Id.
102. This would come to be known as the ALARA (“as low as reasonably achievable”) standard.
See D.C. Kocher, Perspective on the Historical Development of Radiation Standards, 61 HEALTH PHYS.
519, 524–25 (1991) (discussing development of ALARA standard).
103. See infra discussion parts II.A.3 and II.A.4.
104. See Muller, supra note 86; see also Kulp et al., supra note 81; COMMONER, supra note 66, at
49–65.
105. See, e.g., NRC, BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS, supra note 87, at 29 (“The basic fact is—and no
competent persons doubt this—that radiations produce mutations and that mutations are in general
harmful. It is difficult, at the present state of knowledge of genetics, to estimate just how much of what
kind of harm will appear in each future generation after mutant genes are induced by radiations.
Different geneticists prefer differing ways of describing this situation: But they all come out with the
unanimous conclusion that the potential danger is great.”).

2012]

GENEALOGIES OF RISK

923

effects, no matter how small, would persist across generations, and that
“acceptable risk” provided the proper normative frame for evaluating these
risks would prove to be a harbinger of the challenges in the years ahead to deal
with the far more ubiquitous, and far more serious, problem of low-level
exposure to carcinogenic chemicals.106
2. Occupational Exposures and Threshold Limit Values
Like radiation, chemical hazards in the workplace became an increasingly
prominent concern during the middle decades of the twentieth century. As
America’s industrial economy expanded, the links between human health and
the working environment were subjected to more intense scrutiny. By the
1930s, industrial hygiene had become a professional lab-based pursuit, facing
the same basic challenge that confronted efforts to deal with the dangers of
radiation: how to establish “safe” levels of exposure.107 Given the many factors
involved and the different kinds of possible injury, however, efforts to establish
safe levels of exposure in the workplace proved far more complicated than
setting permissible limits for radiation exposure. Making the problem tractable
required moving away from the earlier field-based methods pioneered by Alice
Hamilton and others to embrace a more self-consciously scientific and
increasingly abstract way of thinking about hazards based on extrapolations
from laboratory research and animal experiments.108
This was made all the more challenging by the rapidly growing number of
chemicals in the workplace and the recognition that low-level exposures, long
latency periods, and chronic poisonings posed a formidable set of challenges.
For the first time, industrial hygienists began directing sustained attention to
carcinogens in the workplace and the incidence of occupational cancer.
Building on the pioneering work of Hamilton and others, Wilhelm Hueper
published his monumental study, Occupational Tumors and Allied Diseases in
1942,109 providing the first major survey of the international literature on
occupational causes of cancer and a hard-hitting assessment of the proliferation
of hazards associated with new synthetic chemicals in the workplace. Hueper’s
encyclopedic study offered a strong endorsement of “precaution” (his word) in
the face of a rapidly growing set of chemical hazards that was wreaking havoc
on the lives of countless workers across the industrialized world.110 In

106.
107.

See Part II.A.4 infra.
See Christopher Sellers, Factory as Environment: Industrial Hygiene, Professional
Collaboration and the Modern Sciences of Pollution, 18 ENVTL HIST. REV. 55, 67–68 (1994) (discussing
increasing professionalization and reliance on laboratory-based techniques in industrial hygiene during
first quarter of the twentieth century).
108. See SELLERS, supra note 61, at 179–84 (discussing shift from Alice Hamilton’s more
informal, field-based approach to laboratory and experimental methods).
109. WILHELM C. HUEPER, OCCUPATIONAL TUMORS AND ALLIED DISEASES (1942).
110. See id. at 9 (“Occupational cancers represent . . . a challenge to the industry as well as to
public health agencies, as they are the only malignant neoplasms the development and occurrence of
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Hueper’s view, “the new artificial environment” created by the proliferation of
industrial chemicals posed a distinct set of challenges for efforts to protect the
health of workers and the general public.111 Echoing sentiments expressed by
earlier public health researchers but reflecting a more expansive sense of the
possible role of law in preventing, rather than merely compensating for
industrial injury, Hueper concluded his study with a call for strong government
action to protect all citizens, rich and poor, against the new threats to human
health posed by industrialization:
The care, preservation, and improvement of the health of the people as a
whole represents one of the noblest and most important tasks of every
genuine and honest government. . . . The fundamental requirements for a
healthful living, not merely for a small, select, and socially privileged
group, but for the entirety of its citizens, must be safeguarded by suitable
laws adequately enforced.112

Translating this into practice, of course, was easier said than done.
In their efforts to develop a more rigorous, science-based approach to
workplace hazards, the new generation of industrial hygiene researchers that
came of age during the mid-twentieth century worked to formalize the concept
of a safe or threshold concentration level for particular substances in the
workplace as the key tool for protecting workers and maintaining a safe
working environment.113 This deceptively simple and quite powerful
conceptual innovation illustrated how abstract, general concepts could
transform complex, uncertain situations, often saturated with significant
political and ethical concerns, into technical matters.114 As Christopher Sellers

which can be largely or completely eliminated, if proper precautionary measures are taken to prevent
any undue contacts of the workers with the offending agents, or if the cancerigenic factors are excluded
from industrial operations.”); id. at 845 (“It is unfortunate that most laws dealing with occupational
disease including cancer emphasize the compensation feature for disability sustained, and neglect the
preventive aspect of these disorders.”). Hueper later became the founding director of the environmental
cancer section of the National Cancer Institute and had a major influence on efforts to regulate
carcinogens in the food supply. See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
111. See id. at 3–5 (discussing new artificial environment created by industrial chemicals and
multiple potential routes of human exposure).
112. Id. at 848. That Hueper was able to articulate a much more expansive view of government
involvement in health and safety regulation compared to the approach advanced by Alice Hamilton and
others in the 1920s, which identified company physicians as the primary agents responsible for ensuring
worker health and safety, indicated how much the world had changed since the New Deal and the rise of
the administrative state. See HAMILTON, supra note 61, at 541–42 (urging industrial physicians to carry
out their “duty” to safeguard the health of workers).
113. See SELLERS, supra note 61, at 174–75 (discussing development of safe or threshold
concentration in industrial hygiene); Sellers, supra note 107, at 57 (characterizing industrial hygiene as
“the first public health field in which the biomedical concepts of chemical physiology and toxicology
came to be regularly translated into more precise, quantitative ways of dealing with environmental
chemical hazards”).
114. See Dietrich Henschler, Exposure Limits: History, Philosophy, Future Developments, 28
ARCH. OCCUP. HYG. 79 (1984) (tracing historical development of occupational exposure limits); Jeffrey
M. Paull, The Origin and Basis of Threshold Limit Values, 5 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 227 (1984) (same);
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put it, “the safe concentration level purported to fasten on the point at which
worker and workplace fell out of physiological balance—the highest
atmospheric concentration at which a chemical remained harmless or the lowest
at which it turned harmful.”115
To be sure, many compromises and value choices were embedded in this
seemingly objective exercise, and the very idea of a sharp distinction between
safety and harm represented a dramatic simplification of the real working
environment.116 Writing in 1955, Herbert Stokinger, Chief Toxicologist for the
U.S. Public Health Service, cautioned that these concentration limits “should
not be regarded as fine lines between safe and dangerous concentrations, that is,
a point above which injury is bound to occur and below which complete safety
may be expected for all exposed persons.”117 “Competent judgment,” in
Stokinger’s view, was required to interpret and apply these standards in
particular situations.118
But these techniques and the quantitative standards that resulted tended to
take on a life of their own as they migrated from research to regulation. When
the first lists of concentration limits were compiled in the 1940s, everyone
seemed to recognize their provisional nature and few would have suggested
that they could substitute for experience and medical monitoring. In 1942, the
American Council of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a group
established four years earlier, compiled a list of existing state government
exposure limits for various chemicals, noting that the compilation was “not to
be construed as recommended safe concentrations.”119 Three years later,
industrial hygienist Warren Cook published a list of 136 exposure limits based
on his own analysis and a review of existing limits.120 As the first effort to
codify the available data on concentration limits, Cook’s list would prove to be
enormously influential.121 But Cook took pains to point out that his effort was
intended “to provide a handy yardstick to be used as guidance for the routine
control of these health hazards—not that compliance with the figures listed

SELLERS, supra note 61, at 175–76 (discussing development of concept of safe concentration levels in
the United States and the ways in which the exercise marginalized moral and political concerns).
115. Id. at 175.
116. See Henschler, supra note 114, at 83–89 (discussing “compromises” and simplifications
involved in establishing exposure limits, including inattention to variations in individual susceptibilities,
lack of knowledge and basic data, lack of long-term studies and reliance on animal testing, focus on
time-weighted average exposures rather than peak concentrations, single chemical approach with no
attention to “mixed exposures,” and the special challenge of carcinogens).
117. Herbert Stokinger, Standards for Safeguarding the Health of the Industrial Worker, 70 PUB.
HEALTH RPTS. 1, 6 (1955).
118. Id.
119. Quoted in Grace E. Zeim & Baryy I. Castleman, Threshold Limit Values: Historical
Perspectives and Current Practice, 31 J. OCCUP. MED. 910, 911 (1989).
120. Warren A. Cook, Maximum Allowable Concentrations of Industrial Atmospheric
Contaminants, 14 J. INDUS. MED. 936 (1945).
121. Id. See also Paull, supra note 114, at 230. See also Zeim & Castleman, supra note 119, at
911.
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would guarantee protection against ill health.”122 Adherence to such limits, in
his view, was no substitute for continued monitoring and adjustment as needed
to protect workers’ health.123
Within a few years, however, Cook’s warnings had been all but forgotten.
The ACGIH used Cook’s list as the basis for its own standards, referred to
initially as “maximum allowable concentrations” (MACs) and then as
“threshold limit values” (TLVs), endowing them in the process with a certain
authority that went well beyond their scientific basis.124 By defining TLVs as
“maximum average concentrations of contaminants to which workers may be
exposed for an 8-hour working day (day after day) without injury to health,”
the ACGIH indicated that these were health hazard thresholds and that keeping
exposures below the limits would provide protection against possible harm.125
In fact, most of the TLVs published by the ACGIH were the same values
published by Warren Cook in 1945, and there is no evidence that the group
performed any systematic review of these limits before repackaging them as
threshold limits capable of protecting workers’ health.126 Nevertheless, soon
after their release, TLVs were widely adopted by state and local governments
across the country eager to remove themselves from such a thorny area.127
What started as a “handy yardstick” intended to provide guidance to industrial
hygiene researchers had morphed into a set of uniform limits that purported to
draw a bright line between safe and unsafe.
In offering such precision, even if unwarranted by the facts, TLVs catered
to a general enthusiasm for scientific management in the modern factory and to
the desire of regulators and others for techniques that would allow them to
make legible and thereby govern the increasingly complex and contested world
of chemical hazards in the industrial workplace.128 At the heart of this effort
was a process of normalization, a triumph of population thinking that redefined
122.
123.
124.

See Cook, supra note 120.
Id.
See CORN, supra note 61. MACs were renamed as TLVs in 1948. See Zeim & Castleman,
supra note 119, at 911.
125. See Zeim & Castleman, supra note 119, at 911; Paull, supra note 114, at 233.
126. See Zeim & Castleman, supra note 119, at 911 (“Both the term used and its definition now
promoted the TLVs as health-hazard thresholds for exposure to chemical and mineral substances, many
of which were known to have serious, irreversible effects. . . . Despite the accompanying . . . assertion
that TLVs were based on the best available information, there is no evidence that any review was done
or new rationale offered to justify this sweeping disregard for the uncertainties underlying the TLVs.”).
127. Id. (noting that state and local agencies reduced their personnel in this area and stopped
issuing their own MACs in the early 1950s). Prior to this time, there had been significant variation in the
limits adopted by state and local governments.
128. See Sellers, supra note 107, at 74 (discussing role of industrial hygiene in laying the
foundation for a modern “toxicological approach” to industrial chemicals thereby “constitut[ing] another
step along the pathway blazed by scientific management: towards displacement of worker control of the
shop floor by that of trained middle-class professionals”). As Sellers also discusses, the expertise
developed in the area of industrial hygiene would translate directly into early investigations of air
pollution in the years to come. Id. at 74–75. See also THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE
PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995).
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worker safety in terms of time-weighted average exposures to and responses by
the average worker based largely on laboratory research and animal toxicity
tests.129 “Man” (and it was almost always adult white men who provided the
basis for these averaging exercises) became an abstract “standardized machine”
in the conceptual models and extrapolative exercises used to develop TLVs.130
The inherent variability among individuals, the problems involved in
extrapolating from animals to humans, the difficulties of sorting out
interactions between multiple chemical exposures, the possibilities of longerterm sub-clinical effects such as subtle neurological harms—all of these were
marginalized, even erased, by the deep simplifications embedded in the concept
of threshold limits values.
Viewed as a technology, TLVs proved to be an immensely important
innovation in occupational health and safety and, increasingly, in the larger
world of environmental science and regulation. In purporting to delineate the
boundary between safe and unsafe, these standards exercised considerable
epistemic authority regarding the complex world of industrial chemicals,
implying that the hazards associated with industrial chemicals could be known
and controlled, that safety was attainable.131 But in practice TLVs were like
any standard; they could always be challenged, even manipulated. And there is
little question that some of the resulting standards reflected the professional and
political-economic biases of those responsible for developing them.132
Moreover, as standards based on a dynamic set of knowledge practices
regarding the impacts of industrial chemicals on workers’ health, TLVs were
inherently unstable. As new and improved analytical techniques allowed
occupational health researchers to move further beyond experience in
determining whether low-level exposures led to increasingly subtle responses,
the logic behind TLV’s pushed relentlessly towards downward revision. In the
process, safety became increasingly relative—a fluid concept dependent upon a
rapidly changing set of underlying knowledge practices and an increasingly
abstract conception of the normal, average man.
129.
130.

See SELLERS, supra note 61.
A.I.G. McLaughlin, Medical Inspector of Factories for the United Kingdom, voiced
significant concern about the use of these techniques to protect worker health and safety. See A.I.G.
McLaughlin, The Prevention of the Dust Diseases, 262 LANCET 49, 52 (1953) (“Individuals, too, vary
greatly in their capacity to deal with dusts, and of two men who have been working at the same job for
the same length of time one may get a disease of the lungs and the other may be unaffected. This is one
reason why I am not greatly impressed by the validity of what are known as the maximum allowable
concentrations of dusts (M.A.C.), of which lists have been drawn up in various countries. The MACs
seem to be based on the assumption that man is a standardized machine, which clearly he is not.”); see
also Ziem & Castleman, supra note 119, at 912 (quoting McLaughlin and other British authorities on the
problems with the TLV concept).
131. See generally SELLERS, supra note 61 (discussing general issues with establishing health
thresholds).
132. See Ziem & Castleman, supra note 119, at 912–14 (noting that very few physicians were
involved in the work of the TLV committee and that representatives of various industrial firms and trade
associations exercised considerable influence on the work of the committee and its leadership).
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3. Tolerances and Safety Factors
If the effort to understand and regulate occupational exposures proved
more challenging than radiation, it paled in comparison to the difficulties of
dealing with chemicals in food. Diet was a major pathway of potential lowlevel exposures to various chemicals for the general population. The universe
of chemicals in food, including additives, dyes, pesticide residues, and other
environmental contaminants was also far larger than the number of chemicals
relevant to occupational exposures and it was growing rapidly. Significant
variability in diet and sensitivities across the population made it very difficult
to identify, much less quantify, possible harm from the range of actual
exposures. During the 1920s and 1930s, moreover, the ongoing problems with
pesticide residues on foods combined with increased use of chemical
preservatives and other additives underscored the severely limited ability of
federal regulators to maintain even a semblance of adequate protection.133
In light of these limitations, efforts to update the 1906 Pure Food and Drug
Act had been underway for years. But for various reasons the legislation had
stalled until 1937, when more than 100 people died after ingesting Elixir
Sulfanilamide, a commercial compound developed using the highly toxic
solvent diethylene glycol—because of its agreeable smell and taste—without
any testing of the solvent’s toxicity.134 This dramatic case of mass poisoning
made it impossible to stop enactment of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics
Act of 1938 (FFDCA), one of the last significant pieces of New Deal
legislation.135 The FFDCA strengthened the 1906 Act in several respects:
requiring new drugs to be tested for safety by the manufacturer before they
could be sold to the public; prohibiting all unnecessary or avoidable
“poisonous” or “deleterious” substances added to foods; and charging the
newly created Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with determining “safe
tolerances” for those substances that were required as part of the production
process or could not be avoided in good manufacturing practice.136 Like other
New Deal statutes, the FFDCA delegated significant authority to the newly
created FDA to investigate potentially hazardous substances and establish
safety regulations, creating the basis for one of the first modern regulatory
systems built around the concept of safety.

133. See W.B. White, Poisonous Spray Residues on Vegetables, 25 INDUS. & ENG’G CHEMISTRY
621, 621–23 (1933) (discussing “reckless use of insecticides” on vegetable crops and limits of federal
authority to protect public health from spray residues); Walter S. Frisbie, Federal Control of Spray
Residues on Fruits and Vegetables, 26 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 369, 369–73 (1936) (discussing challenges
confronting federal regulation of spray residue problem).
134. See PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 89–93 (2003).
135. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 301 (1938)).
136. Id. § 402(a)(1).
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As such, the FFDCA reflected a growing sense that government played a
necessary role in protecting people against the gathering, largely unseen forces
of industrialism.137 Yet, by the time it was enacted, the 1938 FFDCA was
badly outmatched by the flood of new food chemicals and pesticides coming to
market—a problem that only worsened with the end of World War II when a
whole new suite of synthetic organic pesticides, some of them developed as
part of the war effort, became commercially available, overwhelming the
ability of government to do even the most basic testing, much less regulate in
an orderly fashion. Although DDT was the most famous of these, and garnered
the most attention, it was only the beginning of a “new era in pesticides” that
raised a host of challenging questions about the adequacy of current laws and
the ability of the government to ensure safety.138 By 1947, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) estimated that some 25,000 pesticides had been
registered or licensed for use under the original Insecticide Act of 1910 and the
numbers were growing rapidly.139
Congress responded with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) of 1947 in an effort to create a more robust licensing
framework for the growing number of “economic poisons” being deployed in
U.S. agriculture.140 But unlike the FFDCA passed almost a decade earlier,
FIFRA provided no authority for the government to ban individual chemicals
on the basis of possible harm. Rather, the new statute focused exclusively on
labeling to ensure proper handling and use.141 Even if the Secretary of
Agriculture had serious concerns about the safety of a particular pesticide, he
was compelled to issue the registration “under protest” and then pursue
withdrawal in a judicial forum.142 This left the FFDCA system of tolerances,
which placed the burden of establishing such tolerances on the government, as

137. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) (“The purposes of this legislation
[FFDCA] thus touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern
industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.”).
138. See, e.g., C.W. Crawford, Pesticides and the Food Law, 4 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.Q. 132, 134
(1949) (“The new era in pesticides, ushered in by the advent of DDT, has brought with it a host of
public-health problems. Accurate knowledge of the seriousness and extent of those problems is not
keeping pace with the development and use of the newer pesticides. . . . [I]t is apparent that too many of
the newer products have been rushed into production and use before sufficient investigation of their
potential hazards and before users are sufficiently educated to avoid procedures that unnecessarily
contaminate foods, and thus jeopardize public safety.”); see also THOMAS R. DUNLAP, DDT:
SCIENTISTS, CITIZENS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1981) (discussing history of DDT and efforts to regulate
the pesticide).
139. See JOHN WARGO, OUR CHILDREN’S TOXIC LEGACY: HOW SCIENCE & LAW FAIL TO
PROTECT US FROM PESTICIDES 70 (1996).
140. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat. 163
(codified as amended 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1947)).
141. Id. § 136(a).
142. The 1964 amendments to FIFRA eliminated this system of “protest registrations” and allowed
the Secretary to refuse to register the compound or to cancel or suspend an existing registration. Pub. L.
No. 88–305, 78 Stat. 190 (1964).
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the only potential source of federal authority that could protect the food supply
from dangerous pesticide residues and other chemicals.143
The main problem with this overall approach was that the tools and
techniques for evaluating many of these chemicals were just being developed
and could not keep up with the increased number of synthetic organic
pesticides.144 More importantly, understanding and assessing latent effects
from chronic, low-level exposure to these new chemicals posed a qualitatively
different set of challenges for regulators than acute poisonings. The challenge
was similar in many respects to that of understanding health impacts from lowlevel exposures to radiation and chemicals in the workplace. In its 1949 annual
report, the FDA summarized the dilemma facing efforts to protect public
health:
Many new and very potent insecticides were developed during the war and
came into general use before their safety, over a long period of continued
use, was established. . . . The real danger in inadequately tested insecticides
lies in chronic poisoning resulting from the long-time consumption of
minute amounts of the substances. Studies of chronic poisoning require
nearly 3 years, and many compounds have been put into commercial use
before such tests could be completed. Under the law, the Food and Drug
Administration cannot take action against a suspected chronic poison until
its toxicity has been proven.145

Indeed, under the law, before the FDA could even convene the requisite
hearings on a chemical to establish a tolerance, the Agency had to compile the
necessary scientific evidence to propose a tolerance. The process proved
woefully inadequate. As Paul Dunbar, Commissioner of Food and Drugs during
the late 1940s, put the matter: “We knew too little about many of these
insecticides to hold hearings and establish safe tolerances.”146
The situation raised serious concerns. “To commercialize a poison before
its potentialities are known is to use the public as guinea pigs,” wrote C.W.

143.
144.

Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 402(a)(1).
See, e.g., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., FED. SEC. AGENCY ANN. REP. 572 (1949) (“The synthetic
organic insecticides, of which DDT was the forerunner, have increased in number and complexity. The
need for more refined methods of detecting their residues in foods, and of evaluating the toxicity of such
residues, continues unabated.”).
145. See FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., FED. SEC. AGENCY ANN. REP. 514 (1950).
146. See Paul B. Dunbar, The Food and Drug Administration Looks at Insecticides, 4 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 233, 235 (1949). Dunbar elaborated:
During the war, a large number of new and very potent insecticides had been developed.
Little was known about their toxicity to the person who applied the sprays or to the consumer
who ate the finished food product. In several cases we didn’t even have methods for accurate
estimation of the residual spray left on or absorbed by the food product. We didn’t know
whether the residues remained intact, whether they were altered by weathering to nontoxic or
more toxic residues, whether they could be removed by washing, or whether they were
absorbed into the plant structures and, therefore, could not be removed.
Id.
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Crawford, Assistant Commissioner for Food and Drugs.147 “It is true,” he
continued, “that a proper investigation of toxicity is expensive and timeconsuming, but it is equally true that this is a far more sound and prudent
investment than to rush into production and use without the insurance against
disaster that such investigations give.”148 A 1948 editorial in the Journal of the
American Medical Association made a similar point, lamenting that “so little
[was] known about either the acute or chronic pathologic effects on man of
these new pesticides” and noting that “[e]ven though added controls may
impede the development of pesticides, these are essential precautions which
must be taken to avoid the danger of mass poisoning.”149
In response to these concerns, the House of Representatives convened a
Select Committee to Investigate the Use of Chemicals in Food Products in
1950.150 Chaired by Congressman James Delaney of New York, the Delaney
Committee, as it was known, conducted a series of hearings over the next
several years on the “nature, extent, and effect of the use of chemicals,
compounds, and synthetics in the production processing, preparation and
packaging of food products.”151 Much of the attention at the initial hearings
focused on the current state of tolerances for pesticide residues.152
Given the inadequacies of the current approach, many of the witnesses
recommended that no chemical be permitted entry into the nation’s food supply
unless its safety had been documented—standard practice for new drugs under
the 1938 FFDCA.153 By placing the burden of establishing pesticide tolerances
squarely on the government and by failing to provide any ability to control or
regulate the use of pesticides in advance of an issued tolerance, the FFDCA
failed to protect the public from pesticide residues while it conducted the

147.
148.
149.

Crawford, supra note 138, at 135.
Id.
Editorial, Pesticides: Chemical Contaminants in Foods, 137 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1604, 1605

(1948).
150. See Investigation of the Use of Chemicals in Food Products, H.R. Res. 323, 81st Cong.
(1950).
151. Id. In 1951, the Committee was given the additional mandate of investigating the use of
chemicals in the production of cosmetics, and the Committee’s name was changed to the Select
Committee to Investigate the Use of Chemicals in Food and Cosmetics. The Committee held extensive
hearings between 1950 and 1952, receiving testimony from over 200 witnesses, including government
officials, prominent scientists, industry representatives, medical and health organizations, and consumer
groups. See Investigation of the Use of Chemicals in Foods and Cosmetics, H.R. REP. NO. 82-2356, at
1–3 (1952), reprinted in 12 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, & COSMETIC ACT
AND ITS AMENDMENTS 499, 499–501 (1979) [hereinafter Delaney Committee Report] (recounting
history of the Select Committee).
152. See Delaney Committee Report, supra note 151.
153. Id. at 523 (“The strong recommendation of most of the witnesses before the committee was
that no chemical should be permitted entry into the nation’s food supply until its safety for use has been
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also id. at 525 (recommending amendment to FFDCA
“to require that chemicals employed in or on our foods be subjected to substantially the same safety
requirements as now exist for new drugs and meat products”).
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necessary proceedings to establish tolerances.154 By the early 1950s, more than
fifteen years after passage of the FFDCA, the FDA had issued tolerance
regulations limiting pesticide residues in only a single instance.155
In response to these shortcomings and the publicity created by the Delaney
Committee’s hearings, Congress amended the FFDCA in 1954,156 establishing
that any raw agricultural commodity with a pesticide residue would be
considered adulterated under the Act unless the residue was within a tolerance
that had been issued by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.157
Henceforth, all residues had to have a tolerance and the burden was shifted to
the manufacturer to “establish the safety of such pesticide-chemical residue” in
tolerance proceedings.158 Finally, the amendments expressly provided that the
Secretary could establish a “zero tolerance” if the scientific data did not justify
a higher level.159
Notwithstanding these welcomed burden-shifting provisions, the new
amendments reinforced the significant knowledge gap confronting government
regulators. The FDA still faced the enormous task of evaluating individual
safety cases and establishing tolerances for thousands of compounds. And even
if the government could find the capacity to manage such a process, the
underlying challenge of interpreting animal tests and extrapolating to humans
had no obvious resolution.
To address these challenges, Dr. Arnold Lehman and others at the FDA
developed the concept of safety factors in the early 1950s as way of
compensating for some of the uncertainties in the translation of animal test data
into regulatory standards. In a 1954 article, Lehman and his colleague O.G.
Fitzhugh advanced the notion that chemicals in food should be subjected to a
“100-fold margin of safety” in extrapolating from animal tests.160 The rationale
for choosing such a safety factor was based on the assumption that human
154. Id. at 520 (“But the setting of tolerances does not give the Food and Drug Administration any
advance control over the use of pesticides. Unless the manufacturer conducts adequate chronic toxicity
tests for a new pesticide, the Government is powerless until it completes its own toxicity tests and
conducts a formal public hearing for the purpose of issuing tolerance regulations. Both procedures
consume more time than is consistent with efficient protection of the public health.”).
155. See REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 7125 AMENDING THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND
COSMETIC ACT WITH RESPECT TO RESIDUES OR PESTICIDE CHEMICALS IN OR ON RAW AGRICULTURAL
COMMODITIES, H.R. REP. NO. 82-1385, at 2 (1954), reprinted in 12 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT AND ITS AMENDMENTS 833, 834 (1979) [hereinafter 1954
Pesticide Amendment Committee Report].
156. An Act to Amend the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act with Respect to Residues of
Pesticide Chemicals in or on Raw Agricultural Commodities, Pub. L. No. 518–559, 68 Stat. 511 (1954).
157. Id. (codified as § 408(a)(a)) (providing that pesticide chemical will be deemed unsafe unless
within a tolerance prescribed by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare). This authority was
transferred to EPA in 1970.
158. See 1954 Pesticide Amendment Committee Report, supra note 155, at 837.
159. Id. at 512.
160. See A.J. Lehman & O.G. Fitzhugh, 100-Fold Margin of Safety, 18 ASS’N FOOD & DRUG
OFFICIALS U.S. Q. BULL. 33 (1954) (advancing notion of 100-fold margin of safety as a way to establish
“safe” levels of exposure for humans based on animal toxicity tests).
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beings were “about 10 times as sensitive to poisons as the rat” and that a “sick
individual may be as much as 10 times more susceptible to toxic substances
than an individual in good health.”161 In other words, Lehman and Fitzhugh
concluded, largely on the basis of their own judgment and experience, that a
potentially 10-fold greater sensitivity in humans when compared to test animals
combined with a potentially 10-fold difference in susceptibility among
members of the human population yielded a safety factor of 100. Accordingly,
the “safe” level for any particular food chemical in humans was determined by
dividing the lowest “‘no effect ’level” observed in animal tests by the safety
factor of 100.162 This pragmatic approach to the problem of uncertainty was
obviously more intuitive than scientific:
The “100-fold margin of safety” is a good target but not an absolute
yardstick as a measure of safety. There are no scientific or mathematical
means by which we can arrive at an absolute value. . . . Since man can
seldom be used as an experimental subject, reliance for the evaluation of
the toxicity of a substance must ordinarily be placed upon studies in
laboratory animals. Even then it cannot be said for certain that lack of
toxicity in animals will necessarily forecast what may occur in man.
However, the selection of the 100-fold margin of safety serves as a
reasonable safeguard to minimize the danger. 163

The 100-fold safety factor was subsequently codified in FDA regulations and
found widespread use throughout the world.164 As a tool for managing
uncertainty, it allowed animal testing to be translated into “safe” concentrations
of chemicals in food without having to develop complex mathematical
extrapolation models,165 reflecting a frank recognition of the limits of
knowledge and a prudent approach to the task of operationalizing safety.
4. The Special Problem of Carcinogens
Although the Delaney Committee was charged with investigating the use
of all chemicals in food, the problem of carcinogens occupied a special place in
its mandate.166 This reflected both the growing public face of cancer in the
United States167 and the recognition that carcinogens posed particular

161.
162.

Id. at 34.
Id.; see also Hutt, supra note 67, at 20 (discussing history of 100-fold safety factor); Michael
L. Dourson & Jerry F. Stara, Regulatory History and Experimental Support of Uncertainty (Safety)
Factors, 3 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 224, 225 (1983) (same).
163. Lehman & Fitzhugh, supra note 160, at 35.
164. See Dourson & Sara, supra note 162.
165. See Daniel Krewski et al., Determining ‘Safe’ Levels of Exposure: Safety Factors or
Mathematical Models, 4 FUNDAMENTAL & APPLIED TOXICOLOGY 383 (1994) (discussing differences
between safety factor approach and mathematical models in extrapolating from animal tests to humans).
166. See Delaney Committee Report, supra note 151, at 5 (discussing attention of Delaney
Committee to possible carcinogens in food additives and pesticides and noting “the definite lack of
knowledge on the subject”).
167. See MUKHERJEE, supra note 65; PATTERSON, supra note 65.
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challenges for regulation. The basic question was whether a threshold dose
could be established (standard practice in the case of non-carcinogens) or
whether cancer-inducing compounds should be treated differently. If it turned
out that certain chemicals acted as mutagens, like radiation, then the conclusion
was obvious: there was no absolutely safe, threshold dose.
Given the very limited understanding of the mechanisms of
carcinogenesis, the lack of any systematic effort to determine the number,
much less the potency, of carcinogens in the food supply and the broader
environment, and only a vague appreciation for the fact that many
environmentally induced cancers emerged after long latency periods, it was not
at all clear that the question whether a “safe” level of exposure existed could
ever be answered. One possible way forward was to refine and elaborate the
use of animal tests as proxies for human experience. But this approach also
involved a series of challenging analytical and normative questions. Decisions
had to be made about the appropriate types of animals, relevant levels of
exposure, and techniques for extrapolating from animal models to human
beings. Embedded within this exercise were important technical and logistical
questions regarding study design as well as questions about the availability of
resources needed to test thousands of chemicals in a manner that would
generate the information needed to evaluate whether long-term exposures to
low-levels of chemicals in the environment would cause cancer.168 And, of
course, the big question looming in the background was whether evidence that
a particular chemical caused cancer in test animals meant that it was a potential
human carcinogen.
For a number of leading cancer researchers, the prudent course was to
assume that evidence of carcinogenicity in animals provided a sufficient basis
for treating such chemicals as potential carcinogens for humans. In an early
1950 article on chemical carcinogens, the Director of the National Cancer
Institute, J.R. Heller articulated the basic idea:
Considering that a danger of the chemical carcinogens lies in the slow,
almost unnoticeable harm that comes from contact with them, it might be
wise from a preventive point of view to consider all chemical agents which
have elicited cancer in animals as having the potential properties for
producing cancer in the human organism. 169

168. The 1970 Ad Hoc Committee Report to the Surgeon General on the Evaluation of Low Levels
of Environmental Carcinogens estimated that 20,000 compounds would need to be tested by bioassay as
part of a comprehensive screening program. Such an endeavor would cost $1 billion and greatly
exceeded the laboratory and professional resources then available. See AD HOC COMM. EVALUATION OF
LOW LEVELS OF ENVTL CHEM. CARCINOGENS, EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CARCINOGENS:
REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL (1970), reprinted in Chemicals and the Future of Man, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization and Government Research of the S. Comm. on
Government Operations, 92d Cong. 187 (1971) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CARCINOGENS] .
169. J.R. Heller, Chemical Carcinogens, 2 ARCH. IND. HYGIENE 390, 393 (1950); see also id. at
399 (“In view of the lack of knowledge of where the danger lies, or the extent of it, no one is in position
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This view was later endorsed by the International Union Against Cancer
(IUAC), the leading international forum for cancer research and policy. At its
Sixth International Cancer Congress in Sao Paulo, Brazil in 1954, the IUAC
adopted a resolution addressing the animal-to-human extrapolation challenge:
In the case of agents whose carcinogenicity for man is not known but
which elicit cancer in experiments conducted upon animals—although it is
recognized that the development of cancer in response to such materials
may be conditioned by the type of exposure, notably the species of animals
or the route of administration—it is not prudent to regard such agents as
harmless for man.170

At the same time, the IUAC also adopted a resolution rejecting the notion that
there could be a safe or threshold dose for carcinogens: the “concept of ‘safe
threshold doses’ are [sic] dubious where complete control of a hasard [sic]
involving exposure to carcinogenic agents is desired.”171 The leading
international forum on cancer thus drew a sharp distinction between substances
with threshold effects and those inducing irreversible effects, such as
carcinogens, for which no safe threshold level of exposure could be defined,
and it endorsed the view that animal tests could serve as indicators of
carcinogenicity in humans.
Two years later, the participants at the 1956 IUAC meeting extended this
line of thinking, recommending unanimously that “as a basis for active cancer
prevention, the proper authorities of various countries promulgate and enact
adequate rules and regulations prohibiting the addition to food of any
substances having potential carcinogenicity.”172 As understood by the IUAC, a
potential carcinogen referred to “any substance which has been convincingly
demonstrated to be carcinogenic to animals, and though not yet shown to act as
such in man, could be suspected of possibly having a similar effect in man.”173
Early cancer researchers thus urged extensive laboratory testing with
animals before new chemicals would be permitted for use in the food supply. If
such studies revealed evidence of carcinogenicity, the chemicals should not be
allowed in the food supply. Although far from perfect, such an approach
appeared to offer the only viable way forward given the obvious problems of
trying to draw any sort of definitive conclusions based on direct experience.
Animal testing, in other words, provided the only realistic means for
confronting the basic problem of ignorance that confronted cancer researchers
and regulators.

to say today just what remedial action is needed. But in view of what we do know, we have to consider
precautionary action now to protect the workers involved and the general public.”).
170. See Resolutions Adopted by the Symposium on Cancer Prevention, 6th International Cancer
Congress (1954), reprinted in 11 ACTA 1, 72 (1955).
171. Id. at 73.
172. See Int’l Union Against Cancer, Report of Symposium on Potential Cancer Hazards from
Chemical Additives and Contaminants to Foodstuffs, 13 ACTA 170, 193 (1957).
173. Id. at 187.
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But even this approach was fraught with uncertainty and made all the
more challenging by the fact that existing screening and testing programs were
weak to non-existent. Hueper, serving at the time as chairman of the Cancer
Prevention Committee of the IUAC, emphasized “[t]he present state of highly
defective knowledge in such matters as well as the almost universal lack of a
comprehensive and competent program of investigation and supervision of
health and cancer hazards from food additives and contaminants . . . .”174 In his
testimony at the 1957 Food Additives hearings, Hueper elaborated:
I do not believe that one can establish a safe dose of carcinogens. I do not
think that we have the method or evidence available by which we can
reliably determine a safe dose. In fact, we have no safe dose for any
environmental carcinogen including radioactive substances. You probably
know or you remember that the so-called maximum permissible dose of
radioactive exposure has been lowered in recent years several times. So we
are still in the twilight area in which we do not know exactly when and
where a safe dose for an environmental carcinogen may be placed. I believe
from the total evidence we have on environmental carcinogenic agents . . .
that we would be wise as a precautionary measure to exclude as far as that
is practicable any addition of carcinogens to our food supply. 175

Others prominent scientists agreed.176 The implication for policy was
straightforward: given the significant uncertainty, even ignorance, confronting
efforts to understand whether certain chemicals caused cancer, evidence of
carcinogenicity in animals provided a useful proxy for human experience.

174. W.C. Hueper, The Potential Role of Non-Nutritive Food Additives and Contaminants as
Environmental Carcinogens, 13 ACTA 220, 243 (1957). Hueper further noted that a “disturbing aspect
of [rapid introduction of new chemicals in the food supply] is that there exists no mandatory provision
for assuring, a priori, that biologic properties of each of these additives and contaminants, particularly
later long term or delayed effects, have adequately been studied.” Id. at 220.
175. Food Additives, Hearing before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on Bills to Amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with Respect to Chemical
Additives in Food, 85th Cong. 372 (1957) (statement of Dr. W.C. Hueper), reprinted in 14 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT AND ITS AMENDMENTS 163, 534 (1979)
[hereinafter Food Additives Hearings]; see also id. (concluding that “it would be a wise precautionary
measure not to add any chemicals to our food supply which produce cancer either in man or in
experimental animals”).
176. See, e.g., Food Additives Hearings, supra note 175, at 337 (statement of Dr. Blackwell Smith)
(“I do not think that the exclusion of carcinogens would in itself cause any serious inconvenience. The
basic problem, it seems to me, is that we cannot know what the long-term effect of any new chemical on
human beings will be until those human beings have lived out their life span and we have had a chance
to observe them throughout their lives. That means a whole generation of observation.”); id. at 538
(statement of Dr. Herbert E. Carter) (“One of the most important difficulties is the lack of an adequate
basis for evaluating the dose-response relationship. Establishment of such a relationship is necessary in
order to decide whether there is really a harmless dose level of a carcinogen. I would not go so far as Dr.
Hueper and say unconditionally that there is no such thing as a harmless level for a carcinogen; without
present knowledge it simply is not possible to answer this question one way or another.”).
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Moreover, given that there was no “safe” dose for carcinogens, a principle of
“zero tolerance” appeared to be the only way to ensure safety.177
In 1958, Congressman Delaney added his famous anti-cancer clause to a
package of food additives amendments to the FFDCA, giving this strong
precautionary approach to carcinogens the force of law by effectively banning
food additives that had been shown to induce cancer in animals or humans.178
Under the new provision, no food additive
shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by
man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the
evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or
animal.179

The Delaney Clause, as it came to be known, traced its origins directly to the
work of early cancer researchers such as Hueper and the IUAC,180 firmly
embedding the non-threshold view of carcinogenesis in U.S. law as part of an
affirmative embrace of precaution in the face of uncertainty.
Almost immediately, the Delaney Clause came under attack, initially on
grounds that it did not allow scientists to exercise judgment and, later, on
grounds that it was unrealistic in the face of a burgeoning universe of potential
carcinogens.181 But the clause also had many staunch defenders, including
prominent scientists, and it would prove to have remarkable staying power

177. Some of the witnesses at the 1957 hearings on Delaney’s proposal put the matter in ethical
terms. See, e.g., Food Additives Hearings, supra note 175, at 337 (testimony of Dr. Blackwell Smith)
(“There is . . . no moral justification for obliging consumers, many of whom are children, with life
expectancies serving the long latent period of carcinogens, to accept such needless risks. Most of us are
dependent upon processed foods for life. We do not have the opportunity to exercise choice, as we do
have in the case of exposure to carcinogens in smoking.”).
178. Food Additives Amendment, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784, 1786 (1958) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A)).
179. Id.
180. Congressman Delaney made this point directly in his remarks during the floor debate on the
proposed amendments. See 1958 Cong. Rec. 17,420 (1958) (statement of James J. Delaney), reprinted in
14 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT AND ITS AMENDMENTS
866, 874 (1979) (“This particular provision followed the recommendation of the International Union
Against Cancer at its cancer symposium held in Rome in 1956. At that time, the members of the
conference, consisting of over 40 cancer experts from some 21 countries, unanimously recommended
that as a basis for active cancer prevention, the proper authorities of various countries promulgate and
enact adequate rules and regulations prohibiting the addition to food of substances found to be cancer
inducing.”).
181. See discussion infra note 229. The famous “cranberry scare” of 1959 provided fodder for
early critics of the Delaney Clause. In November 1959, some two weeks before Thanksgiving, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare announced that traces of the herbicide amintriazole (3AT) had been detected on cranberries from Oregon and Washington. Because there was evidence that
aminotriazole was carcinogenic, the Department, acting on the same principle that motivated the
Delaney Clause, ordered the impoundment of more than 3 million pounds cranberries for testing,
causing significant losses for the cranberry industry and fueling public fears about carcinogens in food
despite the fact that there was very little evidence of any health hazard at the levels detected. See
Andrews, supra note 36, at 213–14 (discussing cranberry scare and its relationship to recently enacted
Delaney Clause).
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despite all of the criticism.182 In 1960, Arthur Flemming, the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, offered a strong early defense of the Delaney
Clause, rejecting the notion that it somehow undermined the exercise of
scientific judgment:
The rallying point against the anticancer provision is the catch phrase that it
takes away the scientist’s right to exercise judgment. The issue thus made
is a false one, because the clause allows the exercise of all the judgment
that can safely be exercised on the basis of our present knowledge. The
clause is grounded on the scientific fact of life that no one, at this time, can
tell us how to establish for man a safe tolerance for a cancer-producing
agent. Until cancer research makes a breakthrough on this point, there
simply is no scientific basis on which judgment or discretion could be
exercised in tolerating a small amount of a known carcinogenic color or
food additive. 183

It is important to recognize, therefore, that the Delaney Clause reflected, and
was seen to reflect, the state of scientific knowledge at the time. It was a
science-based approach to carcinogens.
Without question, there were problems with its application and
contradictory results depending on how a specific chemical ended up in or on
food.184 When viewed from the contemporary perspective of hard-path risk
assessment, moreover, the efforts of Hueper, Delaney, and others to prevent the
release of cancer causing chemicals (whether in the workplace, the food supply,
or the broader environment) seem naïve and unworkable—a misguided attempt
to establish a blanket prohibition on cancer-causing chemicals that failed to
take account of the benefits that might come from such substances.185 Taken on
its own terms and placed in proper historical context, however, the Delaney
Clause and the approach to scientific knowledge that it stood for represented a
perfectly defensible approach to the regulation of carcinogens. It was a
different kind of thinking that reflected a different view of the world—one
marked by recognition of irreducible uncertainties and a sense of humility
regarding the limits of human understanding in the face of an unknown
universe of potentially carcinogenic chemicals.

182. Although FDA and EPA found various ways to work around some of the more difficult
implications of Delaney, the clause itself was not “fixed” until the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act.
These developments are beyond the scope of this Article.
183. Color Additive Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th
Cong. 499–501 (1960) (statement of Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare).
184. See Richard A. Merrill, Food Safety Regulation: Reforming the Delaney Clause, 18 ANN.
REV. PUB. HEALTH 313 (1997) (discussing problems with application of Delaney Clause); NAT’L RES.
COUNCIL, REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD: THE DELANEY PARADOX (1987) (discussing uneven
application of the Delaney Clause with respect to pesticide residues in raw and processed foods).
185. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 10 (criticizing the Delaney Clause as scientifically and technically
naïve).
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Searching for Safety

In the years following passage of the Delaney Clause, the connections
between industrial chemicals, environmental contamination, and chronic
disease, most notably cancer, became a major national issue. Rachel Carson
published Silent Spring in 1962, drawing extensively on the work of Hueper
and others and raising serious questions about the adequacy of existing laws.186
“The most alarming of all man’s assaults upon the environment,” she wrote,
is the contamination of air, earth, rivers, and sea with dangerous and even
lethal materials. This pollution is for the most part irrecoverable; the chain
of evil it initiates not only in the world that must support life but in living
tissues is for the most part irreversible. In this now universal contamination
of the environment, chemicals are the sinister and little-recognized partners
of radiation in changing the very nature of the world—the very nature of its
life.187

During this time, a new focus on “environmental health” emerged as part of a
larger embrace of ecology and a recognition that technology, broadly
understood, posed a very real threat to human and natural communities.188
Thus, in its inaugural 1962 report to the Surgeon General, the U.S. Public
Health Service’s newly formed Committee on Environmental Health Problems
urged that the mission of public health needed to be “enlarged to include
provision for the positive protection of the healthy against the adverse
influences of a more complex technological society which operates in evermore
crowded communities.”189Echoing these sentiments, Secretary of the Interior
Stewart Udall warned in his 1963 classic, The Quiet Crisis, of “the growing
imbalance between the works of man and the works of nature.”190 In the new

186.
187.
188.

See CARSON, supra note 66.
Id. at 6.
See, e.g., Eugene P. Odum, The New Ecology, 14 BIOSCIENCE 14, 15 (1964) (advocating for a
“new ecology” based on a more holistic, systems-based approach with applications for understanding
and solving problems of resource depletion and environmental degradation); Eugene P. Odum, The
Strategy of Ecosystem Development, 164 SCIENCE 262, 266–67 (1969) [hereinafter Odum, The Strategy
of Ecosystem Development ] (“Until recently mankind has more or less taken for granted the . . .
protective functions of self-maintaining ecosystems, chiefly because neither his numbers nor his
environmental manipulations have been great enough to affect regional and global balances. Now, of
course, it is painfully evident that such balances are being affected, often detrimentally.”).
189. PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS TO THE SURGEON GENERAL 7 (1962); see also
ROSEN, supra note 57, at 463 (“With our expanding and changing industrial technology have come
environmental problems of increasing complexity. The once dominant problems of bacterially
contaminated air, water, and food have now been replaced in considerable degree by chemical pollution,
and the possible relation of this condition to the induction of cancer.”).
190. STEWART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS 201 (1963). See also id., at 189 (“Our
accomplishments in minerals and energy, in electronics and aircraft, in autos and agriculture have lifted
us to new heights of affluence, but in the process we have lost ground in the attempt to provide a habitat
that will, each day, renew the meaning of the human enterprise. A lopsided performance has allowed us
to exercise dominion over the atom and to invade outer space, but we have sadly neglected the inner
space that is our home. We can produce a wide range of goods and machines, but our manipulations
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“era of ecology,” where the connections between human health and the
environment were ever more apparent, safety and survival depended on
restoring that balance:
As history moves on, our time will be known as the age in which man
learned to admit that he is part of the balance of nature—the age in which
man began to assess the negative as well as the positive sides of his
actions—the age in which man joined his perspective on technology with a
perspective on his environment.191

Along with Carson and others, Udall urged his fellow citizens to embrace a
more humble approach to technology and progress, one founded on a renewed
ethic of responsibility and oriented toward the long view.
Three years after Carson published Silent Spring, President Johnson’s
Science Advisory Committee issued its landmark report, Restoring the Quality
of Our Environment, detailing the nation’s growing pollution problems, calling
for an expanded government response to deal with existing problems, and
advocating for the exercise of “ecological foresight” as a means to prevent new
problems in the future.192 Consistent with the general attitude of the emerging
environmental movement, the report stressed the importance of precaution in
the face of uncertainty:
We now know that the full effects of environmental changes produced by
pollution cannot be foreseen before judgments must be made. The
responsible judgment, therefore, must be the conservative one. Trends and
indications, as soundly based as possible, must provide the guidelines;
demonstration of disaster is not required. Abnormal changes in animal
populations, however small, at whatever stage in the life history of the
individual, or in whatever niche of the species complex, must be considered
warnings of potential hazard.193

In elaborating principles to guide governmental responses at multiple levels,
the report also embraced the predominant rights-based framing of
environmental quality that animated much of the early environmental
movement, stressing the rights of individuals to “improved quality of life from
reduced pollution” and pointing to the “responsibility of each polluter for all
forms of damage caused by his pollution.”194
Yet, throughout the report, there were unmistakable signs of a gathering
bureaucratic approach to environmental regulation that clearly reflected the
growing influence within the Johnson administration of planning and

have multiplied waste products that befoul the land, and have introduced frightening new forms of
erosion that diminish the quality of indispensable resources and even imperil human health.”).
191. Stewart L. Udall, A Message for Biologists, 14 BIOSCIENCE 17, 17 (1964)
192. See U.S. PRESIDENTIAL SCI. ADVISORY COMM. ENV’T POLLUTION PANEL, RESTORING THE
QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT 14 (1965).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 16.
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management based on systems analysis and operations research.195 Embedded
within this approach was a strong preference for technocratic judgment and
decision making that would insulate the crucial responsibility for establishing
environmental protection standards from Congress and the political process.196
These deeper currents of bureaucratization and managerialism would provide
fertile ground for the rise of quantitative risk assessment in the years ahead.
But if there was a central insight that emerged during this period, it was
that human health and the environment were deeply connected and faced
considerable dangers from the galloping advance of technology.197 Chemical
hazards in particular came to be seen as a problem of the “total
198
environment.”
The potential harms associated with carcinogens were no
longer restricted to the industrial workplace or food, but also part of a growing
concern with air and water pollution.199 Efforts to operationalize safety in the

195. See, e.g., id. at 17 (recommending administrative and budgetary separation between agency
responsibility for research on pollution issues and enforcement); id. at 23–25 (outlining a multi-agency
approach to coordination and systems studies in the area of pollution); id. at 33–38 (outlining an
approach to meeting manpower needs across the government); id. at 48–56 (discussing organizational
strategy and framework for understanding and controlling environmental pollution). For a general
discussion of the rise of systems analysis and operations research and its influence on government
during this time, see supra note 8 and references therein. For a more specific discussion of the
importance of “systems thinking” in ecology and operations research in the context of federal water
pollution control, see PAUL CHARLES MILAZZO, UNLIKELY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: CONGRESS AND
CLEAN WATER, 1945–1972 at 99–111 (2006).
196. See Restoring the Quality of Our Environment, supra note 192, at 60–61 (“The setting of
standards is highly technical; there must be provision for appropriate revision of standards from time to
time as new scientific knowledge and improved methods of measurement become available. These
necessary judgments are best exercised by highly knowledgeable scientists and engineers. Difficulties
and inequities would be avoided if Federal responsibility for setting these standards resided in the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. It would be desirable if the legislative branch of the
government refrained from setting standards or tolerance limits directly by law.”). This last sentence was
almost certainly a reference to the Delaney Clause.
197. See, e.g., BARRY COMMONER, SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL (1966) (discussing various human
health and ecological threats associated with modern technology).
198. The phrase “total environment” gained increasing currency during the 1960s as part of the new
ecological approach to health and environment that focused specifically on the effects of chemicals and
ionizing radiation. See, e.g., René Dubos, Environmental Biology, 14 BIOSCIENCE 11, 11 (1964)
(arguing for an approach to pollution and human health that situated man within his “total
environment”); Leroy E. Burney, Governmental Responsibilities in Environmental Health, 76 PUB.
HEALTH REPORTS 291, 291-94 (1961) (discussing need to understand challenges of chemical
contamination and ionizing radiation in the context of the “total environment of modern man”). Burney
was the Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service from 1956-61. See also NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, THE EFFECTS ON POPULATIONS OF EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION 34
(1972) (“In general, man’s welfare depends upon the long-range quality of his total environment.
Substances removed or added in large enough amounts can lead to imbalance or disorder of a life
support system that is the result of evolutionary development over the ages.”). The journal SCIENCE OF
THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT, which was (and is) dedicated to documenting the effects of human activities
on the environment, was established in 1972.
199. See ROSEN, supra note 57, at 465 (noting that “the atmosphere of the modern industrial
community is a carcinogenic sea, polluted and made murky by many sorts of individual waste. In such
an environment it is hardly possible to avoid daily contact with cancer-producing agents.”); W.C.
Hueper, Environmental Carcinogenesis and Cancers, 21 CANCER RESEARCH 842, 842 (1961)
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face of such hazards, moreover, could no longer rely on direct experience.
Proxies and new extrapolative techniques had to be developed. In the process,
human health would be subjected to various abstractions and averaging
exercises. Policy choices would have to be made about how to interpret what
little data existed, whether to build in safety factors and other protections, and
how far to push efforts to quantify potential harms.
Without question, the larger statutory frameworks for regulating the new
harms posed by radiation and chemicals were sorely lacking, even non-existent,
and throughout this period (and beyond) the law seemed to be in a constant
chase to catch up with a rapidly proliferating set of hazards.200 In several
instances, notably radiation, there was also a growing recognition that safety
was an increasingly fluid, relative term—an interpretation that would take on
added salience in the years ahead as regulators came to embrace the notion of
“acceptable risk.” But there was also a strong precautionary impulse at work
during this period, manifest in the push to keep radiation exposures “as low as
practicable,” the burden shifting provisions of the 1954 pesticide amendments,
the use of safety factors to compensate for uncertainty, and, most prominently,
the 1958 Delaney Clause. All of these developments shared the same basic
concern of protecting human health in the face of significant uncertainty, a
general sensibility and approach to regulation that would carry over into the
early 1970s and to the effort to establish a coherent normative framework for
environmental law during its formative years.
III.

REGULATION AND THE FRONTIERS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE,
1960S-1970S

By the end of the 1960s, the concept of safety thresholds that had occupied
so much attention during the middle decades of the twentieth century was under
considerable strain. Revolutionary advances in analytical techniques during the
1960s and 1970s opened up a vast new world of invisible hazards impinging on
everyday life, challenging the binary approach to safety that underwrote
previous efforts. As this new world came into view, Congress, regulators,
judges, and other professionals confronted an important, even fateful, choice:
(discussing “the long neglected fact that many of the known environmental carcinogens initially
encountered in certain occupational activities are subsequently being introduced into the general human
environment as pollutants of the air, water, and soil and as constituents and impurities of many
consumer goods, and are creating through this mechanism a serious public health problem”); Sellers,
Factory as Environment, supra note 107, at 74–75 (discussing key role of industrial hygienists in
extending the toxicological approach beyond the workplace to studies of air pollution).
200. Beginning in the early 1960s, policymakers and commentators also began to call for more
systematic attention to “environment” as an organizing principle for law and public decision making.
See, e.g., Lynton K. Caldwell, Environment: A New Focus for Public Policy?, 23 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
132, 138–39 (1963) (tracing a number of environmental problems to the fragmentation of public
decision making and the inability to see environmental problems in comprehensive terms and calling for
a more systematic focus on environment as a key organizing principle for public policy). Caldwell was
deeply involved in drafting the National Environmental Policy Act.

2012]

GENEALOGIES OF RISK

943

whether and how to extend and elaborate the earlier precautionary impulse or to
push forward with more formal, quantitative approaches to assessing risk.
Looking back, it is easy to identify the major trend during this period as
the embrace across multiple domains of more formal risk-based approaches as
the foundation for rational decision making. But up until the mid-1970s, much
of the form and substance of the overall approach to environmental harms was
up for grabs. It was by no means obvious, in other words, that the appropriate
response to a larger and more complicated world of environmental harm was to
embrace more formal, quantitative approaches to risk. This was a true moment
of possibility, as evidenced in some of the early pesticide cancellation
proceedings, in OSHA’s efforts to develop a generic cancer policy, in landmark
environmental laws such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, and in
appellate court decisions such as Reserve Mining and Ethyl Corp.201 With the
proliferation of new laws and agencies charged with regulating potential
environmental harms, Congress, regulators, and the courts sought to develop a
general, flexible framework that would allow agency professionals to exercise
their expert judgment and regulate in a manner that would protect public health.
Early environmental statutes used the language of “endangerment” and “margin
of safety” far more often than the language of “risk,” drawing on different
conceptual and normative tendencies.202 There was a view, at least initially,
that the practice of assessing hazards was tractable and that much of its
development could be left to the agencies.
By the middle of the 1970s, however, this all began to change as the
notion of safety was explicitly redefined as “acceptable risk,” giving rise to an
unambiguous move toward quantitative risk assessment as the basis for health,
safety, and environmental regulation. During this time, the courts also began to
take a harder look at agency practice. And there was a marked retreat from
earlier precautionary stances toward a more muscular embrace of formal risk
assessment and an explicit effort to discipline agency decision making,
epitomized by the Toxic Substances Control Act’s “unreasonable risk” standard
and its elaborate procedural requirements, the Supreme Court’s 1980 Benzene
decision, and the push for regulatory reform in the 1980s.203
This Part discusses these developments, focusing on the revolutionary
advances in analytical techniques that occurred during the 1960s and early
1970s and their implications for health, safety, and environmental regulation;
efforts to extend the precautionary impulse of earlier years to new challenges
involving chemicals, air and water pollution, and carcinogens in the workplace;
and parallel efforts to redefine safety as acceptable risk and move toward more

201.
202.

See infra Part III.B.
See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§
1251–1387 (2006).
203. See discussion infra Parts III.C and IV.
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formal, quantitative approaches to risk in the face of the new world of
environmental harms that was coming into view.
A. New Ways of Seeing
In 1958, when the Delaney Clause was adopted, there were only four
substances that were known to induce cancer in humans: soot, radiation,
tobacco smoke, and beta-naphthylamine.204 Twenty years later, scientists had
identified thirty-seven human carcinogens and over 500 animal carcinogens.205
With significantly expanded animal testing, it was becoming clear that a
growing number of substances induced cancer at some site in at least some
strain or sex of laboratory animal.206 At the same time, new techniques
highlighted the significant range in cancer potencies among different
chemicals.207 Not all carcinogens were created equal, in other words; some
were strong, others were relatively weak.208 This mattered, of course, for any
effort to weigh the relative hazards or risks associated with a particular
chemical, and it raised questions about the blanket application of the principle
of zero tolerance.
Major advances in analytical techniques and detection capabilities during
this time also revealed chemical residues and other substances in food, air,
water, and living tissues at far lower concentrations than was possible in
previous decades. Thus, FDA reported that between 1958 and 1978 the
sensitivity of detection methods for monitoring chemicals in food increased by
“between two and five orders of magnitude,”209 an improvement that allowed
the detection of carcinogens at the parts per trillion level.210 As one scientist
writing in the late 1970s stated, “[T]oday substances can be routinely measured
at concentrations up to a million times less than was possible in 1958.”211
Similar advances were underway in the effort to detect chemicals in the
environment. During the early 1970s, environmental scientists and the newly
created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began to use gas
chromatograph mass spectrometry (GC-Mass Spec) and other techniques that
could detect trace organic compounds and other hazardous substances in the

204.
205.
206.

See Richard Wilson, Risks Caused by Low Levels of Pollution, 51 YALE J. BIO. 37, 48 (1978).
Id.
Id. See also Listing of D&C Orange No. 17 for Use in Externally Applied Drugs and
Cosmetics, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,331, 28,343 (Aug. 7, 1986) (recounting developments in animal testing).
207. See Section 409 Food Additive Regulations; Order Responding to Objections to EPA’s
Response to Petition Requesting Revocation of Food Additive Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 7750, 7772–73
(Feb. 25, 1991) (“Unlike the Congressional understanding in 1958, scientists now recognize that the
degree of human risk posed by substances found to be carcinogens can vary immensely.”).
208. Id. (noting that the Carcinogenic Potency Database showed a range of cancer potencies that
was greater than ten million-fold).
209. See Chemical Compounds in Food Producing Animals, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,070, 17,075 (Mar. 20,
1979) (discussing advances in detection capabilities).
210. Id.
211. Wilson, supra note 204, at 48.
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low parts per billion range, several orders of magnitude below what had been
possible only a decade earlier.212 When combined with expanded
environmental monitoring, it soon became apparent that the world of potential
environmental harms was far greater than previously recognized. To take only
one example, the use of computerized GC-Mass Spec techniques to analyze
water samples during the late 1960s and early 1970s “revolutionized” efforts to
test for trace organics in surface waters, revealing a much more extensive
problem of water pollution than previously recognized.213 The new techniques,
according to EPA scientists, made “identification of pollutants in the part-perbillion range with a high degree of confidence . . . routine. . . . What was once
an impossible task for a staff of 100 working six months . . . [could] be
accomplished by a skilled individual in a few hours.”214 By the early 1970s,
various studies using these techniques had revealed hundreds of compounds,
some of them suspected carcinogens, in surface waters and drinking water
systems around the country.215 This led directly to enactment of the Safe

212. See EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CARCINOGENS, supra note 168, at 184–85 (discussing
role of gas-liquid chromatographic techniques in facilitating significant improvements in detection
capabilities since the late 1950s); EPA, MEASUREMENT OF CARCINOGENIC VAPORS IN AMBIENT
ATMOSPHERES, EPA-600/7-78-062, 1 (1978) (discussing development of analytical techniques to collect
and analyze air samples to detect presence of toxic and/or carcinogenic organic compounds); Air Quality
Criteria: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the S. Comm. On Public Works,
90th Cong. (1970), reprinted in 1 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 608, 615–16 (1970)
(statement of Dr. Samuel S. Epstein) (discussing development of new “high sensitive biological
techniques for measuring the carcinogenicity of organic extracts of atmospheric pollutants”); L.A.
Wallace, Human Exposure to Environmental Pollutants: A Decade of Experience, 25 CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL ALLERGY 4, 4 (1995) (discussing “exquisite sensitivities” of gas chromatography-mass
spectrometry and their use by the EPA during the early 1970s); William L. Budde & James W.
Eichelberger, Organics in the Environment, 51 ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 567A, 567A (1979)
(discussing new “measurements of the presence and concentration of a variety of pollutants . . . made
possible by significant advances in analytical instrumentation, electronics, computer science, and
analytical chemistry during the 1960s and early 1970s”).
213. See W.M. SHACKELFORD & L.H. KEITH, FREQUENCY OF ORGANIC COMPOUNDS IDENTIFIED
IN WATER, EPA-600/4-76-062 at 1 (1976) (“Rapid technical advances in gas chromatography-mass
spectrometry after 1970 enabled many more compounds in water to be identified.”); Stephen R. Heller
et al., Trace Organics by GC/MS 9 ENVT’L SCI & TECH. 210, 210 (1975) (noting that computerized GCMass Spec capabilities developed in 1960s “quickly revolutionized the field of trace organics analysis”
leading to major commitment by EPA in 1971 to install computerized GC-Mass Spec systems at
laboratories across the country).
214. See Heller et. al., supra note 213, at 211.
215. See, e.g., EPA, INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION OF THE LOWER MISSISSIPPI RIVER IN LOUISIANA 66–
67 (1972) (discussing presence of large numbers of synthetic organic chemicals present in Lower
Mississippi River, including several suspected carcinogens found in New Orleans drinking water
systems); EPA, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF SUSPECTED CARCINOGENS IN DRINKING WATER:
INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS at i (1975) (discussing 1974 EPA study finding “small quantities of 66
organic chemicals, some of which were suspected carcinogens” in the New Orleans drinking water
supply).
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Drinking Water Act in 1974216 and a much more expansive effort to deal with
toxic water pollutants under the Clean Water Act.217
This period also witnessed significant improvements in the ability to track
the fate and transport of chlorinated organic compounds and other synthetic
chemicals in the global environment, building directly on earlier fallout studies
that tracked the distribution of strontium-90 and other radionuclides.218 Thus,
during the 1960s, scientists began detecting DDT, PCBs, and other persistent,
bioaccumulative compounds throughout the world—from marine mammals in
the Arctic to the breast milk of tribal women in remote areas of Papua New
Guinea—illustrating the ever-widening reach of industrial chemicals and
serving as a major source of motivation for the early environmental
movement.219 Food chains, the underlying architecture of ecological systems,
the process of bio-magnification: these “patterns of nature” became visible in
new ways and provided powerful evidence of the deep connections between
human health and the environment.220
Finally, new extrapolative techniques were also developed and refined
during this period, allowing scientists to extend dose-response relationships
from the observable to the unobservable range in a quantitative manner.
Starting in the early 1960s, various techniques, such as the Mantel-Bryan or
log-probit model, were debated in the scientific literature.221 By the early
1970s, regulatory scientists had begun to experiment with these new techniques
in assessing chemical hazards.222 In providing a formal, mathematical basis for

216. Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1661 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j26 (2000)).
217. In 1976, EPA entered into a consent decree under which it would spend the rest of the decade
(and beyond) developing water quality criteria and effluent standards for 65 toxic chemicals and families
of chemicals. See NRDC v. Train (Flannery Decree), Civ. A. No. 2153-73 (D.D.C. June 9, 1976),
reprinted in 6 ELR 20,588; see also Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the
Clean Water Act, 21 ELR 10528 (1991).
218. See George M. Woodwell, Toxic Substances and Ecological Cycles, 216 SCI. AM. 24 (Mar.
1967) (discussing contributions of fallout studies to understanding “global, long-term ecological
processes that concentrate toxic substances” in the environment).
219. See generally H.L. Harrison et al., Systems Studies of DDT Transport, 170 SCIENCE 503
(1970) (discussing use of systems models for understanding long-term impacts of DDT in ecosystems);
David B. Peakall & Jeffrey L. Lincer, Polychlorinated Biphenyls: Another Long-Life Widespread
Chemical in the Environment, 20 BIOSCIENCE 958 (1970) (documenting presence of PCBs in various
environmental media and animal tissues).
220. See, e.g., Odum, The Strategy of Ecosystem Development, supra note 188, at 264 (discussing
the role of radionuclide tracers in “providing a means of charting food chains in the intact outdoor
ecosystem”); Woodwell, supra note 218 (discussing role of fallout studies in understanding
bioaccumulation of toxic substances).
221. See, e.g., N. Mantel & W.R. Bryan, Safety Testing of Carcinogenic Agents, 27 J. NAT.
CANCER INST. 455 (1961) (proposing log-probit model for low dose extrapolation).
222. See David G. Hoel, Statistical Models for Estimating Carcinogenic Risks from Animal Data,
Proceedings of the 5th Annual Conference on Environmental Toxicology, AMRL-TR-74-125 285-91
(1974) (discussing statistical techniques for low-dose extrapolations to estimate cancer risk in humans
associated with exposure to various environmental agents and their applications in regulatory context);
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DRINKING WATER AND HEALTH 29–59 (1977) (discussing use and
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extrapolating from high-dose animal experiments to the unobservable range of
low-dose human exposures, these new ways of seeing opened up the possibility
of developing quantitative estimates of risk associated with low-level
exposures.
It would be difficult to overstate the significance of these revolutionary
advances in environmental monitoring and analysis. The new ways of seeing
that resulted brought a whole new world into view, creating considerable
challenges for law and regulation. In fundamental ways, these new techniques
underwrote the changing conceptions of time and space that Richard Lazarus
posits as a driving force behind the rise of environmental law,223 revealing a
world of environmental hazards that far exceeded, in scale and scope, previous
understandings.
The challenges confronting regulators were profound. As Peter Hutt,
former Chief Counsel to the FDA, noted,
When FDA entered the 1970s, the Agency believed that it was feasible to
eliminate virtually all carcinogens from the food supply. By the end of the
1970s, the Agency had indisputable proof that it [was] impossible. Thus, it
became essential to adjust regulatory policy to accommodate this new
scientific information.224

According to Hutt, FDA was “forced to admit” at the end of the decade that
“[a] requirement for warnings on all food that may contain an inherent
carcinogenic ingredient or a carcinogenic constituent (in contrast to a
deliberately added carcinogenic substance) would apply to many, perhaps most,
foods in a supermarket.”225 EPA likewise struggled to prioritize its efforts
across its multiple statutory responsibilities in the face of a much larger
universe of potential environmental harms.226 The big question looming in all
of this was whether the older, precautionary posture exemplified by the
Delaney Clause could be adapted to this new reality or whether some other
approach would be needed.

associated challenges of extrapolation techniques in chemical safety assessment); see also infra Part
III.C.
223. See Lazarus, supra note 36, at 54–66 (discussing how “changing conceptions of time and
space compelled a transformation in law generally and the emergence of a comprehensive regime for
environmental protection in particular”).
224. Hutt, supra note 67, at 24–25.
225. Id. at 15.
226. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECISION MAKING IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY (1977) (discussing multiple decision making challenges confronting EPA in its
efforts to carry out its various statutory responsibilities); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 1
PERSPECTIVES ON TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: A REPORT TO THE
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 12 (1977) (noting the increasingly difficult and complex
challenges facing environmental regulation as refinements in research and monitoring revealed more
subtle and unexpected impacts from a range of different agents and interactions).
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B. Environment, Margin of Safety, and the Frontiers of Scientific
Knowledge
Elaborating and adapting the precautionary approach embodied in the
Delaney Clause in the face of a much more vast and complicated world of
potential environmental harms would not be easy. Rigid application of “zero
tolerance” within and outside of the food safety context was simply not
possible without dramatic disruptions, and the Delaney Clause itself would be
revised over time, first through agency practice and, then, in the 1996 Food
Quality Protection Act, to reflect the increasingly complex world that was
coming into view.227 But to suggest that these new challenges called for or
even required a move to more formal exercises in quantitative risk assessment
is to miss a great deal. In fact, during much of the 1970s, there were multiple
efforts across the burgeoning fields of health, safety, and environmental law to
adapt earlier precautionary impulses to the new world of environmental harm
that had become visible.
1. Chemicals and the Future of Man
By the late 1960s, in the midst of the remarkable advances in analytical
techniques that revealed a vast and growing world of potential carcinogens in
the environment, criticisms of the Delaney Clause shifted from the previous
charge that it posed too many constraints on the exercise of scientific
judgment228 to a more general concern that the zero tolerance approach was
simply not feasible in a world where carcinogens were far more prevalent.229
The science that had supported the Delaney Clause was outdated, the argument
went; the anti-cancer clause had become an “article of faith” badly out of synch
with the realities of a complex industrial society.230 Had Congress understood
the true extent of the cancer hazard, it surely would never have imposed zero
tolerance.231
And yet, many of the same scientists who had supported the Delaney
Clause from its inception mounted a vigorous defense of the zero tolerance
principle. In their view, zero tolerance provided the most prudent approach to
227.
228.
229.

See Merrill, supra note 184.
See discussion supra notes 174–82.
EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CARCINOGENS, supra note 168 (discussing agreements
that zero tolerance was not feasible in the wake of significant advances in analytical techniques that
allowed for detection of carcinogens at lower concentrations). See also B.L. Oser, An Assessment of the
Delaney Clause After 15 Years, 11 FOOD & COSM. TOXICOLOGY 1121, 1125–26 (1973) (“One of the
main difficulties with the Delaney clause, as with other statutory provisions for ‘no residue’ or ‘zero
tolerance,’ has been the continuing improvement, without apparent limit, in the sensitivity of analytical
instrumentation and techniques, as a result of which substances prohibited on a ‘no residue’ basis have
later been detected in traces so small as to be beyond the range of any conceivable toxicological
significance.”).
230. See, e.g., Nicholas Wade, Delaney Anti-Cancer Clause: Scientists Debate an Article of Faith,
177 SCIENCE 588 (1972) (discussing heated debates during 1970s regarding the Delaney Clause).
231. Id.
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the considerable uncertainties that remained and, in many cases, had been
amplified by the fact that the world of potential carcinogens had turned out to
be more vast and complex than previously understood. That there were more
carcinogens impinging on daily life than previously thought, in other words,
provided all the more reason to hold onto zero tolerance. Two prominent
National Cancer Institute scientists made this point emphatically in 1968. “It is
fair to say,” they wrote, “that trace amounts of carcinogens surround us and
probably enter our bodies with our food, air or water. What zero tolerance in
respect of food additives really means is that deliberate addition to the
carcinogenic burden already upon us should be avoided where this is at all
feasible.”232 Given the growing universe of potential carcinogens and the
recognition that cancer often resulted from an accumulation of insults, any
deliberate release of carcinogens to the environment should be avoided if at all
possible.
The following year, a special commission formed by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, known as the Mrak Commission, released a
comprehensive report on the pesticides problem that underscored the
difficulties confronting efforts to regulate the hazards associated with industrial
chemicals.233 “[T]he field of pesticide toxicology,” according to the
Commission,
exemplifies the absurdity of a situation in which 200 million Americans are
undergoing life-long exposure, yet our knowledge of what is happening to
them is at best fragmentary and for the most part indirect and inferential.
While there is little ground for forebodings of disaster, there is even less for
complacency.234

The Commission’s report went on to discuss the “formidable inherent
difficulties in fully evaluating the risks to human health consequent upon the
use of pesticides”235 and stressed the qualitatively different type of human
health hazard presented by pesticides and industrial chemicals.236

232. J. H. Weisburger & E. K. Weisburger, Food Additives and Chemical Carcinogens: On the
Concept of Zero Tolerance, 6 FOOD & COSM. TOXICOLOGY 235, 242 (1968).
233. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S COMMISSION
ON PESTICIDES COMMISSION ON PESTICIDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
(1969) [hereinafter MRAK COMMISSION REPORT]; see also William H. Rodgers, The Persistent Problem
of the Persistent Pesticides: A Lesson in Environmental Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 567 (1970) (providing
detailed critical review and discussion of the Mrak Commission’s recommendations).
234. See MRAK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 233, at 37.
235. Id. at 231.
236. Id. at 243 (“While the risks to health that abound in the home, in the street and at work are
accepted as inevitable and are limited as far as possible, the hazards to health that stem from
environmental exposure to chemical agents are usually beyond the capacity of the individual to control.
By their very nature—such as chronicity or subtlety of effects produced—the risks deriving from this
source constitute an altogether different dimension from all others (except for radiation) in their threat to
human safety. Pesticide exposure is but one sector of environmental chemical hazard, yet its problems
typify the complexities of the chemical sophistication of our society.”).
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On the vexing issue of extrapolating from animals to humans and from
high to low doses outside of the observable range, the report pointed to the
complexity and irreducible uncertainties that attended such an effort:237 “The
basic problem is that extrapolation outside the range of observation must be
based on a generally unverifiable assumption about the mathematical nature of
the dose-response relationship near zero dosage.”238 Given “the perplexities
and imponderables” involved in such an exercise, “it would be imprudent to
place excessive reliance on mathematical sleight of hand, particularly when the
dose-response curves used are largely empirical descriptions lacking any
theoretical physical or chemical basis.”239 Based on its review of the scientific
literature, the Commission called for the elimination within two years of all
uses of DDT except those deemed essential to the preservation of human health
and welfare, and similar restrictions on other persistent pesticides.240 On the
question of zero tolerance, the Commission recognized the challenges entailed
in applying the principle in the face of greatly enhanced ability to detect
chemicals in the environment, but it stopped well short of embracing any sort
of risk-based approach, invoking instead the margin of safety concept and
calling for strict limits of potentially toxic chemicals.241
On the heels of the Mrak Commission’s report, the National Cancer
Institute’s Ad Hoc Committee on the Evaluation of Low Levels of
Environmental Carcinogens issued its report to the Surgeon General,
Evaluation of Environmental Carcinogens.242 Chaired by veteran cancer
researcher Umberto Saffiotti, the Ad Hoc Committee reviewed in detail the
significant advances in animal bioassay research and chemical detection
methods, acknowledging that these advances constituted a major argument
against the Delaney Clause.243 Yet, in spite of the increased difficulties posed
by the fact that carcinogens were much more prevalent in the environment and
237. Id. at 464 (“Many different factors may influence dose-response in carcinogenesis in man and
animals. Their complexity is such that no assuredly safe level for carcinogens in human food can be
determined from experimental findings at the present time.”); id. at 492–95 (discussing difficulties of
extrapolating dose-response relationships from animal studies to no-effect levels in humans).
238. Id. at 493.
239. Id. at 495 (quoting SUBCOMM. ON CARCINOGENESIS, FDA COMM, REPORT ON PROTOCOLS
FOR SAFETY EVALUATION (1969)) (“Although it is possible in principle to estimate ‘safe’ levels of a
carcinogen, uncertainties involved in downward extrapolation from test levels will usually result in
permissible levels that are the practical equivalent of zero.”).
240. Id. at 8–10.
241. Id. at 10 (“Modern techniques have greatly increased the sensitivity of the analytical methods
available when the zero tolerance concept was advanced. This fact must be recognized in judging the
possibilities of hazards and establishing tolerance limits with a sufficient margin of safety to protect
human health and welfare.”). See also id. at 481 (noting that improved analytical techniques had
increased “the sensitivity of chemical detection more than one thousand-fold in the past 15 years”).
242. See EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CARCINOGENS, supra note 168.
243. Id. at 186. (“The major new argument presented today against the ‘anticancer clause’ is that
the marked increase in sensitivity of many analytical methods makes it possible to detect low levels of
carcinogens in a broader segment of the environment and that, therefore, the immediate enforcement of
regulations requiring a zero tolerance become more difficult, in some instances impossible.”).
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the food supply than previously recognized, the Ad Hoc Committee did not
yield in its unqualified support of zero tolerance: “The principle of zero
tolerance for carcinogenic exposures should be retained in all areas of
legislation presently covered by it and should be extended to cover other
exposures as well.”244 According to the Committee, “[o]nly in the cases where
contamination of an environmental source by a carcinogen has been proven to
be unavoidable should exception be made to the principle of zero tolerance.245
These issues of the applicability and scope of zero tolerance became a
major focus during Congressional hearings convened in 1971 under the rather
modest title, “Chemicals and the Future of Man.”246 Several of the nation’s
leading cancer researchers testified at the hearings, virtually all of whom
supported the same basic conclusion regarding the challenges of assessing
chemical hazards and the need for prudence and precaution in the face of such
hazards.247 There were, in short, intractable epistemological challenges facing
efforts to get a handle on the chemicals problem—challenges that were
particularly apparent in the case of ‘weak carcinogens’ such as pesticides, food
additives and air pollutants, which proved “far more difficult to assess
toxicologically or epidemiologically.”248 The “gross insensitivity of animal test
systems” together with the “impossibility of gauging human sensitivity from
animal tests” and the lack of “ample data on interactions between carcinogens”
made it impossible “to predict safe levels of carcinogens based on an arbitrary
fraction of the lowest effective animal dose in a particular experimental
situation.”249 In other words, the entire process of evaluating the hazards
associated with low-level exposures to chemicals was marked by a certain
arbitrariness in choosing extrapolation models, in selecting safety factors, and
in defining what might count as acceptable risk.250 Given the irreducible

244.

Id. at 181.

245. Id.
246. Chemicals and the Future of Man: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Executive
Reorganization and Government Research of the Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong. (1971)
[hereinafter Chemicals and the Future of Man].
247. See, e.g., id. at 50–53 (statement of Dr. Samuel S. Epstein) (discussing challenges of
assessing chemical hazards); id. at 177 (statement of Dr. Umberto Saffiotti) (same).
248. Id. at 10, 50–53; see also id. at 53 (testimony of Dr. Samuel S. Epstein) (“Current
toxicological techniques are insensitive and relatively limited in their ability to detect weak carcinogens,
and other toxic agents, individually and in various combinations or mixtures realistically reflecting low
or ambient levels and patterns of environmental exposure. Similarly, epidemiological techniques are
unlikely to detect weak carcinogens and other toxic agents, unless there are sharp differentials in
exposure of the general population, as with cigarette smoking. For widely dispersed agents, such as
intentional or accidental food additives, to which the population at large is generally exposed, human
experience is unlikely to provide any meaningful indication of safety or hazard.”).
249. Id. at 51.
250. Id. at 177 (statement of Umberto Saffiotti) (“[T]he evaluation of cancer hazards for man is a
complex scientific problem for which different inputs are necessary: chemical analytical data on the
environmental distribution of a compound and the levels of exposure in man; biological data on its
carcinogenic activity in animal tests; dose-response data in the selected animal models; arbitrary
selections of mathematical models for extrapolation to low level effects; arbitrary selection of the so-
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uncertainties involved in such an effort, the zero tolerance approach of the
Delaney Clause offered the only prudent response.251 As one witness put it:
“Special pleadings, reflecting narrow economic and social interests, for the
continued use of carcinogenic chemicals—albeit at reduced levels based on
arbitrarily derived supposed safety margins—are unacceptable.”252
Leading regulatory officials agreed. In a 1970 address to the American
Society of Toxicology, EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus spoke of the
“chemical barrage to which we are so recklessly exposing ourselves” with very
little understanding of the potential impacts on human health and the
environment.253 “We need to know more—far more—about what we are doing
to ourselves and our planet, and to the fetuses of our unborn children, and to the
genetic heritage of those children by the pervasive use of the chemical wonders
of our age.”254 But action could not wait for complete understanding:
[W]e cannot suspend action until we know everything there is to know, for
science is never complete. Our knowledge in these matters is . . . ‘a
receding mirage in a vast desert of ignorance.’ Therefore, as we seek more
and better data in the toxicological field, it is absolutely essential that we
act on the knowledge we already have or face the possibility of irreversible
environmental harm and even tragic damage to the lives and health of our
own or future generations.255

In the face of ignorance and uncertainty, prudence required action to avoid such
hazards and minimize the possibility of irreversible environmental harm.
This basic approach to the pressing challenge of chemical hazards
animated efforts to deal with DDT and other synthetic organic pesticides. As
discussed above, many of these compounds came to market right after World
War II with little if any testing of their potential hazards. But in the wake of
Silent Spring and in the face of mounting evidence of the persistent,
bioaccumulative nature of these chemicals, many began to question the safety
of DDT and other pesticides.256 In 1969, the newly formed Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) petitioned the Secretary of Agriculture to issue notices of
cancellation under the pre-1972 version of FIFRA for all DDT-based pesticides
called ‘safety factors’ for the extrapolation from animals to man; and finally the selection of a ‘socially
acceptable risk.’”).
251. Id. at 51 (statement of Dr. Samuel S. Epstein) (defending zero tolerance approach for
carcinogens); id. at 171 (statement of Dr. Umberto Saffiotti) (“[P]roof that a substance, which had been
recognized as carcinogenic in animals, actually causes cancer in man would require in most cases
extremely complex and lengthy epidemiologic studies. In some cases it may be impossible to obtain
such proof because of the complexity of controls that would be needed for a satisfactory demonstration.
Therefore, the only prudent approach is to assume that chemicals which are carcinogenic in animals
could also be such in man, although the direct demonstration in man is lacking.”).
252. Id. at 51 (statement of Dr. Samuel S. Epstein).
253. Chemicals and the Future of Man, supra note 246, at 66.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., MRAK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 233, at 8–9 (recommending elimination of
all non-essential uses of DDT); id. at 382–98 (reviewing research on hazards associated with DDT).
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and to suspend the existing registration during the pendency of the cancellation
proceedings because of the “imminent hazard” posed by the compound.257
USDA deferred its decision on cancellation and took no action on the
emergency suspension request.258 In 1971, the D.C. Circuit, with Judge
Bazelon writing for the court, concluded that cancellation proceedings should
proceed whenever a pesticide registration raised a “substantial question of
safety” and remanded the case for a decision on suspension and a statement of
reasons on the decision to defer cancellation.259 The following year, in one of
the first major exercises of regulatory authority by the recently created EPA,
William Ruckelshaus issued his decision canceling most of the existing
registrations for DDT.260
Based on three years of “intensive administrative inquiry into the uses of
DDT,” Ruckelshaus concluded “that the long-range risks of continued use of
DDT on cotton and most other crops is unacceptable and outweighs any
benefits.”261 The case against the pesticide rested primarily on evidence of
DDT’s toxic, persistent, bioaccumulative properties as well as the fact that the
benefits of DDT usage were “marginal, given the availability of alternative
insecticides and pest management programs, and also the fact that the crops
produced with DDT are in ample supply.”262 “Persistence and biomagnification
in the food chain,” Ruckelshaus wrote, “are, of themselves, a cause for concern,
given the unknown and possibly forever undeterminable long-range effects of
DDT in man and the environment.”263
On carcinogenicity, Ruckelshaus cited animal studies and expert opinion
that DDT should be classified as a potential carcinogen.264 He also noted that
the long latency period of many cancers made it impossible to determine with
certainty whether DDT was carcinogenic in humans. There were simply too
many unknowns not to regulate:
The Agency and EDF have established that DDT is toxic to nontarget
insects and animals, persistent, mobile, and transferable, and that it builds
up in the food chain. . . . In short, they have established at the very least the
risk of the unknown. That risk is compounded where, as is the case with
DDT, man and animals tend to accumulate and store the chemical. These
facts alone constitute risks that are unjustified where apparently safer
alternatives exist to achieve the same benefit. . . . The evidence of record

257. See EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (recounting procedural history
of the DDT cancellation). In 1972, a new version of FIFRA was enacted, transforming a law focused
almost exclusively on registration and labeling law into a regulatory statute.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 593.
260. See Consolidated DDT Hearings: Opinion and Order of the Administrator, 37 Fed. Reg.
13,369 (July 7, 1972).
261. Id. at 13,369.
262. Id. at 13,370.
263. Id. at 13,371.
264. Id.
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showing storage in man and magnification in the food chain is a warning to
the prudent that man may be exposing himself to a substance that may
ultimately have a serious effect on his health. . . . The possibility that DDT
is a carcinogen is at present remote and unquantifiable; but if it is not a
siren to panic, it is a semaphore which suggests that an identifiable public
benefit is required to justify continued use of DDT.265

No effort was made, and none was deemed feasible, to quantify the actual
health risks of DDT.266 It was enough that it had been linked to cancer in
animals, persisted in the environment, accumulated in the food chain, and was
present in human tissues.267 Notwithstanding its mandate to balance risks and
benefits, in exercising its statutory authority to prohibit major uses of DDT,
EPA embraced an approach that was very much in line with the general
motivations behind the Delaney Clause. The world had changed. New synthetic
organic pesticides posed a qualitatively different set of hazards, raising the
stakes for efforts to protect human health and the environment. “[G]iven the
unknown and possibly forever undeterminable long-range effects of DDT in
man and the environment,”268 precaution was the appropriate response.269
EPA took the same approach with other pesticides during these early
years. Aldrin and dieldrin, two particularly toxic compounds used against corn
soil insects, were challenged at roughly the same time as DDT. Like DDT,
these compounds were persistent and mobile in the environment, with a
propensity to accumulate in plant and animal tissues, ending up in “the milk,
meat, poultry, and soy products consumed by humans.”270 A National Human
Monitoring Survey conducted by EPA had detected dieldrin residues in 96.5,
99.5, and 98.2 percent of human fat samples tested during 1970, 1971, and
1972, respectively.271 After EPA initiated cancellation proceedings in 1971 but
refused to issue an emergency suspension,272 the case came before the D.C.
Circuit.273 Writing for the court, Judge Leventhal quoted EPA on the evolving
concept of safety:

265.
266.

Id. at 13,373.
See EPA, REASONS UNDERLYING THE REGISTRATION DECISIONS CONCERNING PRODUCTS
CONTAINING DDT, 2,4,5-T, ALDRIN, AND DIELDRIN (1971) (document on file with author) [hereinafter
EPA STATEMENT OF REASONS].
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. The wisdom of the decision banning most uses of DDT in the United States has been the
subject of considerable debate. At least one recent study, however, showed a five-fold increase in breast
cancer risk among young women exposed to DDT during the period of peak DDT use in the 1940s and
1950s, suggesting that the public health implications of DDT use are still not fully understood. See
Barbara A. Cohn et al., DDT and Breast Cancer in Young Women: New Data on the Significance of Age
at Exposure, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1406 (2007).
270. EDF v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
271. Id.
272. EDF v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (recounting procedural history).
273. Id.
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[T]he final decision with respect to whether a particular product should be
registered initially or should continue to be registered depends on the
intricate balance between the benefits and the dangers to the public health
and welfare resulting from its use. The concept of the safety of the product
is an evolving one which is constantly being further refined in light of our
increasing knowledge.274

Given that there were at the time some 45,000 outstanding pesticide
registrations with “hundreds of substances in use,” EPA faced “immense
difficulties of achieving a comprehensive solution to pesticide control.”275
With respect to the “imminent hazard” standard for suspension orders, the court
noted, “It is enough if there is substantial likelihood that serious harm will be
experienced during the year or two required in any realistic projection of the
administrative process.”276 Still, the court deferred the matter pending a report
from an Advisory Committee formed to review the issue.277
Two years later, EPA issued the suspension order and the matter was soon
back before the D.C. Circuit and Judge Leventhal.278 The court reiterated its
approach to the “imminent hazard” question, pointing out that the standard was
“not limited to a concept of crisis.”279 In the case of aldrin and dieldrin, EPA
had made the requisite “imminent hazard” finding on the basis of widespread
human exposure and data indicating carcinogenicity in mice and rats.280 This
was well within the agency’s expertise, according to the court, even though
“the extrapolation of data from mice to men may be quantitatively imprecise, it
is sufficient to establish a ‘substantial likelihood’ that harm will result.”281
Here again, no effort was made to quantify the risks.
The following year, the court with Judge Leventhal again writing for the
panel employed the same general reasoning to uphold EPA’s suspension of
heptachlor and chlordane.282 In response to the manufacturer’s argument that
dietary exposure to these pesticides was “insignificant” and “well below ‘safe’
dose levels as calculated by the Mantel-Bryan formula, or by the World Health
Organization’s Acceptable Daily Intake figures,” the court upheld EPA’s
decision to

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 535 n.5 (quoting EPA STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 266).
Id. at 535–36.
Id. at 540.
Id.
EDF v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (detailing procedural history).
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1299. As the court elaborated “[u]se of animal data is particularly appropriate where, as
here, accurate epidemiological studies cannot be conducted because the virtually universal
contamination of humans by residues of adlrin/dieldrin make it impossible to establish an
uncontaminated human control group. The long latency period of carcinogens further hinders
epidemiological research, and the ethical problems of conducting cancer experiments on human beings
are too obvious to require discussion.”
282. EDF v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (affirming EPA order suspending registrations of
heptachlor and chlordane).
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reject[] the concept of a “safe” dose level defined by mathematical models
because of “the incomplete assumptions made . . . about the sources of
human exposure in the environment, the natural variation in human
susceptibility to cancer, the lack of any evidence relating the level of
human susceptibility to cancer from heptachlor and chlordane as opposed
to that of the mouse, and the absence of precise knowledge as to the
minimum exposure to a carcinogen necessary to cause cancer.” 283

Here again, the court found it unnecessary to push EPA to develop a
quantitative estimate of risk.
In all of these pesticide cases, neither EPA nor the D.C. Circuit found that
it was appropriate, much less possible, to develop a precise quantification of
risk as a basis for regulation even though the underlying statute expressly called
for a balancing of risks and benefits. Mathematical extrapolation models were
viewed as too arbitrary and uncertain to provide any real guidance. Humility
and a deep-seated concern about lack of knowledge provided the normative
backdrop for these early exercises in precautionary regulation.
2. Endangerment, Precaution, and Environmental Law
Pesticides and chemicals, of course, were only part of a broader set of
concerns about environmental degradation that gained traction throughout the
1960s and 1970s. Widespread air and water pollution, in particular, pushed
Congress steadily toward a much stronger federal role in environmental
protection. With passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments284 and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,285 the modern
foundations for federal pollution control law were established. Drawing on
years of extensive hearings, deep bipartisan support, and strong leadership from
Senator Muskie and others in Congress, these new flagship environmental
statutes embodied a commitment to bold federal action in the face of a
deepening crisis.286 Despite their differences, moreover, both statutes embraced
a precautionary stance, calling on the EPA to act in the face of uncertainty, to
build in margins of safety to protect against hazards not yet identified, and to

283.
284.
285.

Id. at 1009.
See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816

(1972).
286. See, e.g., Senate Debate on S. 4358, September 21, 1970, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 at 223 (1974) (statement of Sen. Muskie)
(“Our environmental problems have contributed heavily to . . . self-doubt and fear. A nation which has
been able to conquer the far reaches of space, which has unlocked the mysteries of the atom, and which
has an enormous reserve of economic power, technological genius and managerial skills, seems
incapable of halting the steady deterioration of our air, water, and land. The legislation we take up today
provides the Senate with a moment of truth: a time to decide whether or not we are willing to let our
lives continue to be endangered by the wasteful practices of industrial society, or whether we are willing
to breathe new life into our fight for a better quality of life.”).
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move forward with technology-based controls without waiting for precise
estimates of risk.287
The critical task confronting regulators and courts seeking to give effect to
these statutory commands was to determine when a potential threat to human
health became legally cognizable. This was the question that EPA and the D.C.
Circuit confronted in the pesticide cases; it was also the question confronting
early efforts to regulate air and water pollution under the newly enacted Clean
Air and Clean Water Acts. In the well-known Reserve Mining case involving
discharges of asbestos fibers into the air and the waters of Lake Superior, the
Eighth Circuit found that even though no harm had been demonstrated to have
occurred, the precautionary command of the Clean Water Act compelled a
finding that the potential threat of harm was “of sufficient gravity to be legally
cognizable.”288 The court noted that it was in uncharted territory, confronting a
case that did not involve “‘historical’ facts subject to ordinary means of judicial
resolution,” but rather “disputes involving conflicting theories and
experimental results, about which it would be judicially presumptuous to offer
conclusive findings.”289 As in the pesticide area, the court was operating well
beyond the realm of experience, forced to grapple with complex and contested
lines of evidence “on the frontiers of scientific knowledge.”290 Following an
earlier panel dissent by D.C. Circuit judge Skelly Wright in the Ethyl Corp.
case involving leaded gasoline and the Clean Air Act, the court interpreted the
“endangering” language of the Clean Water Act to require a “precautionary or
preventive approach” that clearly contemplated action in the face of “potential

287. See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1680 section
109(b)(1)) (requiring national primary ambient air quality standards to be set at a level that provides “an
adequate margin of safety”); id. at 1684 (section 111(b)(1)(A)) (establishing “endangerment” threshold
for listing of stationary source categories for new source performance standards); id. at 1685 (section
112(b)(1)(A)) (requiring emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants to be set at level providing
“ample margin of safety”); id. at 1690 (section 202(a)(1)) (establishing “endangerment” threshold for
mobile source standards); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816, 816 (sections 101(a), 101(a)(1), and 101(a)(3)) (declaring objective of Act to “restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” and establishing
“national goal that the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters be eliminated by 1985” and
“national policy that the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited”); id. at 857
(section 307(a)(4)) (requiring that any effluent standard established for toxic pollutants be set at a level
“which the Administrator determines provides an ample margin of safety”).
288. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 500 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc); see also John S.
Applegate, The Story of Reserve Mining: Managing Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental Regulation,
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 43–76 (Lazarus & Houck eds., 2005) (discussing background and
details of case and noting its importance for environmental law as early example of effort to grapple
with scientific uncertainty); DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 15–34 (1999) (discussing Reserve Mining and
highlighting its importance as “the first major judicial confrontation with environmental risk”).
289. Id. at 507.
290. Id. at 519 (“The preceding extensive discussion of the evidence demonstrates that the medical
and scientific conclusions here in dispute clearly lie ‘on the frontiers of scientific knowledge.’”) (citation
omitted).
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harm as well as actual harm.”291 In this case, not only was there no evidence of
actual harm from the discharges, it was not possible to quantify the risks.
Animal tests were suggestive at best and any effort to extrapolate to human risk
estimates was a non-starter.292 Instead, “the hazard . . . [could] be measured in
only the most general terms as a concern for the public health resting upon a
reasonable medical theory.”293 And because “[s]erious consequences could
result if the hypothesis on which [this theory was] based should ultimately
prove true,” the court found that it was empowered to act under the statute.294
The following year, the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc reheard the famous
Ethyl Corp. case involving a challenge to EPA’s efforts to regulate leaded
gasoline under section 211 of the Clean Air Act on the grounds that airborne
lead endangered human health.295 Writing for the majority, Judge Skelly
Wright offered a powerful endorsement of a precautionary approach to
environmental hazards. In doing so, he drew directly on the earlier pesticide
cases and Reserve Mining, grounding his opinion on an approach to
environmental law that put the problem of knowledge front and center and
embraced a deep respect for uncertainty. Thus, Wright began the opinion by
pointing to the considerable epistemic challenges embedded in the modern task
of health, safety, and environmental regulation:
Man’s ability to alter his environment has developed far more rapidly than
his ability to foresee with certainty the effects of his alterations. It is only
recently that we have begun to appreciate the danger posed by unregulated
modification of the world around us, and have created watchdog agencies
whose task it is to warn us, and protect us, when technological “advances”
present dangers unappreciated or unrevealed by their supporters. Such
agencies, unequipped with crystal balls and unable to read the future are
nonetheless charged with evaluating the effects of unprecedented
environmental modifications, often made on a massive scale. Necessarily
they must deal with predictions and uncertainty, with developing evidence,
with conflicting evidence, and, sometimes, with little or no evidence at
all.296

The challenges confronting regulators were unprecedented.297 And while all of
these challenges were marked by significant uncertainty—the dangers they

291. Id. at 528. As the court noted, the specific “endangerment” language that was at issue in the
case predated the 1972 amendments. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 536.
294. Id. at 535 (“Reserve’s air and water discharges pose a danger to the public health and justify
judicial action of a preventive nature.”). The remedies imposed included immediate action to reduce air
emissions and a reasonable time to convert the water discharges to land disposal. Id. at 500.
295. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
296. Id. at 2–3.
297. Id. at 25 (“Never before have massive quantities of abestiform tailings been spewed into the
water we drink. Never before have our industrial workers been occupationally exposed to vinyl chloride
or to asbestos dust. Never before has the food we eat been permeated with DDT or the pesticides aldrin
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posed very much “a question on the frontiers of scientific knowledge”298—
waiting for certainty was not feasible: “[T]he statutes—and common sense—
demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than
certain that harm is otherwise inevitable.”299
What is critical to recognize here is that underneath this strong normative
embrace of precaution, Judge Wright was advancing a flexible, pragmatic
theory of knowledge and risk assessment that recognized the provisional nature
of “facts” and the difficulties entailed by a pure science-based approach.
Indeed, while certainty was an important scientific ideal, it was not feasible in
the complex world of environmental health.300 As Judge Wright noted,
Even scientific “facts” are not certain, but only theories with high
probabilities of validity. . . . While awaiting statistical certainty may
constitute the typical mode of scientific behavior, its appropriateness is
questionable in environmental medicine, where regulators seek to prevent
harm that often cannot be labeled “certain” until after it occurs. . . . The
uncertainty of scientific fact parallels the uncertainty of all fact. 301

Invoking the work of David Hume and Thomas Kuhn, Judge Wright
recognized that scientific knowledge was dynamic, partial and contingent and,
accordingly, always subject to redescription, revision and, on occasion, even
wholesale abandonment by expert communities.302 The implication for
regulators operating under the mandate of a precautionary statute was clear:
uncertainty was not a legitimate basis for inaction. But neither could there be
any guarantee that a particular decision to regulate would turn out as expected,
and the regulatory enterprise itself should be seen as a pragmatic, “essentially
experimental” activity.303 “[T]he search for intelligent means of regulating our
economy, industry, and ecology,” according to Judge Wright, was best “carried
on . . . through informed, candid, and careful experimentation.”304
and dieldrin. And never before have hundreds of thousands of tons of lead emissions been disgorged
annually into the air we breathe.”).
298. Id. at 26 n.55.
299. Id. at 25. On the question of whether the threatened harm must be “probable” in order to merit
action, Wright rejected arguments that a particular formula could be applied, finding instead that the
determination of what constituted a danger sufficient to merit regulation under the statute depended on
the facts of each case. Id. at 18.
300. See id. at 25 (“Undoubtedly, certainty is the scientific ideal to the extent that even science can
be certain of its truth. But certainty in the complexities of environmental medicine may be achievable
only after the fact, when scientists have the opportunity for leisurely and isolated scrutiny of an entire
mechanism.”).
301. Id. at 25 n.52 (citing Thomas Kuhn and David Hume).
302. Id.
303. J. Skelly Wright, Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26
ADMIN. L. REV. 200, 211 (1974).
304. Id. As Judge Wright elaborated,
In this very human society, there is no guarantee that regulatory policy will achieve its
purported objectives or not have unforeseen consequences along the way. But new
approaches, including even de-regulation, must be considered. And this inescapable truth
calls for acknowledgement that ringing demands for certainty and dryly logical perfection in
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In the specific case of airborne lead, the techniques and lines of evidence
available to determine the potential health impacts—toxicology, epidemiology,
and clinical research—should be evaluated together in Judge Wright’s view as
part of a flexible approach to risk assessment. Such an exercise constituted a
“normal part of judicial and administrative fact finding,” saturated with
“normative conflicts, projections from imperfect data, experiments and
simulations, educated predictions, differing assessment of possible risks, and
the like.”305 The key point in all of this, moreover, was that law, rather than
science, provided the normative foundation for the overall effort, and courts
and administrative agencies need not (indeed should not) try to make risk
assessment into a purely scientific enterprise.306 At the end of the day,
[s]ome of the information will be factual, but much of it will be more
speculative—scientific estimates and “guesstimates” of probable harm,
hypotheses based on still developing data, etc. Ultimately [the
Administrator] must act, in part on “factual issues,” but largely “on choices
of policy, on an assessment of risks, [and] on predictions dealing with
matters on the frontiers of scientific knowledge. A standard of danger—
fear of uncertain or unknown harm—contemplates no more.”307

In the case at hand, even though scientists had “questioned whether the addition
of lead to gasoline, and its consequent diffusion into the atmosphere from the
automobile emission, pose[d] a danger to public health” and even though “hard
proof of any danger caused by lead automotive emissions ha[d] been hard to
come by,” the court found that EPA was justified in taking a precautionary
approach and finding that such emissions did in fact endanger the public
health.308 As it turned out, the subsequent removal of lead from gasoline
translated directly into dramatic decreases in blood lead levels across all

new techniques of agency regulation are more likely to foster despair and stagnation than
progress.
Id. at 211–12.
305. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 28 n.58.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
308. Id. at 7–8. It is important to recognize that up until the early 1970s, the lead industry was the
primary supporter of research on the health effects of lead and played a very active role in shaping the
science that informed these early regulatory efforts. See Kenneth Bridford & David Hanson, A Personal
Perspective on the Initial Federal Health-Based Regulation to Remove Lead from Gasoline, 117 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1195, 1195 (2009) (noting that because of its role as primary supporter of
research on lead, the industry “was in a position to impede the free flow of scientific information related
to the hazards of lead in gasoline, including restrictions on the ability to publish this information without
prior approval. Consequently, the vast majority of relevant studies of lead in gasoline published until the
early 1970s were favorable to the lead industry.”). Both Bridford and Hanson worked at EPA during the
1970s and played “major roles in developing the rationale for and drafting the initial federal healthbased regulation to remove lead from gasoline.” Id.
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segments of the population and has been widely hailed as one of the great
public health achievements of the twentieth century.309
Other cases embraced this general approach and line of reasoning.310
Margin of safety—a term borrowed from engineering as well as earlier
approaches in food safety and embedded in both the Clean Air and Clean Water
Acts—was viewed as the most appropriate tool to deal with uncertainty and the
general lack of experience with these new potential harms.311 The use of
extrapolation models to generate quantitative risk estimates was considered too
arbitrary and unreliable in these early efforts to regulate on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge.312 More generally, there was a conviction in these and
other cases that uncertainty and lack of knowledge had to be engaged in a
fulsome and forthright manner—that risk assessment, however conducted, had
“to face the hard questions created by lack of knowledge.”313 As Judge Bazelon
put it in the Vermont Yankee case, which involved the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission’s responsibilities to assess the hazards associated with nuclear
waste: “To the extent that uncertainties necessarily underlie predictions of this
importance on the frontiers of science and technology, there is a concomitant
necessity to confront and explore fully the depth and consequences of such

309. See, e.g., H.L. Needham, Childhood Lead Poisoning: The Promise and Abandonment of
Primary Prevention, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1871, 1871 (1998) (recognizing removal of lead from
gasoline as one of the great public health triumphs of the twentieth century).
310. See, e.g., EDF v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (endorsing precautionary approach
of EPA in regulating PCBs under section 307 of the Clean Water Act: “[B]y requiring EPA to set
standards providing an ‘ample margin of safety,’ Congress authorized and, indeed, required EPA to
protect against dangers before their extent is conclusively ascertained.”); id. at 81 n.73 (“The toxics
section reflects a policy behind the 1972 Act: a congressional determination that pollution standards
must be set to protect against dangers concealed by the limitations of current scientific knowledge.”);
Lead Indus. Assoc., Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1152–56 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing the precautionary
nature of the statutory mandate to protect public health under the Clean Air Act’s provisions regarding
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)).
311. See discussion supra note 287 (citing use of “margin of safety” language in various sections
of Clean Air and Clean Water Acts); National Air Quality Standards Act of 1970, S. Rep. No. 91-1196,
at 10 (1970) (“Margins of safety are essential to any health-related environmental standards if a
reasonable degree of protection is to be provided against the hazards which research has not yet
identified.”); EDF v. EPA, 598 F.2d at 81 (noting that the “term ‘margin of safety’ was intended to
provide protection ‘against hazards which research has not yet identified’”); id. at 81 n.72 (quoting
legislative history on margin of safety which was employed “to reflect the lack of data on potential
toxicity where there is no experience under conditions of human or environmental exposure.”); Hercules
Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Under the ‘ample margin of safety’ safety directive,
EPA’s standards must protect against incompletely understood dangers to public health and the
environment in addition to well-known risks.”); Lead Indus. Assoc., 647 F.2d at 1154 (discussing role of
margin of safety requirement “to protect against effects which have not yet been uncovered by research
and effects whose medical significance is a matter of disagreement”).
312. See, e.g., Society of the Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975)
(upholding OSHA’s decision to regulate vinyl chloride even though the facts in dispute were “on the
frontiers of scientific knowledge” and notwithstanding the Secretary’s policy judgment “in
extrapolating . . . from mouse to man” to reduce the permissible level to the lowest detectable level).
313. David L. Bazelon, Risk and Responsibility, 205 SCIENCE 277, 279 (1979).
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uncertainties.”314 Figuring out how to operationalize this, of course, was the
crux of the matter. But there was a clear recognition in these cases that much
was at stake in the many choices confronting regulators seeking to organize
environmental decision making in the face of a host of new problems.
Environmental law, only just born, was already at an important crossroads, its
future very much up for grabs.
3. The Quest for a Generic Cancer Policy
OSHA too was at a crossroads, struggling with its own regulatory
challenges. In its first six years, the agency had concluded only four
rulemakings in the health area,315 and was facing significant pressure from
Congress and others to develop a more effective approach.316 Most pressing
among the challenges confronting the agency was the need to deal with an
increasing number of carcinogens in the workplace. In 1973, OSHA had issued
emergency temporary standards for fourteen carcinogens, which after a remand
from the Third Circuit, it reissued as permanent standards in 1974.317 In
developing these standards, OSHA drew directly on the 1970 Ad Hoc
Committee report on Environmental Carcinogenesis, with particular reliance on
the basic principles that evidence of carcinogenicity in animals provided a
sufficient basis on which to conclude that such substances were carcinogenic in
humans and that there was no safe exposure level for carcinogens.318 Over the
next several years, OSHA refined its overall approach to carcinogens,
proposing a Generic Carcinogen Policy (GCP) in 1977.319
In its GCP proposal, the Agency highlighted the intractable regulatory
challenges confronting the effort to develop standards for a growing number of

314. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev’d, 435 U.S. 519 (1977). Judge
Bazelon’s procedural version of “hard look” review was rejected by the Supreme Court in the Vermont
Yankee case.
315. See Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a Potential
Occupational Carcinogenic Risk, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,149 (Oct. 4, 1977) (noting four completed
rulemakings in OSHA’s six year history).
316. See Thomas O. McGarity, OSHA’s Generic Carcinogen Policy: Rule Making Under Scientific
and Legal Uncertainty, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION 55–56 (Nyhart et al. eds., 1983)
(discussing pressures on OSHA to develop a generic approach to cancer).
317. See Emergency Temporary Standard on Certain Carcinogens, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,929 (May 3,
1973) (issuing temporary standards); Dry Color Mfrs. Assoc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3rd Cir.
1973) (vacating and remanding emergency temporary standards); Carcinogens, 39 Fed. Reg. 3756 (Jan.
29, 1974) (order issuing permanent standards); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Assoc. v. Brennan, 503
F.2d 1155 (3rd Cir. 1974) (upholding standards).
318. See Carcinogens, supra note 317; Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Toxic
Substances Posing a Potential Occupational Carcinogenic Risk, supra note 315, at 54, 154. See also
McGarity, supra note 316, at 57–61.
319. OSHA issued its proposed GCP in 1977. See Identification, Classification, and Regulation of
Toxic Substances Posing a Potential Occupational Carcinogenic Risk, supra note 315.
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environmental carcinogens.320 A substance-by-substance approach to setting
health standards for occupational carcinogens was simply not feasible:
It is OSHA’s belief that if this proposal or something like it is not
promulgated, with present resources the output of standards to protect
American workers from carcinogens will never be adequate and may
collapse by means of the futility of the effort. Indeed, to follow the present
system and procedure for each and every individual substance and hazard
would be, we contend, beyond the abilities of any agency, no matter how
large a staff it may have.321

On the issue of quantitative risk assessment, OSHA stated that the significant
uncertainties involved in extrapolating from high-dose animals studies to lowlevel human exposures precluded use of such techniques to determine specific
risk estimates.322 Instead, the agency sought to develop a more streamlined
approach that would allow the agency to regulate automatically on the basis of
certain findings regarding potential carcinogenicity. If a chemical induced
tumors (benign or malignant) in animal tests, emergency temporary standards,
followed by permanent standards, would immediately issue requiring
employers to reduce employee exposure to the lowest feasible level.323 This
deliberate departure from the chemical-by-chemical approach reflected a
conscious and, in many respects, courageous effort by OSHA to hold onto a
precautionary approach in the face of an increasingly complex and growing set
of hazards. Quoting extensively from the Ad Hoc Committee’s report and from
Judge Wright’s decision in Ethyl Corp., OSHA sought to ground the GCP
proposal on a forthright recognition of the uncertainties that were endemic to
such an exercise and the concomitant need for pragmatic solutions to the cancer
problem.324 This was very much in the spirit of the Delaney Clause.325 But it
would not last.

320. Id. at 54,149 (noting that increasing number of environmental chemicals would lead to
increased number of carcinogens and concomitant increase in the size and complexity of OSHA’s
rulemakings).
321. Id. at 54,154.
322. Id. at 54,167. In its final rule issued in 1980, OSHA rejected the use of quantitative risk
assessment in these circumstances. See Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Potential
Carcinogens (Final Rule), 45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5200-01 (Jan. 22, 1980) (“The uncertainties involved in
extrapolating from high-dose animal experiments to predict low-dose risks to humans are far too large at
present to justify using the estimates as the basis for quantitative risk/benefit analysis. This conclusion is
well illustrated by the more than million-fold variation in the estimates of risk derived by different
authors for risks to persons exposed to vinyl chloride at the OSHA standard of 1 ppm.”).
323. Id. at 54,168.
324. Id. at 54,153 (quoting extensively from Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en
banc)); id. at 54,166 (quoting EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CARCINOGENS, supra note 168).
325. Id. at 54,166–67 (citing the Delaney Clause and its defenders in support of OSHA’s
“regulatory decision” to treat carcinogens as having no “safe” levels).
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C. Acceptable Risk & the Changing Technocratic Ideal
In fact, at the same time that OSHA was developing its Generic Cancer
Policy, more formal approaches to risk were already taking shape, in large part
as a response to the greatly enhanced ability to detect potential environmental
hazards. Recourse to mathematical extrapolation models along with more
systematic treatment of inference choices and default assumptions came to
occupy an increasing amount of attention by regulators as safety came to be
redefined as acceptable risk and regulators looked for new tools to quantify and
compare risks to determine whether they met a threshold of acceptability.326
These efforts took on additional salience in the world of hard looks and
regulatory reform that gained traction during the second half of the 1970s. As
the decade wore on, the pragmatic, flexible theory of knowledge that
underwrote the normative posture of endangerment and precaution seemed
increasingly untenable. The New Deal inspired view of expert judgment was
giving way to a more disciplined “systems” approach to technology and hazard
assessment that drew upon a growing enthusiasm for the methods of operations
research and decision theory.327
But the first efforts to use formal, quantitative risk assessment as a basis
for regulatory decisions were not direct responses to the emerging hard look
doctrine in administrative law or the growing enthusiasm for regulatory reform
that gained traction in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Rather, at both FDA and
EPA, the first steps toward quantitative risk assessment were taken in an effort
to make sense of the much more complicated world of environmental hazards
brought into view by new analytical techniques. Thus, beginning in the early
1970s, FDA pioneered the use of quantitative risk assessment based on lowdose extrapolation models as part of an effort to deal with the fact that new
detection methodologies had rendered the previous “no residue” exception for
carcinogenic animal drugs untenable.328 At about the same time, EPA deployed
quantitative risk assessment in an effort to get a handle on a whole new world
of risks associated with vinyl chloride exposure among the general
population.329 The agency also began to develop its own set of guidelines for
carcinogen risk assessment as a basis for regulation under multiple statutes,
taking a very different approach than OSHA.330 By the second half of the
1970s, the standard of “acceptable risk,” along with its mirror image
“unreasonable risk,” was embraced across various regulatory domains by

326. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 222, at 29–59 (discussing use of various
extrapolation techniques for chemical safety assessment).
327. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 8 (discussing influence of operations research and systems theory
on risk assessment and other forms of policy analysis during the post-World War II period).
328. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
329. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
330. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
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Congress and agencies as they sought to develop more formal, objective
approaches to protecting public health and the environment.
1. DES and Quantitative Risk Assessment at FDA
Not surprisingly, the first regulatory use of quantitative risk assessment
occurred in the area of food safety, largely in response to the substantial
advances in detection capabilities during the 1960s and 1970s. Specifically,
FDA’s struggle to deal with diethylstilbestrol, or DES, in animal feeds
provided the impetus for the Agency’s first effort to develop formal,
quantitative risk assessment as a basis for regulation.331 In 1962, Congress had
added the “DES proviso” to the FFDCA, providing that carcinogenic animal
drugs could be approved for use in food-producing animals if, under proper use
and on the basis of “approved methods” for residue detection, “no residue” of
the carcinogenic substance would be present in food derived from the animals
after slaughter.332 The primary motivation behind this was to allow continued
use of DES, a known carcinogen, as a growth promoter in chickens and beef
cattle. At the time of the amendment, state-of-the-art analytical methods were
sensitive to a level of 2 parts per billion (2 ppb) and did not detect residues after
slaughter.333 By the early 1970s, the USDA began using gas chromatography
methods sensitive to the 0.5 ppb and later moved to even more sensitive
radiotracer studies.334 Based on the new methods, residues of DES began to
show up in slaughtered animals at dosage levels previously found to satisfy the
“no residue” threshold.335 FDA responded by withdrawing pending
applications for new DES animal drugs on the grounds that the Delaney Clause
prohibited their use.336 And even though the courts overturned these
331. See, e.g., Joseph V. Rodricks, Origins of Risk Assessment in Food Safety Decision Making, 7
J. AM. C. TOXICOLOGY 539, 539 (1988) (tracing “origins of risk assessment as a regulatory tool to
FDA’s attempt, during the 1960s and 1970s, to deal with various uses of diethylstilbestrol (DES)”).
332. 21 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(H) (2006).
333. See BASF Notice of Withdrawal of Petition for Food Additives, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,485, 10,487
(Apr. 27, 1973) (discussing evolution of detection methodologies and sensitivities for DES residues).
This was also the period during which links were established between DES use by pregnant women and
certain gynecological cancers in their daughters. In 1971, a study published in the New England Journal
of Medicine showed that seven of eight girls and young women (ages 14 to 22) who had been diagnosed
with a rare form of vaginal cancer had been exposed prenatally to DES. See Arthur L. Herbst et al.,
Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 NEW ENG. J. MED. 878 (1971).
334. Id.
335. These residues were detected in spite of the fact that the USDA sampling program was widely
viewed as inadequate. See, e.g., Chemicals and the Future of Man, supra note 246, at 55 (statement of
Dr. Samuel S. Epstein).
336. See Order Denying Hearing and Withdrawing Approval of New Animal Drug Applications
for Liquid and Dry Premixes, and Deferring Ruling on Implants, 37 Fed. Reg. 15,747, 15,749 (Aug. 4,
1972) (“The new USDA study clearly shows [DES] residues that are in the range of current detection
methodology; new detection methodology is being developed that would be significantly more sensitive.
Thus, under the law there is no alternative but to withdraw approval of the drug, even though there is no
known public health hazard resulting from its use.”); BASF Notice of Withdrawal of Petition for Food
Additives, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,485, 10,487 (Apr. 27, 1973) (“The data obtained from the USDA
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withdrawals on the basis of improper notice and the technical point that the
Delaney Clause did not apply because the new methods had not been formally
established as “approved methods,” it was obvious that the world had
changed.337
Simply put, by the early 1970s, it had become quite clear that the “no
residue” standard was entirely contingent upon the sensitivity of the analytical
technique used to detect residues and that, as such techniques improved, a
literal interpretation of the standard—what some referred to as a “no
molecules” approach—would become impossible to meet in the absence of a
complete ban.338 In an effort to bring some coherence to the issue, the FDA
initiated a rulemaking in 1973 that included the first published criteria on
sensitivity of method and the first explicit call for a quantitative risk-based
approach.339 Rather than specify a particular analytic technique that would
provide the basis for the no residue standard, the agency proposed a particular
dose-response model for extrapolation to low doses and defined an
“acceptable” level of risk as one in 100 million.340 This was the first proposed
regulatory use of a low-dose extrapolation model and a landmark on the road to
quantitative risk assessment.341 As such, it elicited wide-ranging reactions from
various constituencies and it took well into the 1980s for the FDA to resolve
the matter.342
In a more general sense, the new approach represented a deeper shift in the
conception of expertise. Expert judgment was giving way to a more anonymous
and increasingly formal systems approach built on standard methods and
procedures. As the pluralism and interest group politics of the 1970s gained
radioactive-tagged DES implant study clearly establish the presence of residues of DES and/or its
conjugates 120 days after implantation. No known data utilizing comparably sensitive methodology
shows the absence of DES residues. . . . The Commissioner is taking this action [withdrawing the
application] because of a lack of proof of safety, not because of proof of a public health hazard. No
human harm has been demonstrated as a result of the use of DES implants. Because the new USDA test
clearly shows DES residues in cattle liver, the law requires that use of the drug must be discontinued.”).
337. See Hess & Clark v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975, 994–95 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (vacating on grounds that
agency failed to provide proper notice and hearing); Chemetron v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ., and
Welfare, 495 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (vacating DES withdrawals on grounds that decision
was not based on use of an “approved method” for detecting DES residues).
338. See Chemical Compounds in Food Producing Animals, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,070, 17,073–17,074
(Mar. 20, 1979) (discussing “no molecules” interpretation of the DES proviso and its implausibility).
339. See Compounds Used in Food-Producing Animals, 38 Fed. Reg. 19,226, 19,227 (July 19,
1973).
340. Id. The agency proposed a modified version of the Mantel-Bryan or log-probit extrapolation
model. Based on the proposed approach, the level of a specific drug residue could be calculated on the
basis of a low-dose extrapolation from the relevant animal studies and, if it was below the “acceptable”
one in 100 million level, the sponsor of the drug would then be required to submit a detection method
capable of measuring residues at or below this level.
341. See Hutt, supra note 67.
342. FDA issued its final rule on the “no residue” issue in 1987. See Sponsored Compounds in
Food-Producing Animals; Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating the Safety of Carcinogenic Residues,
52 Fed. Reg. 49,572 (Dec. 31, 1987) (final rule on the operational definition of “no residue” and tying it
to “significant” risk threshold in one in one million).
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momentum and in the midst of a growing enthusiasm for regulatory reform,
embattled agencies facing gargantuan regulatory tasks looked to quantitative
risk assessment as an increasingly attractive way of insulating their decision
making from criticism. There was a view that management systems, protocols,
and frameworks could be developed to rationalize agency decision making and
remove, as much as possible, the elements of individual judgment.343
2. Vinyl Chloride and Quantitative Risk Assessment at EPA
At roughly the same time that FDA was developing its approach to
quantitative risk assessment, EPA was moving in the same direction as it
grappled with the possible risks of exposure to vinyl chloride—a compound
that came into widespread use after World War II.344 Between 1943 and 1973,
vinyl chloride production in the United States soared from less than 99 million
pounds to more than 5.2 billion pounds.345 The first reports of adverse health
effects in workers exposed to vinyl chloride were published in the late
1940s,346 but it was not until 1971 that the first scientific article was published
demonstrating the carcinogenicity of vinyl chloride in experimental animals.347
Three years later, it was reported that several workers from the B.F. Goodrich
plant in Louisville, Kentucky had died from a rare form of liver cancer linked
directly to vinyl chloride exposure.348 OSHA responded first with an
emergency standard of fifty parts per million (ppm) and then a new permanent
standard of one ppm, following the approach that it would soon seek to validate
in its Generic Cancer Policy.349
The larger concern in all of this was whether the general public was at
risk. Shortly after the Goodrich deaths came to light, a joint investigation by the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health and the Centers for
Disease Control suggested that the carcinogenic hazards facing industrial

See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 226.
See EPA, EPA-600/6-75-004, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT REPORT ON VINYL
CHLORIDE AND POLYVINYL CHLORIDE 3 (1975) (documenting production and use of vinyl chloride in
the United States after World War II).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 70.
347. See P.L. Viola et al., Oncogenic Response of Rat Skin, Lungs, and Bones to Vinyl Chloride,
31 CANCER RES. 516 (1971) (documenting carcinogenic effects of vinyl chloride exposure in
experimental rats).
348. See Vinyl Chloride Hearing before the Subcomm. on Environment, S. Commerce Comm., 93d
Cong. 40 (1974) [hereinafter Vinyl Chloride Hearing] (statement by Dr. Marcus Key, Director National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health) (describing liver angiosarcoma deaths among workers at
Goodrich facility).
349. See Emergency Temporary Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,342
(April 5, 1974); Vinyl Chloride: Proposed Standard, 39 Fed. Reg. 16,896 (May 10, 1974) see also
Jacqueline Karnell Corn, Vinyl Chloride: Setting a Workplace Standard: An Historical Perspective on
Assessing Risk, 5 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 497 (1984) (discussing OSHA’s efforts to set a workplace
standard for vinyl chloride).

343.
344.
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workers could extend to those living in proximity to vinyl chloride facilities.350
At the time, no one had any understanding of the relevant population, much
less exposure levels and pathways. EPA responded by establishing a task force
to investigate the risks associated with vinyl chloride exposure for the general
population, an investigation that resulted in the agency’s first formal
quantitative risk assessment.351
The task confronting EPA in carrying out such an exercise was immense.
By the early 1970s, there were more than fifty vinyl chloride plants scattered
around the country with cumulative emissions estimated at more than 220
million pounds per year.352 More than 4.5 million people lived within five
miles of these facilities.353 In order to understand the hazards confronting these
people, new procedures would have to be established to sample and monitor the
ambient air, models would have to be constructed to better understand exposure
pathways and incorporate relevant toxicological studies, decisions would have
to be made regarding how to interpret animal studies and apply them to human
exposures, and arguments would have to be advanced regarding the appropriate
regulatory instrument.354
As with DES, moreover, the issue turned in large part on whether and how
the agency would extrapolate from existing human and animal studies to low
doses among the general population. During congressional hearings on the
matter, Dr. Kenneth Bridbord, a member of the EPA task force, responded to
questions on this issue, pointing to low-dose extrapolations under development
by researchers at the National Cancer Institute.355 “We have to stress,” he said,
that these are extrapolations and judgments based upon models that many
people feel are reasonable, but are by no means perfect. . . . I am not a
prophet and cannot speculate whether or not we will find a level where all
of a sudden the risk becomes zero. These are estimates based on projections
beyond the limits of availability in the data. But nonetheless they are highly

350. See Vinyl Chloride Hearing, supra note 348, at 43 (statement of Dr. Joseph Wagner, NIOSH
Director of Field Studies and Clinical Investigations) (“In conclusion, the NIOSH-CDC investigation
into vinyl chloride points out the importance of industrial studies for identifying potential carcinogenic
hazards which may extend into the general population, and the need for pretesting chemical substances
by animal bioassays.”).
351. See id. at 348 (statement of James Agee, Assistant Administrator EPA) (identifying Goodrich
incident as “trigger for EPA concern” and describing formation of EPA task force). EPA also issued an
emergency order banning the sale of pesticide sprays containing the substance. In April 1974, FDA
recalled and then banned all hair sprays and cosmetics using vinyl chloride as a propellant. The risk
assessment for vinyl chloride was published in December 1975. See EPA, QUANTITATIVE RISK
ASSESSMENT FOR COMMUNITY EXPOSURE TO VINYL CHLORIDE (1975).
352. See EPA, supra note 344, at 3.
353. See National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Standard for Vinyl Chloride,
41 Fed. Reg. 46,560, 46,560 (Oct. 21, 1976) (citing estimates of 4.6 million people living within five
miles of vinyl chloride and polyvinyl chloride facilities).
354. See Vinyl Chloride Hearing, supra note 348, at 64–74 (statements of Agee, Bridboard, and
Schweitzer) (discussing challenges facing EPA in assessing risks of vinyl chloride); EPA, supra note
344, at 4 (discussing challenges of assessing vinyl chloride risks).
355. See Vinyl Chloride Hearing, supra note 348, at 70.
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suggestive of a continuing but a diminishing risk at lower levels of
exposure. . . . Does that risk extend to 1 ppm? Does it extend to 100 ppb?
Again we are operating in the avenue of the unknown. . . .356

In its risk assessment for vinyl chloride, EPA scientists used two extrapolation
models (linear and log-probit) that yielded a range of less-than-one to twenty
annual excess cancers of all types among residents living in the vicinity of
these plants.357 Based on this risk assessment, EPA promptly listed vinyl
chloride as a hazardous air pollutant under section 112 of the Clean Air Act358
and proposed a national emissions standard for it.359 In its proposed standard,
the Agency recounted the evidence of vinyl chloride’s carcinogenicity and
concluded that it was an “apparent non-threshold pollutant.”360
EPA further noted that “for a carcinogen it should be assumed, in the
absence of strong evidence to the contrary, that there is no atmospheric
concentration that poses absolutely no public health risk.”361 Given this
assumption, the agency thus confronted a dilemma in discharging its duty under
section 112 to set emissions standards “at the level which in [the judgment of
the Administrator] provides an ample margin of safety to protect the public
health from such hazardous air pollutants.”362 EPA could either choose a “zero
emission limitation,” which “would be the only emission standard which would
offer absolute safety from ambient exposure,” or it could go with “[a]n
alternative interpretation of section 112” that would reduce emissions “to the
lowest level achievable by use of the best available control technology.”363 In
cases of “apparent non-threshold pollutants,” such as vinyl chloride, where
“complete emission prohibition would result in widespread industry closure”
and where the agency “determined that the cost of such closure would be
grossly disproportionate to the benefits of removing the risk that would remain
after imposition of the best available control technology,” EPA went with the
technology-based approach. It proposed a standard that would limit emissions
of vinyl chloride from most sources to ten ppm.364 Notwithstanding the
language of the statute, the agency felt confident in choosing such an approach

356.
357.
358.

Id. at 70–71.
EPA, supra note 351.
See Air Pollution Prevention and Control: Hazardous Air Pollutants, Addition to List, 40 Fed.
Reg. 59,477 (Dec. 24, 1975) (adding vinyl chloride to the section 112 list).
359. See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Proposed Standard for Vinyl
Chloride, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,532 (Dec. 24, 1975) (proposing standard limiting various sources of vinyl
chloride emissions to ten ppm).
360. Id. at 59,534.
361. Id.
362. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006); see also Proposed Standard for Vinyl Chloride, supra note 359,
at 59,534 (“The issue was how far the level of such pollutants should be reduced to provide ‘an ample
margin of safety.’”).
363. See Proposed Standard for Vinyl Chloride, supra note 359, at 59,534.
364. Id.
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on the grounds that Congress could not have intended to impose such draconian
costs on the American economy.365
In its final rule promulgating the proposed ten ppm standard, EPA
rehearsed the basic findings of the vinyl chloride risk assessment but did not
state whether it considered the resulting risks to be significant or acceptable.366
Nor did the agency provide any elaboration of its responsibilities under section
112 or the legal basis for choosing a technology-based approach.367 The EDF
immediately challenged the rule on the grounds that section 112 was a pure
health-based standard that prohibited consideration of costs and technology.368
In its challenge, EDF sought to move EPA into alignment with the Generic
Cancer Policy approach that OSHA was developing.
In the resulting settlement, EPA agreed to propose new, more stringent
standards and to establish a goal of zero emissions.369 The agency then
proposed a new rule in June 1977, imposing a more stringent five ppm standard
and embracing a goal of zero emissions, but it reiterated the view that a
complete prohibition on emissions of non-threshold pollutants was not
consistent with Congressional intent.370 For the next seven years, EPA sat on
the proposal and eventually withdrew it in 1985, an action that resulted in
another lawsuit and, ultimately, a revision to section 112 as part of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments.371 While the details of that episode are beyond the
scope of this Article, what is important to recognize is that with vinyl chloride,
EPA had embraced a more formal, quantitative approach to assessing risk—one
that rested increasingly on the use of mathematical extrapolation models to
develop specific risk estimates for individual substances as a means of bringing
order to its burgeoning regulatory responsibilities.372 Over time and under the

365.
366.

Id.
See National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Standard for Vinyl Chloride,
41 Fed. Reg. 46,560, 46,560 (Oct. 21, 1976).
367. Id.
368. See NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1149 (1987) (recounting history of the litigation on the
vinyl chloride standard). See also David D. Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short
Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L. Q. 497, 579–81 (1978)
(discussing EDF challenge to EPA’s vinyl chloride standard).
369. See NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d at 1149; Doniger, supra note 368, at 581–85 (discussing
settlement).
370. See Vinyl Chloride, 42 Fed. Reg. 28,154, 28154 (June 2, 1977). As EPA put the matter:
In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, then, the only level of vinyl chloride which
would appear to be absolutely protective of health is zero, which may be achievable only by
banning vinyl chloride emissions completely. That, in turn, would require closing the entire
industry. As explained in the earlier rulemaking, it is not clear that Congress would have
intended this result, so instead EPA required the lowest level achievable using technological
means.
Id.
371. See NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d at 1149. These developments will be dealt with in a subsequent
article.
372. EPA was moving down this same path at the same time in the context of its efforts to
regulated toxic water pollutants under the Flannery Decree. See supra note 217; EPA, Water Quality
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influence of greater public and judicial scrutiny, this approach would come to
constrain the exercise of judgment that EPA had embraced in the early
pesticide cases and that Judge Skelly Wright and others had held up as a
technocratic ideal. Quantitative risk assessment was thus much more than a
simple tool; it was a rationale and general approach to agency decision making
that departed dramatically from earlier conceptions of expert judgment.
3. Carcinogen Risk Guidelines
During the same period that EPA was struggling to make sense of the
vinyl chloride problem, it also released a set of “interim guidelines and
procedures for carcinogen risk assessment” in an attempt to deal with an
expanding universe of chemical carcinogens that implicated multiple statutory
responsibilities.373 The agency noted that regulatory action against carcinogens
other than ionizing radiation was relatively recent, dating from the Delaney
Clause of the late 1950s, and that the “no-threshold concept” for carcinogens
that emerged during this time made it increasingly untenable to adopt a zerorisk approach:
In the debate over the health effects of radioactive fallout from atomic
weapons in the 1950s, the evidence for a no-threshold concept for cancer
induction emerged, which supported the idea that there is no such thing as a
completely safe dose; in other words, any exposure, however small, will
confer some risk of cancer on the exposed population. Evidence has
accumulated that the no-threshold concept can be applicable to chemical
carcinogens. On the basis of this concept, the first significant regulatory
legislation relating to chemical carcinogens, the Delaney Clause of the Pure
Food and Drug Act, imposed a complete ban on any food additive that
showed evidence of tumorigenic activity for humans or animals. This
statutory requirement represents the approach of eliminating all risk.
However, it has become increasingly clear that in many areas risk cannot
be eliminated completely without unacceptable social and economic
consequences.374

As with ionizing radiation, “acceptable risk” appeared to offer a more viable
approach to conceptualizing and regulating the potential harm associated with
chemical carcinogens. “We thus have a comparable conceptual basis for the
regulation of chemicals as for ionizing radiation where the philosophy has been
to eliminate or reduce exposure to the greatest extent possible consistent with
the acceptability of the costs involved.”375 Any substance that “causes a
Criteria Documents, 45 Fed. Reg. 79,318 (1980) (describing the quantitative procedures used in risk
assessment for toxic water pollutants). See also NAT’L ACAD. SCI., DRINKING WATER AND HEALTH 27–
59 (1977) (providing detailed description of risk assessment and its application to toxic water
pollutants).
373. Health Risk and Economic Impact Assessments of Suspected Carcinogens, 41 Fed. Reg.
21,402 (May 25, 1976).
374. Id. at 21,402–03.
375. Id. at 21,403.
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statistically significant excess incidence of benign or malignant tumors in
humans or animals” would be considered a “presumptive cancer risk.”376 But
the ultimate decision to regulate would be based on a detailed “risk benefit
assessment,” an exercise that was automatic under FIFRA but one that would
need to proceed on a priority basis under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,
and Safe Drinking Water Act. Finally, EPA Administrator Russell Train
pointed to the administrative law implications of the new guidance: “In my
opinion, the current guidelines represent a significant improvement in the
Agency’s approach to the processes of decision making for carcinogens by
providing improved procedures for making risks and benefit assessments for
public review of the Agency’s deliberations.”377 Here again, we see a reflection
of the new view of expertise as embedded with a system of procedures that
could be disciplined and standardized through administrative law and agency
practice.
Viewed in retrospect, perhaps the most important practical aspect of this
overall approach, and what distinguished it from OSHA’s efforts to develop a
generic cancer policy, was that it contemplated——demanded in fact——a
case-by-case, chemical-by-chemical approach to carcinogen risk assessment.
EPA had started down a road that, while seeming to promise a more rigorous
and objective basis for regulatory decision making, would come to consume
enormous resources in the years ahead, without always generating definitive or
timely results.378
4. Unreasonable Risk
During this time, Congress also started to embrace a more self-conscious
approach to risk. As early as 1972, in both the substantial overhaul of FIFRA
and the newly enacted Consumer Products Safety Act, Congress employed the
concept of “unreasonable risk” as the basic standard of protection.379 The 1977
amendments to the Clean Water Act likewise framed the regulation of so-called
non-conventional water pollutants partly in terms of acceptable risk.380 And the

376.
377.
378.

Id.
Id.
See NRC, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 3–4 (discussing problems with current
chemical risk assessments).
379. See, e.g., Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973,
979 (Oct. 21, 1972) (defining “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” as “any unreasonable
risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and
benefits of the use of any pesticide”); id. at 981 (establishing as requirement for registration that proper
use of pesticide not cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment); id. at 984 (employing
“unreasonable adverse effects on environment” standard as basis for cancellation or change in
classification); Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207, 1208 (Oct. 27, 1972)
(declaring purposes of Act, including protection of “the public against unreasonable risks of injury
associated with consumer products”).
380. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(2)(C) (2006) (giving EPA limited authority to control nonconventional pollutants that “may reasonably be anticipated to pose an unacceptable risk to human
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1977 Clean Air Act amendments included references to “unreasonable risk” in
some of the waiver provisions added to the new source performance standards
in section 111.381
The most dramatic example of this shift in thinking, however, was the
evolution of the legislation that culminated in passage of the 1976 Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA).382 The legislation grew out of the increased
awareness during the 1960s and early 1970s that a single-media approach to
environmental protection would never be sufficient to address the potential
hazards associated with the large and growing universe of industrial
chemicals.383 As with pesticides and new drugs, these chemicals needed to be
addressed in a separate, comprehensive statute that would generate the
necessary health and safety information before allowing chemicals into
commerce and provide tools to regulate their production, use, and
distribution.384 As Russell Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ), remarked during the initial hearings on a toxic substances bill
in 1971,
Our awareness of environmental threats, our ability to screen and test
substances for adverse effects, and our capabilities for monitoring and
predicting, although inadequate, are now sufficiently developed that we
need no longer remain in a purely reactive posture with respect to chemical
hazards. We need no longer be limited to repairing damage after it has been
done; nor should we allow our population to be used as a laboratory for
discovering adverse health effects. There is no longer any valid reason for
continued failure to develop and exercise reasonable controls over toxic
substances in the environment.385

Here was a strong endorsement of precaution as the foundation for new
chemicals legislation.
The drafting of a new toxic substances control statute began in 1970,
spearheaded by two staffers at the newly created CEQ, J. Clarence Davies and

health or the environment because of bioaccumulation, persistency in the environment, acute toxicity,
chronic toxicity (including carcinogenicity, mutagenicity or teratogenicity), or synergistic propensities”).
381. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 701-02 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7411(k)(1)(A)).
382. See Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976). For an overview
and some general background on TSCA, see David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, its History and Key
Underlying Assumptions, and its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 J. LAW & POL’Y 333 (2010).
383. See The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1971 and Amendment, Hearings before the
Subcomm. on the Environment of the S. Comm. on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 92d Cong. 63–67 (1972)
(testimony of Russell Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality) (discussing growing public
health threat posed by chemical hazards, inadequacies of existing environmental laws, and need for new
comprehensive and systematic approach to controlling toxics substances).
384. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, TOXIC SUBSTANCES iv–vii (1971) (discussing need for
new legal authorities to deal with problem of toxic substances).
385. The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1971 and Amendment, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on the Environment of the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 92d Cong. 66 (1972)
(testimony of Russell Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality).
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Charles Lettow.386 After considerable debate within the Administration, which
Davies contends weakened the initial CEQ proposal, the President submitted a
draft law to Congress in 1971.387 Notwithstanding the compromises, the
proposed legislation was simple and expansive, employing the language of
endangerment and safety and giving EPA broad authority to require testing of
chemicals in order to ensure the “protect[ion] of health and the
environment.”388 Unreasonable risk is nowhere to be found in the first several
iterations of the proposed legislation, nor does it appear in any substantive way
in the extensive legislative hearings that occurred during 1971 and 1972.389
Some of the early amendments to the legislation, and a significant number of
the witnesses who testified, also drew directly on past experiences with
pesticides and new drugs, calling for express provisions in the law that would
make it abundantly clear that chemical manufacturers had the burden of
demonstrating safety before they would be allowed to sell their products.390
386. See The Toxic Substances Control Act: From the Perspective of J. Clarence Davies, Interview
Transcript at 10–12 (Chemical Heritage Society, 2009) (on file with author) (discussing early
development of legislation at CEQ).
387. The Administration’s proposed bill is contained in COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE
PRESIDENT’S 1971 ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM 146–62 (1971). One of the most important gaps in the
new legislation, as initially introduced (and ultimately enacted), was the fact that the testing
requirements applied only to chemicals that were produced in commercial quantities after the date of
enactment, leaving many tens of thousands of chemicals effectively unregulated—a fact that continues
to plague chemicals regulation.
388. See The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1971 and Amendment, Hearings before the
Subcomm. on the Environment of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 4 (1972) (citing section 201 of
Senate Bill 1478: “[I]t is the policy of the United States . . . that such authority over chemicals be
exercised in such a manner as not to unduly impede technological innovation while fulfilling the
primary purpose of this title to assure that such innovation and commerce does not endanger human
health or the environment.”); id. at 12–13 (citing section 205 of Senate Bill 1478, which required the
administrator to “prescribe by regulation standards for test protocols, and for the results to be achieved
therefrom, as are necessary to protect human health and the environment” from various classes and uses
of chemicals). The impetus for the legislation came from the newly established Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ). In 1970, CEQ staff members J. Clarence Davies and Charles L. Lettow
drafted a strong toxic substances bill that met stiff resistance from the Department of Commerce and
OMB. In an oral history interview with Davies conducted by the Chemical Heritage Foundation, Davies
observed that the bill was weakened considerably before it was even introduced on Capitol Hill, with
new legal and procedural hurdles added. See The Toxic Substances Control Act: From the Perspective of
J. Clarence Davies, Interview Transcript at 10–12 (Chemical Heritage Society, 2009) (on file with
author).
389. See The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1971 and Amendment, Hearings before the
Subcomm. on the Environment of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. (1972); Toxic Substances
Control Act, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the H. Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong. (1972).
390. See, e.g., The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1971 and Amendment, Hearings before the
Subcomm. on the Environment of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 31 (1972) (citing amendment
from Senator Spong stating in section 201 of TSCA that testing of new chemicals “should be the
responsibility of those who produce such chemicals”); id. at 116 (statement of Louise Dunlap, Friends of
the Earth) (arguing in favor of imposing responsibility for testing new and potentially hazardous existing
chemicals on manufacturers); id. at 137 (statement of William H. Rodgers, University of Washington
School of Law) (“It is indisputable that the burden of proving that the benefits derived from use exceed
the risks should be on the manufacturer. The legislation should be explicit in slamming the door on
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Over the next five years, however, the focus of the statute evolved to
“unreasonable threat” and then, finally, to “unreasonable risk,” and the burden
was shifted decisively to EPA to demonstrate that a particular chemical posed
an unreasonable risk before issuing any testing requirements and before
regulating the production, use, or distribution of any individual chemical
substance.391 During the floor debates that accompanied passage of the final
legislation, it was made very clear that these changes were intended to avoid
over-regulation and to constrain any “arbitrary action on the part of EPA.”392
As several participants in the legislative debates pointed out, moreover, these
changes reflected in part (perhaps significant part) the concerted efforts of the
chemical industry to shape the legislation—a sign of the increasing

future efforts to assure operational annihilation of this generally accepted premise); id. at 140 (testimony
of Karin Sheldon, Public Interest Research Group) (“Manufacturers must bear the burden of testing, of
showing that something is safe before it is permitted to go into the market.”). It is interesting to note,
however, that several witnesses were concerned about the potential conflicts of interest that might arise
from requiring industry to test its own chemicals. See, e.g., id. at 111 (statement of Harrison Wellford,
Center for Responsive Law).
391. See Toxic Substances Control Act of 1973, Hearings before the Subcomm. on the
Environment of the Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong. 3–4, 12–13 (1973) (reproducing draft legislation
(S. 426) framing policy rationale and standard for regulating toxic substances in terms of “unreasonable
threat to human health or the environment”); Toxic Substances Control Legislation—1973, Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance, Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d
Cong. 3, 11–12 (1973) (reproducing draft legislation (H.R. 5087) framing regulation of toxic substances
in terms of endangerment and unreasonable threat). As finally enacted in 1976 (and the bill passed
largely because of the additional pressures that resulted from the heavily publicized Kepone disaster on
the James River and an imminent new Democratic administration), the new legislation required the EPA
to find “unreasonable risk” before doing anything. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2), (3) (2006) (“It is
the policy of the United States that . . . adequate authority should exist to regulate chemical substances
and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”); id. § 2603(a)
(requiring finding of “unreasonable risk” as basis for testing requirements); id. § 2605(4) (requiring
finding of “unreasonable risk” as basis for regulation of hazardous chemical substances or mixtures); see
also Applegate, supra note 4 (discussing importance of unreasonable risk standard under TSCA); J.
CLARENCE DAVIES, SAM GUSMAN & FRANCES IRWIN, DETERMINING UNREASONABLE RISK UNDER THE
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 23 (1979) (noting that the term unreasonable risk appears 38 times
in TSCA, half of which occur in sections 5 and 6 which provide for premanufacture notifications for
new chemicals and regulation of chemicals).
392. See, e.g., House Consideration of Conference Report on S. 3149, Toxic Substances Control
Act, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT TOGETHER WITH A SECTIONBY-SECTION INDEX 741, 742 (1976) (statement of Rep. Broyhill) (“The general standard for taking
action under this legislation is that the substance may present an unreasonable risk. The conferees intend
to limit the Administrator to taking action only against unreasonable risks because to do otherwise
assumes that a risk-free society is attainable, an assumption that Congress does not make. Although the
authorities granted to EPA are extremely broad, the conferees have made a concerted effort to include in
the conference report safeguards against arbitrary action on the part of EPA.”) see also Senate
Consideration of Conference Report on Toxic Substances Control Act, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: TOGETHER WITH A SECTION-BY-SECTION INDEX 722, 738 (1976)
(statement of Sen. Durkin) (discussing constraints imposed on EPA in new legislation and noting that
“[h]opefully next year, with the cooperation of a Democratic President the Congress will put the shoe
where it really belongs, and require the chemical companies to prove all their products are safe for future
generations of Americans before proving they are safe for this generation of stockholders”).
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politicization of environmental law during the fractured decade of the 1970s
and the growing influence of professional lobbying operations.393
Thus, in several of its initial manifestations, TSCA embraced the earlier,
more precautionary thrust of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, employing
the language of endangerment and safety and giving EPA fairly broad authority
to require the testing necessary to protect human health and the environment.
By the time of enactment, however, EPA bore the burden of establishing
whether an individual chemical substance posed an “unreasonable risk” before
it could require testing, much less regulate, and the whole issue of generating
health and safety information for the tens of thousands of chemicals already in
commerce had been taken off the table.394 Going forward, this basic fact of
“toxic ignorance,” combined with the substantive burdens and procedural
hurdles that TSCA imposed on EPA, rendered the statute grossly inadequate,
providing the motivation for ongoing calls to reform what some observers view
as the least effective of all U.S. environmental laws.395
The implications of TSCA’s shift from endangerment to unreasonable risk
thus went well beyond word choice, signaling an important reorientation by
Congress toward notions of acceptable risk that would come to inform major
legislative and regulatory efforts in the years ahead.396 Whereas the earlier
language of endangerment trained attention to the actors and activities that
393. See, e.g., Senate Consideration of Conference Report on Toxic Substances Control Act, 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: TOGETHER WITH A SECTION-BYSECTION INDEX 722, 736 (1976) (statement of Sen. Durkin) (discussing intensive lobbying effort by
petrochemical industry to “prevent enactment of meaningful toxic substance control legislation”);
Senate Consideration of S. 3149, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT:
TOGETHER WITH A SECTION-BY-SECTION INDEX 207, 210 (1976) (statement of Sen. Tunney) (“I must
say that I have never seen such an effective lobbying effort as was done against this legislation.”); id. at
208 (“[W]hile the record of chemical dangers continues to grow, segments of the chemical industry have
presented roadblocks at every juncture of the bill’s development. There is no question in my mind that a
statute would now be on the books providing effective protection against chemical hazards had it not
been for the concerted effort of certain segments of the chemical industry to gut essential provisions of
this legislation.”); id. at 219–20 (introducing into the record a letter from Dow Chemical urging “the
broadest and strongest possible grass roots political action campaign in opposition to Toxic Substances
legislation”).
394. EPA estimated that there were more than 60,000 chemicals in commerce at the time of
TSCA’s enactment.
395. See, e.g, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING 84, tbl.7 (1984) (reporting that 78%
of the chemicals in U.S. commerce with production volume of 1 million pounds or more per year lacked
even “minimal toxicity information”); EDF, TOXIC IGNORANCE: THE CONTINUING ABSENCE OF BASIC
HEALTH TESTING FOR TOP-SELLING CHEMICALS IN THE US 15 (1997) (finding that more than 70% of
high production volume chemicals in the U.S. do not meet the minimum data requirements for health
hazard screening set by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Chemicals
Program); see also Richard Denison, Ten Essential Elements in TSCA Reform, 39 ENVTL L. REP. 10,020
(2009) (criticizing TSCA and discussing various elements of TSCA reform); Lynn R. Goldman,
Preventing Pollution? U.S. Toxic Chemicals and Pesticides Policies and Sustainable Development, 32
ENVTL. L. REP. 11,018 (2002) (same); Sachs, supra note 5 (same).
396. In a somewhat ironic twist, this new standard would be invoked in later years as a rationale
for redefining safety as acceptable risk in the context of the hazardous air pollutant provisions of the
Clean Air Act. See NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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were imposing hazards on the public, unreasonable risk suggested that the
public should only be allowed to regulate the underlying activity if the
associated risks were deemed to be unacceptable, translating almost seamlessly
into a balancing of costs and benefits that some observers argued tilted all too
easily in favor of industry. This change in language also reflected a very
different posture toward uncertainty and the possibility of knowledge regarding
complex and emerging environmental hazards. Unreasonable risk, and the
balancing that it entailed, demanded a degree of quantification and precision
that was largely absent in the earlier conceptions of endangerment. There was
an assumption, in other words, that risks could be quantified and understood
sufficiently in order to run them through a risk-benefit analysis as a prerequisite
for regulation. The previously held conviction that the whole enterprise of
assessing these sorts of environmental hazards was operating on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge, that uncertainty was a basic, irreducible fact of any such
exercise, had largely given way. In the process, expert judgment and agency
discretion were replaced with a much more constrained and disciplined
approach to agency decision making that was increasingly embedded in new
structures of accountability. Finally, in concert with all of these trends, the shift
in language signaled in important ways the rise of professional advocacy and
lobbying efforts and the increasingly adversarial nature of environmental
politics.
At a more basic level, these developments also drew on a broader set of
trends that had been underway for some time, further validating and supporting
the embrace of risk thinking across health, safety, and environmental
regulation. Beginning in the late 1960s, systematic thinking about risk within
the framework of decision theory and expected utility began to influence those
interested in technology assessment and environmental protection,397 and
leading professionals at EPA and other agencies began to discuss more formal
approaches to risk within these frameworks.398 Research on risk perception
during this time also gained considerable currency as the emerging class of risk
professionals sought to understand why “ordinary people” failed to see risks in
the way that experts did—a reaction to the growing formalization of risk and
the elevation of expert epistemology as well as the pressing need to understand
why some risks remained “unacceptable” despite what the numbers
indicated.399 In all of this, acceptable risk was becoming the baseline against
which efforts to evaluate hazards would proceed, a development that would
feed directly into efforts during the 1980s to elaborate a more comprehensive

397. See, e.g., Chauncey Starr, Social Benefit versus Technological Risk, 165 SCIENCE 1232 (1969)
(developing formal basis for comparing and evaluating acceptability of different risks).
398. See, e.g., William D. Rowe, EPA, The Anatomy of Risk (1975) (providing extensive
discussion of risk assessment in the context of decision theory and expected utility).
399. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 397; LOWRANCE, supra note 15; FISCHHOFF, supra note 23; MARY
DOUGLAS, RISK ACCEPTABILITY ACCORDING TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1986).
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framework for comparative risk assessment, and reflecting a much more selfconscious effort to rationalize and constrain agency decision making.400
IV.

GOVERNING THE FUTURE

The move to acceptable risk thus promised a new framework for
evaluating different types of hazards, one that seemed to require the application
of quantitative risk assessment as a tool for developing more precise risk
estimates and one that translated seamlessly into a larger framework of costbenefit analysis. By bringing the future into the present and making it
calculable, by transforming external hazards into consequences of collective
decisions, risk worked to socialize hazards and subject them to a more
objective exercise aimed at prioritizing the allocation of scare regulatory
resources. This new form of “equivalence” brought with it new forms of
sociability and new relations between citizens and the regulatory state.401 By
making hazards a product of our collective actions, risk assessment also
highlighted the differences between “expert” and “lay” understandings of risk,
giving rise to a robust and growing literature on risk perception. This new and
growing appreciation for the ways in which different groups of people
perceived risk in turn fed back into the regulatory process and the broader
effort to subsume risk within the framework of expected utility.402
By the early 1980s, efforts to formalize the practice of risk assessment and
marry it to risk management in a single framework were in full swing.403 This
was a period of almost hyper-formalism, marked by the strong endorsement of
quantitative risk assessment as a basis for agency decision making and driven
in part by the dramatic push for regulatory reform that gained traction during
the first Reagan administration.404 There was a decisive retreat from the earlier
technocratic ideal toward a more disciplined and constrained administrative law
400.
401.

See Hornstein, supra note 5.
See Graham & Wiener, supra note 20, at 33 (discussing challenges of comparing certain
kinds of risks, but noting that “it is chiefly our lack of methods of comparison—of ways of seeing
commonality among these risks—that makes these risks seem ‘dissimilar’ or noncomparable, not an
inherent incommensurability”); William Boyd, Ways of Seeing in Environmental Law: How
Deforestation Became an Object of Climate Governance, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 843, 911–15 (2010)
(discussing role of various technologies of equivalence, including risk assessment and cost-benefit
analysis, in environmental law).
402. See, e.g., LOWRANCE, supra note 15; Hornstein, supra note 5.
403. See, e.g., NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 2 (proposing formal framework of risk
assessment and risk management).
404. See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY xiv–xv (1991) (discussing regulatory reform movement of
the early 1980s); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and
Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 191 (1980) (discussing push for more
“efficient” regulation through use of tools such as cost-benefit analysis as part of broader regulatory
reform movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s); James P. Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in
Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 86, 87–88 (1980) (discussing push
for quantitative risk assessment by regulatory reform advocates as an essential input for cost benefit
analysis).
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of risk elaborated through judicial decisions, a series of Executive Orders, more
pervasive involvement of the Office of Management and Budget, and ever
more detailed guidelines that sought to establish a systematic approach to
default assumptions and inference choice in the practice of risk assessment for
cancer and various other endpoints.405
In many respects, this new way of thinking received its biggest boost from
the Supreme Court in its 1980 decision Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO
v. American Petroleum Institute—known to virtually all students of U.S.
environmental law as the Benzene decision.406 In rejecting OSHA’s proposed
benzene standard, which had been developed in a manner consistent with the
agency’s generic cancer policy, a plurality of the Supreme Court imposed a
new threshold requirement that OSHA make a finding of “significant risk”
before establishing any such standard.407 Benzene thus marked a dramatic
break with the past, bringing an end to OSHA’s efforts to develop a generic
cancer policy that would allow the agency to move quickly on suspected
carcinogens, and providing a strong endorsement, if not a mandate, that
agencies involved in health, safety, and environmental regulation base their
decisions to regulate on findings of significant risk.408 Despite the plurality’s
statements that such findings did not have to proceed in any particular
manner—that the determination of significant risk was “not a mathematical
straightjacket”409—most observers took the case to require some form of
quantitative risk assessment in order to justify regulation.410 This was a very
different posture than that endorsed by those favoring a more precautionary
approach.

405. See, e.g., Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993)
(establishing principles for regulation, including risk assessment, impact analysis, and cost-benefit
analysis); Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (Sept. 24, 1986) (setting
forth principles and procedures to guide EPA personnel in the conduct of carcinogen risk assessments);
Guidelines for Mutagenicity Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,006 (Sept. 24 1986) (setting forth
principles and procedures to guide EPA personnel in the conduct of risk assessments for mutagens);
Guidelines for the Health Risk Assessment of Chemical Mixtures, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,014 (Sept. 24, 1986)
(setting forth principles and procedures to guide EPA personnel in the conduct of risk assessments for
chemical mixtures). See also Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of
the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1991) (discussing White
House review of EPA programs); Shelia Jasanoff, Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise
at EPA, 7 OSIRIS 194, 203-17 (1992) (discussing EPA’s effort to develop “principles” to guide its risk
assessment efforts and, during the 1980s, its increasing reliance of satellite scientific bodies for expertise
and peer review).
406. Indus. Union Dep’t., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980); see
also Thomas O. McGarity, The Story of the Benzene Case: Judicially Imposed Regulatory Reform
through Risk Assessment, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES (Lazarus & Houck eds., 2005).
407. Benzene, 448 U.S. 607, 653; see also McGarity, supra note 406, at 154–56.
408. See McGarity, supra note 406.
409. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 655.
410. Id.; see also McGarity, supra note 406 (describing Benzene as “a critical inflection point in
the historical flow of U.S. environmental law”).
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In repudiating OSHA’s efforts to develop a generic cancer policy, the
Benzene plurality thus signaled the end of the Delaney era. Although it would
take well into the 1990s to fully complete this, Benzene made it clear that the
robust view of precaution in the face of uncertainty advanced during the early
to mid-1970s was no longer viable. As the plurality opinion pointed out, safety
could no longer be defined as “risk free.”411 It was time to grow up and face the
reality of a world that would never be rid of environmental harms and take on
the tough choices of how best to allocate scare regulatory resources. By
enshrining a new threshold requirement of “significant risk,” the decision
unleashed efforts across the regulatory state to complete the transformation of
health, safety, and environmental decision making into a formal, quantitative
exercise.
These developments, which cannot be treated in any detail in this Article,
seemed to go well beyond the hard look that Judges Leventhal, Bazelon, and
others had been developing in some of the early environmental cases.412 As
such, they represented a triumph through administrative law of a particular
view of knowledge (and the possibility of such knowledge), marking a
definitive end to the New Deal-inspired approach to health, safety, and
environmental regulation that put faith in expert regulators, placed a premium
on the exercise of pragmatic judgment, and sought to develop relatively simple
approaches to uncertainty. Henceforth, the political environment would turn
increasingly hostile to regulation. Regulatory reform became the new mantra
for those seeking to rein in wayward agencies and bring an increasingly
fashionable economic discipline to the enterprise.413 As a tool for bringing the
future into the present and making it calculable, risk had come to govern much
of the future of health, safety, and environmental law. In the process, the
uncertainty that had been so prominent in prior years was increasingly pushed
to the margins.
Indeed, despite the constant call for more attention to uncertainty in
virtually every official statement on risk assessment since the early 1980s, the
response has almost always been directed at ways of measuring and managing
uncertainty; that is, of making it look more like risk.414 This triumph of risk

Benzene, 448 U.S. at 642 (“The word ‘safe’ does not mean ‘risk free’.”).
See, e.g., EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, J.); EDF v.
EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J.); see also Daniel R. Ernst, Law and the State,
1920-2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 26 (Grossberg and Tomlins eds., 2008)
(discussing the rise of “hard look” review in the 1970s and the debate between Judge Bazelon and Judge
Leventhal on procedural versus substantive hard look review—a debate that was resolved with the
Supreme Court’s 1978 Vermont Yankee decision that rejected Judge Bazelon’s procedural approach in
favor of Judge Leventhal’s substantive hard look).
413. See Ernst, supra note 412, at 27 (“The early 1970s would prove to be the high-water mark of
the federal administrative state in the twentieth century. Thereafter the regulatory environment turned
increasingly hostile.”).
414. See, e.g., NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 2; NRC, SCIENCE & JUDGMENT IN RISK
ASSESSMENT (1994); NRC, SCIENCE & DECISIONS, supra note 3.

411.
412.
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over uncertainty reflected broader trends in post-World War II economics and
social science, manifest in the rise of formal decision theory, the influence of
operations research on organization thinking, and the incorporation of risk into
the framework of expected utility.415 In a world where formal, quantitative
models were fast becoming the standard for rigorous, objective knowledge,
uncertainty had no real place.416 For environmental law, the move from
uncertainty to risk represented a departure from a more situated, pragmatic
approach to regulation to one dominated by expert systems and premised on
calculability and control.417 “Regulating from nowhere,” to use Douglas
Kysar’s evocative phrase, became the technocratic ideal.418
Thus, except for some vestigial echoes in existing statutes and the use of
conservative assumptions in various steps of the risk assessment process, the
world in which endangerment and precaution were plausible alternatives to risk
seemed to have passed by the 1990s. Risk could no longer be differentiated
from the institutions and the practices that administered its intellectual and
material deployment. Disenchantment had been relentlessly set in motion and
the limits of earlier precautionary stances became an accepted fact for much of
mainstream environmental law.
Or so it seemed. Since the 1990s, attention to the limits of risk assessment
and the importance of uncertainty has moved back from the margins to the
center of established thinking about risk. As a recent 2009 National Academy
of Sciences study put it, “the regulatory risk assessment process is bogged
down,” facing substantial challenges in its ability to deliver useful, credible
knowledge for regulators even while it confronted an increasingly complex and
unpredictable world of environmental harms.419 “Uncertainty,” according to
the study, “continues to lead to multiple interpretations and contribute to
decision making gridlock.”420 Thus, major risk assessment exercises for
formaldehyde, trichloroethyelene, and dioxin have been going on for decades,
with many thousands of additional chemicals waiting in the queue.421 In the

415. See Pat O’Malley, Uncertain Subjects: Risks, Liberalism, and Contract, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y
460, 462–66 (discussing move from uncertainty to risk in modern economics); Geoffrey Hodgson, The
Eclipse of the Uncertainty Concept in Mainstream Economics, 45 J. ECON. ISSUES 159 (2011)
(discussing displacement of uncertainty by risk in mainstream economics as result of increasing
formalization of the discipline in post-World War II period); Hornstein, supra note 5 (discussing role of
expected utility in providing theoretical basis for comparative risk assessment).
416. See Hodgson, supra note 415.
417. See Jasanoff, Songlines of Risk, supra note 6, at 144-45 (discussing impacts of quantitative
risk assessment and other “reductive techniques” on broader understandings of uncertainty).
418. See KYSAR, supra note 5.
419. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 3, at ix (“[R]isk assessment is at a crossroads.
Despite advances in the field, it faces a number of substantial challenges, including long delays in
completing complex risk assessments, some of which take decades to complete; lack of data, which
leads to important uncertainty in risk assessments; and the need for risk assessment of many unevaluated
chemicals in the marketplace and emerging agents.”).
420. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 4.
421. Id. at 3–4, 17.

982

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 39:895

case of the dioxin risk reassessment, although multiple extrapolation models
appear to fit the data equally well, they generate risk estimates that vary by
three orders of magnitude.422 More fundamentally, the entire exercise of
determining whether the risk of exposure to a particular carcinogen is
“significant”—that it exceeds the one-in-one million threshold, to take the most
commonly accepted measure of significance—suggests the possibility of
precise quantification and relatively simple classification of risks despite the
fact that the threshold itself, as various commentators have observed, can be
calculated in an almost infinite number of ways depending, for example, on the
choice of animal studies, interpretation of tissue samples, animal-to-human
extrapolation methods, exposure data, and assumptions about exposure
pathways.423 And, of course, the practice of chemical risk assessment has only
just started to address the many non-cancer risks associated with industrial
chemicals such as endocrine system disruption, neurodevelopmental effects, the
complexities of multiple, cumulative exposures, the special sensitivities of
vulnerable populations, and so on. To say nothing of novel technologies such as
synthetic biology or nano-scale engineering or complex global problems such
as climate change.424
It is, of course, easy enough to criticize the shortcomings of risk
assessment, much harder to come up with an alternative. Given the momentum
embedded in risk thinking, there appear to be few if any viable alternatives
waiting in the wings ready to serve as a basis for collective decision making. It
is hard not to be impressed, moreover, by the sophisticated apparatus that we
have built to assess the risks of industrial society. And it would be folly to
suggest that objectivity, viewed less as some sort of end state than as an
epistemic virtue to be realized in practice, should be abandoned as an

422. See, e.g., Peter C. Wright et al., Twenty-Five Years of Dioxin Cancer Risk Assessment, 19
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 31, 35 (2005) (discussing range of cancer risk estimates for dioxin using
different standards and guidelines for extrapolation from same data).
423. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 113–19 (discussing uncertainty and variability
in various components of risk assessment); JOHN WARGO, OUR CHILDREN’S TOXIC LEGACY: HOW
SCIENCE AND LAW FAIL TO PROTECT US FROM PESTICIDES 111–12 (1996) (discussing “infinite number
of ways” that one in one million risk threshold could be calculated depending on choice of animal
studies, extrapolation models, exposure data, etc.).
424. The D.C. Circuit’s recent decision upholding EPA’s endangerment finding for greenhouse
gases and rejecting efforts by challengers to require a quantitative determination of the threshold at
which greenhouse gases endanger public health is instructive. Citing Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), and pointing to the substantial record of scientific evidence on the effects of
climate change, the court noted that EPA’s “failure to distill this ocean of evidence into a specific
number at which greenhouse gases cause ‘dangerous’ climate change is a function of the precautionary
thrust of the [Clean Air Act] and the multivariate and sometimes uncertain nature of climate science, not
a sign of arbitrary and capricious decision making.” Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684
F.3d 102, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2012). On nanotechnology, see David A. Dana, The Nanotechnology
Challenge, in THE NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE: CREATING LEGAL INSTITUTIONS FOR UNCERTAIN
RISKS 6–7 (David A. Dana ed., 2012) (arguing for “a more flexible, adaptive, and fluid model” for
regulating nanotechnology that avoids the problems of a strong precautionary model as well as those of
the more reactive, risk-based approach).
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organizing principle for thinking about hazards.425 As a distinctive form of
knowledge crucial to the rise of modern society, risk thinking migrated with
relative ease into new areas, offering a new, objective basis for health and
environmental decision making and lining up with deep-seated tendencies of
bureaucratic rationality. Part of its success as a modern abstract form of
knowledge—decontextualized, formally neutral, mobile—surely stemmed from
its efficacy in translating external hazards into the possibility of future loss, but
with an implicit commitment to the possibility of future gains as well.
But does this also mean that risk must be the basis for how we organize
health and environmental decision making; for how we make choices about the
environmental and human damage associated with our current economic order;
for how we deal with the prospect of continued degradation and disruption of
the biophysical conditions necessary to support life? Given the problems
confronting risk assessment and its notable deficiencies in the face of a rapidly
expanding and increasingly complex set of challenges, it seems important and
fair, even prudent, to take a critical look at what we have learned from the
experience and to ask whether the way forward is to double-down and push
harder or to step back and try to change course. In doing so, we would do well
to look back at some of the paths not taken and, in any event, to remember that
what ultimately matters is not the body count, the statistics, the trends, but the
contingent, singular genealogies of real people living real lives in real places
with their distinctive exposure histories and body burdens—their lives (our
lives) transformed in subtle and not so subtle ways by the industrial hazards
that impinge upon so many aspects of contemporary life, albeit in deeply
uneven ways, and by the manner in which those hazards and their effects are
subsumed within the standardized, abstract rubric of risk.
CONCLUSION
We live only by knowing something about the future; while the problems of
life, or of conduct at least, arise from the fact that we know so little.

—Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, Profit426
“Environmental law,” Judge Leventhal wrote in one of the early pesticide
cases, “marks out a domain where knowledge is hard to obtain and
appraise.”427 As much as any other area of law, the field has always faced
difficult challenges in acquiring knowledge of the specific problems that it
seeks to regulate and translating that knowledge into regulatory practice.
Operating at the “frontiers of scientific knowledge,” regulators have had to
develop frameworks and tools for making decisions in the context of significant
425. See LORRAINE DASTON AND PETER GALISON, OBJECTIVITY 39–42 (2007) (discussing
objectivity as an epistemic virtue in scientific inquiry).
426. KNIGHT, supra note 54, at 199.
427. EDF v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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uncertainty, even ignorance.428 This basic, irreducible fact of uncertainty was a
constant refrain in efforts to protect workers, public health, and food quality
during the middle decades of the twentieth century and it carried over into the
formative years of environmental law during the early to mid-1970s. As Judge
Wright observed in the famous Ethyl Corp. case, “Questions concerning the
environment are particularly prone to uncertainty. Technological man has
altered his world in ways never before experienced or anticipated. The health
effects of such alterations are often unknown, sometimes unknowable.”429
Not surprisingly, many of the early environmental statutes put the problem
of knowledge at the center of their regulatory regimes, seeking ways to force
the generation of new information about the problems at issue, embracing
particular regulatory triggers and standards that reflected certain assumptions
about the state of knowledge regarding those problems, and requiring margins
of safety as a way of dealing with uncertainty.430 To be sure, much of this
proved to be inadequate, perhaps even naïve, when faced with the true
challenges of securing environmental knowledge. But the premise was sound,
and the enterprise itself was folded into a flexible, pragmatic approach to using
knowledge, however incomplete, to get on with the hard work of environmental
regulation.
As this Article has demonstrated, these efforts drew on a longer history
stretching back to the middle decades of the twentieth century and before—one
that saw similar challenges confronting efforts to operationalize safety in the
context of public health, industrial hygiene, and food safety. In each of these
areas, moreover, efforts to regulate were often marked by a healthy respect for
uncertainty and a view that knowledge of particular hazards was provisional,
contingent, and always incomplete. Without question, there were plenty of
examples of grossly inadequate legislative and regulatory responses to the
proliferating hazards of industrial society, but there were also strong
428. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 71–72 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (“Where a statute is precautionary in
nature, the evidence difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to protect public health, and the decision that of an expert
administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect. Such proof may be
impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of the statute is to be served.”).
429. Ethyl Corp. 541 F.2d at 61.
430. Examples include the environmental assessment and impact statement provisions of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006); the provisions regarding criteria
documents and review and revision of the NAAAQS under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7409
(2006); the various margin of safety requirements in the Clean Air, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(b)(1), 7412(d)(4)
(2006), and Clean Water, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(d)(1)(A), 1317(a)(4) (2006) Acts; testing and data
requirements for pesticide registration under FIFIRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a to a-1 (2006); the testing, premanufacturing notices, and new use requirements under TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603–2604, 2608–2609
(2006). The Senate Commerce Committee Report on one of the early versions of TSCA, made the point
explicit: “It is the object of this legislation to provide knowledge of those [potential health and
environmental problems associated with new chemicals] before the substance is introduced into the
environment, rather than at some later date as is all too frequently the case now.” U.S. S. COMMERCE
COMM., REPORT ON TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT OF 1972, S. DOC. NO. 1478 (1976).
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precautionary impulses that sometimes found their way into actual law. Thus,
one can draw a direct line from the pioneering work of Alice Hamilton and
Wilhelm Hueper in industrial hygiene through the Delaney Clause, EPA’s early
pesticide cancellations, the precautionary thrust of the Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts, the rulings of the D.C. Circuit and other appellate courts in many
of the early environmental cases, and OSHA’s quest for a generic cancer
policy, among others. What all of these efforts shared was an underlying theory
or approach to knowledge marked by humility and a faith in the exercise of
human judgment.431
By the second half of the 1970s, this ideal was fading fast, giving way to a
different theory of knowledge, one that drew on trends that had also been
underway for decades and one premised on a more muscular, confident view
that environmental hazards could, and should, be subjected to quantitative risk
assessment. In some respects, this shift comported with efforts by certain
segments of industry to push for more rigor in environmental decision making
as a means of slowing down and contesting the regulatory process as well as
with the growing enthusiasm for the concepts and tools of welfare economics.
But it also stemmed from a conviction that quantitative risk assessment
provided the most defensible approach to dealing with a much more
complicated world that had been brought into view by the revolution in
analytical techniques that occurred during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Quantitative risk assessment, like cost-benefit analysis and other efforts to
render decision making more technical and quantitative, offered a key
“technology of distance” for regulators seeking to insulate their decisions from
the increasingly rough push-and-pull of politics.432 One suspects (and this is
largely speculation) that at least some of those who experienced the transition
were sympathetic to the earlier technocratic ideal; that they perhaps recognized
the continuing merits of a less constrained, more pragmatic approach to
regulating risk. Maybe. But it would also be a mistake, it seems, not to
acknowledge how difficult it would be to maintain the earlier approach in the
face of a much more complex set of hazards and a growing culture of

431. Cf. Shelia Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing Science, 41
MINERVA 223, 227 (2003) (arguing for the adoption of “technologies of humility,” which she
characterizes as “methods, or better yet, institutionalized habits of thought, that try to come to grips with
the ragged fringes of human understanding—the unknown, the uncertain, the ambiguous, and the
uncontrollable”).
432. See PORTER, supra note 51, at ix (discussing role of quantification as a “technology of
distance” that minimizes the need for “intimate knowledge and personal trust” and is “well suited for
communication that goes beyond the boundaries of locality and community”); see also Lazarus, supra
note 36, at 87–91 (discussing significant and growing distrust of EPA by multiple constituencies during
1970s); Shelia Jasanoff, Acceptable Evidence in a Pluralistic Society, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE:
SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 43–44 (Mayo & Hollander eds., 1991) (“In the United
States, then, the use of quantitative risk analysis can be seen as a response to the exceptionally exposed
position in which regulatory agencies are placed.”).
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adversarialism and distrust.433 How many Skelly Wrights can one expect to
have in any single generation?
Depending on one’s normative leanings, one might view this transition to
hard-path risk assessment as progress—a triumph of utilitarian thinking in
forging a coherent basis for regulating harms in a world of limited resources
through a more accountable and rigorous exercise in administrative law; or as
tragedy—a deathblow to the strong precautionary impulse that animated early
U.S. environmental law through a less overt but more fundamental form of
regulatory capture. As noted, that debate is well rehearsed and vitally important
to the future of environmental law, but it has not been my primary concern.
This Article has focused more on understanding the conditions of possibility
for different ways of thinking about safety, hazard, and risk and how they got
incorporated into efforts to organize and mobilize the institutional capacities of
the administrative state to govern the hazards of industrial society.
One of the defining features of this transition, as noted earlier, was the
displacement of incalculable uncertainty by calculable risk—a shift that
paralleled in some respects a similar transition in economics and other fields
during the middle decades of the twentieth century.434 In looking back at this
aspect of this long and complicated history, however, it seems that the simple
Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty may not be as useful as
some suggest.435 In health, safety, and environmental law, the move to
quantitative risk assessment was underwritten largely by a set of techniques
that allowed scientists and regulators to go beyond experience; that is, the
various extrapolative techniques that were deployed to understand potential
hazards and the risk estimates that resulted could hardly be considered the kind
of actuarial risk that Knight and others were thinking about.436 Perhaps then it
would be better to focus on the range of calculative practices that are being
deployed to govern the future in these areas, and the nature and limits of
specific knowledge claims entailed by these practices. In doing so, we would
do well to recall Max Weber’s admonition that even if we can, in principle,

433. See Lazarus, supra note 36, at 87 (“The legal area of environmental protection came to be
dominated by unkept promises and the promotion of a culture within that area dominated by
adversarialism, polarization, and distrust.”).
434. See Hodgson, supra note 415; see also JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW
CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 321–22 (1998) (“The
intellectual ‘career’ of risk and uncertainty is indicative of many fields of inquiry in which the realm of
analysis was reformulated and narrowed to exclude elements that could not be quantified and measured
but could only be judged.”).
435. Cf. Posner, supra note 54; Sunstein, supra note 54.
436. FDA made this point explicitly in 1986. See Listing of D&C Orange No. 17 for Use in
Externally Applied Drugs and Cosmetics, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,331, 28,344 (Aug. 7, 1986) (noting that the
risk assessment it had performed did not generate “an actuarial risk. An actuarial risk is the risk
determined by the actual incidence of an event. In contrast, the computed risk is a projection based on
certain conservative assumptions that do not understate risk.”).
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master all things by calculation, this tells us nothing at all about “whether it
ultimately makes sense to do so.”437

437.

Weber, supra note 1, at 144.

We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online
companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@boalt.org.
Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq.
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